

バングラデシュ国における参加型予算と開発政策 -市民と地方政府に関する実証的研究-

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**Participatory Budgeting and Development Policy in Bangladesh:
Empirical Study on Citizens and Local Governments**

Global Governance

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Abstract

Among the numerous processes of citizen participation, Participatory Budgeting (PB hereafter) is the most emerging process that directly links citizens to decision-making on the public money allocation with the partnership between and among the actors of local government. Hence, this dissertation aims to examine behavior of actors influencing effectiveness of citizen participation process in PB and local government's characteristics contributing to the outputs of PB. This dissertation uses the participatory governance approach and the rational choice institutionalism theory in order to examine the behavior of actors, such as elected representatives, local government officials, and citizens. The results of the research are summarized as follows:

Firstly, (a) the overall degree of participation in PB is low; (b) on the other hand participation of lower educated people is higher, which means PB is expected to substantialized the bottom-up democracy by them; (c) the ratio of higher educated respondents who are interested in PB to whole is higher than that of the lower level educated ones; (d) the degree of the participation in open-budget session is remarkably higher than those of the other types of PB sessions; and (e) there is a positive relationship between citizen's knowledge and the degree of participation.

Secondly, there has been lack of willingness, proactiveness, and political commitment of the elected representatives in promoting PB as a whole. However, some of them have made use of PB process proactively got the political stability in the form of the higher voter approval rating and the longer terms gained by reelected. On the other hand, the local government officials do not have much desire to expand PB and they are not capable enough in facilitating PB.

Thirdly, the output of PB is significantly affected by the characteristics of the Union Parishad (UP hereafter). A UP with a larger size of area tends to handle a larger size of PB due to

their larger demand of infrastructural development. But at the same time, the amount of PB of a UP with a smaller size of population tends to increase remarkably because PB is thought to be closely related with the citizen's self-actualization. In that sense, is thought to be functioning as the competent interface between the citizens of compact society and the local governments. In addition to that amount of PB is growing in the UPs which have the needs of regional development: They are the urgent investment demands such as the extent of poverty, the needs of infrastructure building, and the urgent educational and cultural demands such as the extent of literacy rate.

In conclusion, firstly, the interlinked results hint that citizen are assumed to have the potential proactive attitude to more active participation to PB process. Secondly, the elected representatives who hand the proactive attitude of making use of PB process got their utilities, the political stability. The result of the research suggests that PB process is the interface between substantial development of demands and the citizen's bottom-up demands. Consequently, the Actor must use PB as a sustainable force for them when they consider the future development of their utilities.

Under these circumstances, the policy implications regarding the effective implementation of PB can be manifold as, more consideration to the higher educated citizens, the ward level meeting with a delegated authority, the strengthened capacity of the elected representatives.

Keywords: Local government, UP, PB, PB actor, citizen, elected representative, local government official, behavior, utility, output.

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Shaikh Mohammad Jobayed Hossain

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Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my parents **Jahura Khatun & Md. Shahed Ali** for their continuous and unconditional blessings.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADB	Asian Development Bank
ADP	Annual Development Program
ADR	Alternative Dispute Resolution
AFS	Annual Financial Statements (Annual Budget)
BBG	Basic Block Grants
BDT	Bangladesh Taka
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DC	Deputy Commissioner
EBG	Expanded Block Grant
FY	Fiscal Year
FYP	Five Year Plan
GOB	Government of Bangladesh
LG	Local Government
LGD	Local Government Division (of GOB)
LGI	Local Government Institution
LGSP	Local Governance Support Project
MGSP	Municipal Governance and Services Project
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
PB	Participatory Budgeting
RCI	Rational Choice Institutionalism (Theory)
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals.
SLGDFP	<i>Sirajganj</i> Local Governance Development Fund Project
SSC	Scheme Supervision Committee
TLCC	Town Level Coordination Committee
UDC	Union Development Committee
UN	United Nations
UN-Habitat	United Nations Human Settlement Program
UNCDF	United Nations Capital Development Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNO	<i>Upazilla Nirbahi</i> Officer (Chief Executive Officer of Sub-district)
UP	<i>Union Parishad</i> (Union Council)
VDP	Village Defense Party
WC	Ward Committee
WDC	Ward Development Committee (of <i>UP</i>)
WLCC	Ward Level Coordination Committee

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Background

Over the past decades, citizen participation has become one of the important aspects of local level decision-making across the world including Bangladesh. Direct participation by citizen in local level planning and budgeting has been getting rapid popularity (Gaventa & Valderrama, 1999) since the 1990s. Therefore, citizen participation has become an essential part of modern government (Cornwall, 2008), not only for legitimacy (Abels, 2007) to elected council members of local government but also for transparency and accountability (Ackerman, 2004; Fung, 2007). Citizen participation offers new way of thinking for development (Cornwall, 2008) that contributes to the good governance (Waheduzzaman, 2010) by making government more responsive, efficient and effective (UN, 2015)¹. But all these depend on who participates, for what they participate and what outcomes of their participation has on the decisions, policies and programs (Skidmore & Bound, 2008). Many authors argue that participation not only promotes individual capacity but also fosters societal changes by collective effort of understanding the common interests (Bachrach, 1975; Barbar, 1984; Graham, 1986; Warren, 2002).

There are numerous mechanisms of engaging citizens into policy decision-making of local government. Among those participatory budgeting (referred to as PB hereafter) is the most emerging mechanism that links people more directly to public policy decision-making (Khan, 2005) by establishing partnership between citizens and the local government (Guthrie, 2003). PB offers citizens an opportunity to empower them and to deliberate, debate, and influence the allocation of public resources. Although PB is a budgetary process, basically it is a tool for good

¹ World Public Sector Report 2015 published by UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs.

local governance that is about empowering citizens (Abers, 2000; Shah, 2007) by building their capacity of raising demands through the ‘learning by doing’ environment (Allegretti & Copello, 2018). Some scholars exaggeratedly demarcated PB as a ‘citizenship schools’ (Wampler, 2000) and or ‘school of democracy’ (Talpin, 2011) and designated PB as a wider paradigm shift to governance in collective decision-making (Wampler, 2000). In this viewpoint, it can be argued that among other participatory mechanisms, PB is a platform for citizens that has all norms of effective participation.

PB stands out not only one of the most important experiments in participatory democracy, but also represents a distinct effort to institutional transformation of state-civil society relations in recent times (Baiocchi et al., 2011). That is why, PB has been advanced by budget practitioners and academics as an important tool for inclusive and accountable governance as it influence government policies (Shah, 2007). Among other goals of PB, increasing accountability and transparency is important (Gordon et al., 2017). So, PB becomes one of the most exciting innovations in development of local democracy (Moynihan, 2007; Röcke, 2014; Sintomer et al., 2010; Sintomer et al., 2013; Smith, 2009; Wampler, 2007) as it gives citizens direct voice in spending, gives elected officials more accurate information about citizens’ preferences, and gives government officials more complete information about public needs and priorities (Gilman, 2016).

Pioneered in Latin American cities in 1989, PB has been adopted by many local governments across the globe by copies, emulations, syntheses and hybrids although many abandonments have been evident (de Oliveira, 2017) by this time. Since its inception, the diffusion process has been continuing from Brazilian City of Porto Alegre to currently more than 7,000 cities and local governments around the world.² Like many other countries, the wave of PB also reached to

² Source: <https://www.participatorybudgeting.org>. Accessed on 9th June 2021.

Bangladesh in early 2000s. PB was introduced first at Union Parishads (UP henceforth), the first tier of rural local governments (Uddin, 2019). Later PB was declared as a mandatory practice for local governments after enacting laws in 2009³ not only for UPs but also for Pourashavas (municipalities), the first tier of urban local government. The local government planning and budgeting were not evidently participatory in Bangladesh before introducing PB. So, PB has become an emergence for local level participatory decision-making in Bangladesh.

PB was evolved in July 2000 in Bangladesh with implementation of some pilot projects in the selected UPs of northern district Sirajganj by the Local Government Division.⁴ These pioneer donor-driven projects were implemented with the financial and technical support of UNDP and UNCDF. And these PB projects were facilitated by the NGOs in collaboration with the UPs. At the beginning, PB was a one-shot event limited only in a UP-wide open-budget session. The budget was prepared by the officials and only was declared in the open-budget session to inform citizens for their endorsement, but not to get feedback. In the immediate years in 2003 and 2004, PB was also practiced in selected UPs of other districts, such as Satkhira, Jamalpur and Gaibandha. These PB projects were also facilitated by the NGOs with the partnership of UPs. These piecemeal-basis PB practices were continued until 2009, although those had limitations and gaps in terms of citizen engagement mechanisms, undefined role of citizens, unspontaneousness of citizens and crisis of sustainability (Hossain, 2011). Despite limitations, PB practices resulted some positive impacts in context of participatory community culture, accountability and transparency. Considering such impacts, government vowed to make PB mandatory by law with incorporating specific mechanisms. Consequently, the Local Government (UP) Act was enacted in 2009. At present,

³ The Local Government (Union Parishad) Act 2009 and Local Government (Pourashava) Act 2009.

⁴ A Division of the Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives.

major PB processes in Bangladesh are prioritization of projects at ward meeting and a wider discussion of those in open-budget session.⁵

Around the decade of 2000, beyond Latin Americas, many Asian countries also started to implement PB. Among others, India, South Korea, Indonesia, China have some better experiences of successful PB implementation (Sintomer et al., 2010). The first Asian PB took shape in the city of Kerala, India in 1996 with 40.0% PB budget. The major steps of PB process were organizing large local assembly (village meeting), drafting of project proposals, approval of projects and participatory implementation and monitoring. Korean PB cases were more enthusiastic as it was marked as the ‘Porto Alegre in the Far East’. PB was started in 2004 in Buk-gu district of Gwangju Metropolitan City after the issuance of guidelines by the Ministry of Government and Home Affairs in 2003 on that time. During subsequent year in 2005, Dong-ku district of Ulsan started PB under the title of ‘citizen participatory budgeting’. This Porto Alegre style PB had three major rounds: regional level meetings for preparing draft proposals, PB council for consolidating proposals, and budget decision-making round for thematic discussion, scrutinization and adoption (Songmin, 2013). In Indonesia, NGO-driven PB was formally started in 2004 in Solo city (Feruglio & Rifai, 2017). Indonesian PB processes include community consensus building meeting, planning budgeting meeting, development of PB (Taylor & Rifai, 2020). But PB in Indonesia could not make mandatory for all local governments (Sintomer et al., 2010). China also started PB in 2004 in Zeguo Town of Wenling under Zhejiang province. The PB processes include making preferences by citizens and examining those proposals by the officials of the town (Hsu, 2009).

Among the mentioned PB cases of Asian countries, it seems that PB of South Korea could produce successful outcomes and has spread widely following the government mandate in 2011

⁵ The PB process and implementation are elaborately discussed in Section 2.5 of Chapter 2.

and 99% of local government units established their own PB ordinances by 2014.⁶ The PB processes of South Korea is a government-led approach that include interesting characteristics of bottom-up facilitation, and initiation through a top-down approach (No, 2018). Arguably, PB of South Korea has similarities with the PB of Bangladesh in terms of adopted processes of direct facilitation by the local government itself. Moreover, South Korean PB is a government-led initiative similar to the PB of Bangladesh. But it seems that PB of Bangladesh could not produce significant results as per expectation even after a decade of getting legal mandate and subsequent implementation. Consequently, PB has not been effective (Hossain, 2019; Morshed, 2007; Sarker 2003; Zafarullah & Huque, 2001).

1.2 Problem Statements

PB is an aspirational local participatory governance approach to improve local public governance as well as public services, which requires an institutional arrangement (Folscher, 2007), landscape (Escobar et al., 2018), and background (Fan, 2018). This emerging tool for engaging citizens to public policy process (Lieberherr, 2003; Shah, 2007) is practiced by the local government institutions under the specific institutional rules and norms (Wampler et al., 2018). PB itself is a political institution (Goldfrank & Schneider, 2006), in which political leaders (elected representatives) strategically introduce it to serve multiple ends, including gaining electoral support, weakening opponents, and fulfilling ideological commitments. Outputs and outcomes of PB depend not only on the designers' (elected representatives) intentions and local contexts but also on the intentions and strategies of other actors (Goldfrank, 2007), such as local government officials and citizens of its electoral jurisdiction. That means, PB is structured within the

⁶ PB was made mandatory by amending the Local Finance Act in 2011 in South Korea. Source: Ministry of Public Affairs and Security (MOPAS).

institutional framework where roles and behaviors of actors persuade development of PB practices. Some previous studies identified facts related to the functions of actors (Gordon et al., 2017; Hettings & Kugelberg, 2018; Moynihan, 2007; Wampler, 2000). But the lacuna of those literatures is that they stayed abstract and did not explicitly discuss how roles and behavioral aspects of each actor influence participatory process of PB with the empirical findings, and specifically PB of Bangladesh context. Therefore, it is significant to investigate how those facts concerning actors of PB influence participation processes and how those processes enhance to achieve the outputs of PB. Therefore, this research will try to make the empirical studies based on the data of the local government's budget-making process.

PB is normally a political decision initiated, facilitated, implemented and promoted by the local government institutions and their actors, such as elected representatives and officials. In this sense, PB is a top-down approach. On the other hand, PB is started by the citizens from the bottom of the community and gradually goes to upper organizational levels for strengthened decision-making. In that sense, PB is a bottom-up approach. In the grounding point of these two approaches, actors are used to engage to maximize their own utilities under the arrangements of an institutional umbrella of PB. Within this structural setup, to establish an effective PB mechanism, it is expected to play significant roles by the actors from the perspective of participatory governance. The role and behavior of actors include political commitment and willingness of elected representatives, supportive policies of local government officials, and a vibrant community that has interested and capacitated citizenry, specifically in case of PB of Bangladesh. How each actor is engaged in the PB processes of local governments of Bangladesh and how each actor behaves in maximizing own utility to contribute to produce outcomes, were not discussed by the previous studies, which is another lacuna of research on PB.

As identified by previous research, actors' roles and behaviors create values in terms of effective outcomes in participatory planning and development, specifically in local government level of Bangladesh (Rahman, 2008; Waheduzzaman, 2008; Waheduzzaman & Mphande, 2012) and PB actors likely to have specific capacities and skills of participation (McKenzie, 1981; Mohammadi, 2010; Waheduzzaman & Mphande, 2012). The role and behavior of citizens can enhance effective participation process that leads to generate desired outputs and outcomes together with the local political context and socio-economic conditions (Matovu, 2007). Except some fact finding by the previous studies, there is lacuna to investigate how different characteristics of local government, such as political, social and economic conditions affect the participatory processes of PB and accordingly affect to generate outputs and outcomes.⁷

In summary, following are seemed the problems of research:

- i) The empirical study has not been sufficient as to what the local government actors' roles are in the participatory process.
- ii) The empirical study has not been sufficient as to what affects the socio-economic characteristics of local governments have on outputs of PB.

By addressing the above-mentioned research problems, this dissertation aims to understand the frontline political and governmental operation concerning participatory budget system in local governments of Bangladesh.

⁷ Output and outcome of PB are defined in Section 3.5 of Chapter 3.

1.3 Research Objective and Research Questions

The objective of this research is to examine behavior and characteristic of each actor of local government influencing PB process and find out how the PB operation can be improved for effective development policy in Bangladesh. To meet up these objectives, this research adopts one main research question with two sub-questions as follows:

Research Question:

- How does each actor in local government make use of PB institution for own utility to contribute to effective implementation of development policy of Bangladesh?

Sub-questions:

1. How does behavior of each actor influence participation process of citizens in PB?
2. How do local governments utilize PB process to contribute to socio-economic development of UP?

Assumptions:

The following assumptions are outlined to answer the research questions of this dissertation:

Assumption 1:

Citizen's awareness, interest and capacity have influence on their participation process in PB.

Assumption 2:

The proactiveness of the actors of local government affects the process of PB.

Assumption 3:

Different characteristics of UP affect PB process and outputs.

1.4 Research Methodology and Data Collection

This dissertation is to discuss how each actor, such as elected representatives, local government officials, and the citizens make use of PB process for own utility based on assumption 1 and 2. Among the three actors, this dissertation focuses on citizens, who are also the main ingredients of participation and PB, and behaviors of other actors could not cover by the survey enough. To examine citizens' behavior as well as other two actors' usage of PB process, this study adopts mixed method approach of research to obtain comprehensive understanding of phenomenon under investigation by integrating of quantitative and qualitative data (Leavy, 2017) collected from the local government UPs and Pourashavas of Bangladesh. Moreover, combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches provides a more complete understanding of a research problem than either approach alone (Berg, 2007; Creswell, 2014; Davies, 2007). This study adopts the quantitative approaches of survey and secondary data, and the qualitative approaches of interviews, field visits, observation of PB activities.⁸

The main instruments for collection of quantitative data are questionnaire survey with the general citizens of selected study areas to understand their attitude, behavior and perception on PB and its process in general. For collecting qualitative data face-to-face qualitative interviews (Interview 1) were done with the elected representatives and officials of selected UPs and Pourashavas to know about their role in implementation of PB.

Key informants' Interviews (KII) (Interview 2 hereafter) was done with the policy level government bureaucrats and field level officials concerned with the local government policy formulation and implementation respectively to know their ideologies and approaches towards the PB policy. Interview 2 also was done with the NGO representatives those are working in the field

⁸ The detail of the research design is discussed in Section 4.2 of Chapter 4.

level and had experiences on the facilitation of PB to obtain more independent opinions. Academics were interviewed to know more about gaps between theories and practices. Moreover, other qualitative approaches, such as non-participant observations were done during field work and field notes were taken accordingly. Existing data (archival documents, statistical data, etc.) were also collected to analyze where appropriate.⁹

1.5 Definitions of Key Concepts

1.5.1 Citizen Participation

‘Citizen participation’ generally refers to citizen involvement in public decision-making (Baum, 2001).¹⁰ Citizen participation is frequently characterized as an inevitable outcome of a logical movement from insulated-bureaucratic modes of governance to more open, transparent, and participatory approaches (Moynihan, 2007). Through participation in government decision-making, general people get scope to contribute to public policy decision, which is a new form of consultation, mobilization and inclusion (Gaventa & Valderrama, 1999). Involving citizens in policymaking and implementation contributes to more effective achievements of policy goals (Goulet, 1989) by creating sense of ownership to citizens (Abers, 2000) that leads to continuation of their involvement as well as sustainability. Participation is one of the main elements of good governance (UNESCAP, 2008) that empowers state and society mutually (Roberts, 1998). So, participation produces a more democratic government, more responsible and engaged citizens and more efficient and effective programs and policies, which are mutually inclusive (Goetz & Gaventa, 2001). Citizen participation takes place within the boundaries and limits of institutional

⁹ The detail contents of data collection are outlined in Section 4.4 of Chapter 4.

¹⁰ Citizen participation also refers to public/civic participation, citizen/civic engagement, citizen involvement, community participation etc.

frameworks and structures and can only be effective if it engages with institutional change. Hence, the flip side of equation is how to strengthen accountability and responsiveness of these institutions and policies through changes in institutional design, and a focus on the enabling structures for good governance (Gaventa & Valderrama, 1999).

Although participation results better governance, there are criticisms as many scholars argues of problems within the process of participation. For example, Abers (2000) mentions that even when policy makers intend to create public forums giving real decision-making, obstacles often prevent participatory policies from empowering the citizens and especially the poor. Similarly, other scholar opines that increased participation may further entrenches existing patterns of political and social inequality instead of desired effect of increasing voice of poor and marginalized (Schonwalder, 1997). However, such arguments do not limit the actual potentiality of participation in terms of enhancing public governance and deepening democracy (Fung & Wrights, 2003) at the local level.

In this context, nullifying such criticisms, participation of citizens in local governance has become more significant as the local government institutions are to serve citizens directly at the grassroots level. It is better to engage citizens in local government policy decision rather to national, because effective participation can be persuaded in a small political institution. Blair (2000) argues that through participation local government will become more responsive to citizens' demands and more effective in service delivery. Similarly, Beetham (1996) asserts that local governance has potential to democratize, because of its capacity of responsiveness with ensured decentralization and devolution. However, Oyugi (2000) mentions that genuine devolution of power to the local level has been rare. But there are demands of democratic local governance with meaningful authority that are accessible and accountable to local citizenry, who enjoy full political rights (Blair,

2000). In this context, Fung and Wright (2003) suggest that rules and mechanisms for direct engagement need to be established, for new relationships of trust and cooperation, particularly to include the sectors of society, which have historically been denied access to public policy realm.

From above discussion on the scope of participation and simultaneously considering the context of Bangladesh local government, citizen participation is meant in this dissertation as “direct engagement of local citizens in policy decision-making process of local government planning and budgeting in establishing better governance for socio-economic development at the local level”.

1.5.2 Participatory Budgeting

The existing conceptual discussions of different literature have distinguished PB¹¹ as a pragmatic idea in the realm of direct democracy.¹² De Sousa Santos (1998) a pioneer PB researcher argues that it is an urban experiment aimed at redistributing city resources in favor of more vulnerable social groups. Another pioneer PB researcher Wampler (2000) highlights PB as an innovative year-round policy-making process, to allocate resources, prioritize social policies, and monitor public spending avoiding social and political exclusion. He designates PB as the ‘citizenship school’ where participation empowers citizens to learn and to be aware of their rights. Since its inception at the city of Porto Alegre in Brazil, PB has been heralded as a crucial democratic innovation that results more fruitful relationship between citizens and local government authorities (Peruzzotti, 2002). At the same time, Abers (2000) thinks that PB helps to open new venues of social movement, while Hall (2005) describes PB as a mechanism, which brings local communities

¹¹ PB is also refers to citizen participatory budgeting, community budgeting, people’s budget initiative etc.

¹² Direct democracy or pure democracy is a form of democracy in which people decide on policy initiatives directly. This differs from the majority of most currently established democracies, e.g., representative democracies.

closer to decision-making on public budget, while it makes connections between citizens, elected representatives and local government officials. It is not only about the voice of people but also about the real power to decide over the spending of their tax money.

There is a broad consensus among the analysts in recognizing success of PB and stressing its positive effects for redistribution of resources to poor neighborhoods, improved public services, and budget transparency (Abers, 2000; Baiocchi, 2001), because participatory mechanisms are considered as the counterweight against corruption and clientelism (Chalmers et al., 1997). Jacobi (1999) sees PB as a new mechanism of resource allocation that promotes decentralization and increases public control over the budgetary investment policies. Similarly, Zamboni (2007) thinks that PB is a further way of decentralization of transferring responsibilities from central to local as well as transferring of decision-making powers from public administrators to public.

Although PB is an important step toward political inclusion and social justice, by no means it is a magic bullet (Wampler, 2007). At the same time, there are risks to be manipulative due to pseudo participation and undemocratic, non-inclusive or elite nature of decision-making (Shah, 2007). Effectiveness of PB depends on many aspects such as political, economic and social context, functional local government body and citizens who are deeply aware of the matter of participation. Around the world, many PBs have been abandoned not for their ineffectiveness but for the lack of proactiveness and willingness of local government leaders.¹³ However, even some closures, number of PB practices are still increasing as many local governments are newly adopting PB around the world. PB is also broadly practiced, shaped, and devised by the local governments of

¹³ Although there is no specific difference between the words 'commitment' and 'willingness' this study considers two words as one terminology meaning same as each other. These two words also refer to 'proactiveness' in case of elected representatives.

Bangladesh, anticipating the effective distribution of scarce resources and avoiding misuses for inclusive socio-economic development.

Therefore, considering the mentioned issues and keeping in mind the scope of this research, PB is defined in this dissertation as “a process of local governance where different actors participates from their own interests and maximizes the outcomes for social and economic development of local constituency”.

1.6 Significance of the Research

Unlike the research and academic scholarships on the PB of many other countries, PB of Bangladesh has remained under-researched, specifically from the perspective of actors' role and behavior of PB institution. Thus, this research attempts to explore roles and behaviors of PB actors of local governments of Bangladesh under the theoretical framework of participatory governance and rational choice institutionalism. The significance of this research could be described in several ways. *Firstly*, this study investigates the concerns of citizens, because these are the central considerable issues of PB process, those work as the ingredients for implementing PB. *Secondly*, this study empirically investigates the perception and behavior of PB actors as well as how they use PB in maximizing their utilities, because behaviors of actors play significant role in effective participation of citizens in the process of PB. *Thirdly*, this study explores the institutional structural matters, such as political, economic and social characteristics of local governments and examined their effect in yielding outcomes of PB. Because PB is not merely a budgetary practice, but mostly a governance process that requires political commitment, financial strength and social structure for effective implementation in contributing socio-economic development.

As mentioned above, this study will fulfil the research gaps in perspective of actors' roles and behaviors around the institutional setting and in perspective of participatory governance. The findings of this study will benefit the policy makers for reshaping the existing PB policies. The research outcomes will scholarly contribute knowledge in the academic discourse of PB in specific and citizen participation in general. At the same time, as PB is a practical tool in effective engagement of citizens in the budgetary policy matter, the research implications can be way forward for practical implementation of PB in redefined and redesigned way of existing processes.

1.7 Dissertation Outline

This dissertation is organized into seven chapters. The outline of each chapter is given below:

Chapter 1 outlines previous research on the significance of PB in numerous decision-making processes involving citizen participation and the history of the global diffusion of PB. It also provides an overview of the future establishment of PB in Bangladesh.

Chapter 2 highlights PB in the context of Bangladesh local government. A situation analysis of the current implementation status of PB of UP and Pourashava are presented. The research issues are identified in this chapter.

Chapter 3 outlines the conceptual framework of this dissertation. It overviews the concepts and the situation of PB. Under the theory of rational choice institutionalism, it focuses on local government actors, such as elected representatives, local government officials and citizens under the theory of rational choice institutionalism. They are attempting to maximize the utility of their own interests, which results in PB outputs; the adoption of specific projects and an increased budget under PB.

Chapter 4 discusses the research design and strategy and justifies the adoption of mixed methodology. The primary data collection instruments include surveys, interviews and secondary data are collected from different sources. The survey included general citizens, and the interviews were conducted with local government officials, elected representatives, government policy personnel, academics and civil society representatives.

Chapter 5 discusses actors' influence on the PB process. It presents the results of a quantitative survey's empirical evidence. It focuses on citizens' awareness, interest, and capacity and the proactiveness of local government actors. It analyzes both quantitative and qualitative data and information extracted from surveys, interviews, and practical observations.

Chapter 6 discusses the characteristics of UP in determining PB outputs. It presents empirical evidence-based findings, primarily from secondary data from the UP budget and other data of socio-economic indicators. In particular, the compact size of the population, urgent demands such as infrastructure investment, and educational and cultural services and discussed in this chapter. It leads to the discussion that PB is regarded as the competent interface between citizens and the local governments.

Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation. It focuses on the citizen's potential proactive attitude toward more active participation in the PB process and the elected representative's proactive attitude. This chapter also discusses policy implications, academic contributions, and limitations, as well as potential avenues for future research.

Chapter 2: Participatory Budgeting in Bangladesh

2.1 Introduction

The objective of this research is to examine behavior and characteristic of each actor of local government influencing PB process and find out how the PB operation can be improved for effective development policy in Bangladesh. To achieve this objective, it is significant to explore situation of citizen participation in PB including role and behavior of actors to identify the research issues. Hence, firstly, a general description on present local government system is featured at the beginning of this chapter. Secondly, the chapter focuses discussion on the present structure, functions, status of citizen participation and implementation of PB of UP in specific and Pourashava in general. Lastly, the chapter features research issues that are envisioned to be investigated by this research.

2.2 Local Government System of Bangladesh

The present local government system of Bangladesh (Figure 2.1) has been established after continuous reform efforts over the period of century, which has its roots in the British colonial period¹⁴ and passed through neocolonial Pakistan regime¹⁵ before arriving at the present structure (Panday, 2011). From the British time to present day, local governments have been playing crucial roles in delivering public services to citizens at their doorsteps. The present local government system has the constitutional roots because the Constitution of Bangladesh¹⁶ preserves the provision of elected representatives at all tiers of local government with delegated powers to


¹⁴ The British Colonial Period 1765-1947.

¹⁵ The Pakistan Period 1947-1971.

¹⁶ Constitution of Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh 1972.

prepare budgets, maintain funds, impose taxes, and implement plans for public services and local development. Moreover, the Constitution has created provisions for autonomous democratic local governments. Under its Article 59, it is mentioned that there must have elected local bodies at each of the administrative units. And Article 60 of the Constitution states that the Parliament¹⁷ shall, by law, confer powers on the local government bodies, including power to impose taxes for local purposes, to prepare their budgets, and maintain funds. By these provisions, local governments are allowed decentralized and autonomous authority.

Figure 2.1 Basic Local Government Structure of Bangladesh.



Note: Developed by Author based on the data and information collected from the Local Government Division, Government of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh as of June 2021.

¹⁷ Parliament of Bangladesh is called the Jatiyo Shangsad or House of the Nation.

Among the local government bodies, this research primarily limits its scope to study PB of UP from the rural type of local governments and secondarily PB of Pourashava (municipality) from the urban type of local governments. Because, firstly, PB is broadly practiced at the UPs and also limitedly in Pourashavas. Secondly, these two are the lowest tiers in rural and urban settings of local government system respectively. Both types of local government are very close to citizens and responsible to deliver basic public services at the doorstep. At present, there are 4,571 UPs and 328 Pourashavas in Bangladesh.¹⁸

This research has a special focus on the citizen participation and PB of UP, although it discusses both UP and Pourashava. Because UP is the main local government body responsible for delivering public services to the majority (63.4%) of the people living in rural areas of Bangladesh¹⁹ under the governance of UPs. Moreover, UP has long and better experiences of PB implementation since PB was introduced first in the UPs. PB is widely practicing by the UPs recently and has created positive impact in the lives of citizens as well as development of communities (Ullah & Pongquan, 2011). Besides, major amount of budget for rural services is channelized through UP and that are the main contents of PB. As discussed above, this dissertation concentrates its discussion mainly on the PB of UP.

2.3 Union Parishad: The Rural Local Government

Union Parishad (the Union Council) is the lowest tier of local government governs at the rural areas to deliver public services to the citizens. It is also the oldest local government institution not only in Bangladesh but also in former Indian Subcontinent. UP was established in 1870 by the Bengal Village *Chowkidary* Act. And accordingly, *Chowkidary Panchayet* system was established

¹⁸ Source: Local Government Division, Government of Bangladesh. As of May 2021.

¹⁹ <https://www.statista.com/statistics/761021/share-of-urban-population-bangladesh/>

during British period (1765-1947). Later, the Bengal Local Self-Government Act, 1885 laid the legal foundation of establishing *Union Council* with the villages (Shafi, 2001). Union Councils were provided both revenue and development functions (Rahman & Khan, 1997) under the ‘Basic Democracy Order’ during Pakistan period (1947-1971). Aftermath of the Independence of Bangladesh (in 1971), the basic democracy system was abolished and created provisions by the Constitution for establishment of local governments with the autonomous functionality providing authority of revenue collection and formulation of own budget. Later the legislatures promulgated and amended in different times and provided UP more functional authorities under Local Government Ordinance 1976, Local Government (UP) Ordinance 1983 (amended in 1997), and Local Government (UP) Act 2009. At the beginning, UP was responsible for collecting local revenue and maintaining law and order only, later responsibilities have been expanded gradually to infrastructure development, implementation of projects/schemes, formulation and management of budget and coordination of government activities at Union level.

2.3.1 Structure of UP

The structure of UP is described here according to the latest promulgated legal documents, such as ‘Local Government (UP) Act 2009’²⁰ and subsequent ‘UP Operational Manual 2012’ (amended in 2013 & 2018). Before discussing the structure, it is necessary to clarify that each UP has a similar structure irrespective of location, size, population and or other criteria.²¹ Each UP is divided into 9 Wards. Each Ward is represented by an elected Member of Council. There are reserved positions of Women Members, who are elected from each three Wards. Chairperson is

²⁰ Local Government (Union Parishad) Act, 2009, the Act No. 61 of 2009, promulgated on 15th October 2009. Amended in 2010, Act No. 60 of 2010.

²¹ UP is a small local government unit having average population of 20,000-30,000 and average land area of 20-30 sq. km. (UNDP, 2002).

the head of Council, elected by the voters of the whole constituents of UP. Thus, the Council of UP is comprised by 13 elected representatives. Moreover, according to Article 63 of the Act, the officials of various other departments working at UP level will be attached to UP Council. The following table describes the organization of UP Council, where there are also the representatives of different citizen's groups.

Table 2.1 Organization of UP Council.

Chairman	There shall be a chairman of UP directly elected by the voters of the UP.
Members	Nine members shall be directly elected from the nine wards.
Women members	Three seats shall be reserved for women. Each of the women members shall be directly elected by the male and female voters of three wards.
Official members	Agriculture Supervisor, Health Assistant, Family Planning Assistant, Family Welfare Worker, Ansar/VDP and staffs of government departments working at UP level are official members. But they will have no voting rights to council.
Other members	Representatives of Freedom Fighters, Cooperative Societies, Disadvantage groups/professions (e. g weavers, fishermen. landless workers, destitute women, etc.) are also members of council without voting right.

Source: Local Government (UP) Act, 2009 & UP Operational Manual 2018.

Beyond the elected Council members, UP has administrative and financial staffs, such as a Secretary, an Account Assistant, Village Polices, Union Digital Center Staffs etc.²² The general features of UP is presented in Table 2.2 and the organizational structure is illustrated in Figure 2.2 below.


Table 2.2 General Features of UP Council.

Level & Quantity	Average Area & Population	Legal Basis	Head of the Council	Composition	Revenue Authority	Functional Capacity
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lowest Tier • Exclusively Rural 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 27 Sq. Km. • 27,000 	Local Government (UP) Act, 2009	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Chairman (Elected) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1 Chairman • 9 Members • 3 Women Members 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Limited revenue authority 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Participatory Planning, budgeting, delivering services

Source: Talukdar (2013).

²² Article 62 of Local Government (UP) Act 2009.

Figure 2.2 Organizational Structure of UP.



Note: Developed by Author based on the Local Government (UP) Act, 2009.

2.3.2 Functions and Responsibilities of UP

The major functions of a UP are (a) administrative activities, (b) maintaining public order/safety, (c) social welfare activities, (d) physical development related planning and implementation. Besides, a UP has 38 specific functions²³ defined by the Local Government UP Act 2009. Among those, some major functions are categorized by their thematic natures and presented in Table 2.3. Importantly, among the functions and responsibilities, planning and budgeting is a major category of functions, which are the main points of discussion of this dissertation.

²³ Functions of UP are detailed out in Schedule 2 of Local Government (Union Parishad) Act, 2009.

Table 2.3 Major Functions of UP.

Category of Functions	Detail Activities
Administrative	1. Coordination of different organization's works. 2. E-governance operationalization and encouragement.
Planning and budgeting	3. Formulating different planning including Five Year Plan. 4. Formulating and implementing annual budget. 5. Fixation and collection of tax, fee, toll etc.
Infrastructural	6. Rural infrastructure development and maintenance: roads, culverts etc. 7. Installation of lamppost in the roads and lighting. 8. Regulation and management of new house and building. 9. Protection of water bodies, ponds, and other sources of water.
Social and economic	10. Primary and mass education related activities. 11. Health and family planning related activities. 12. Elimination family disputes, domestic crisis, women child welfare. 13. Development of sports and social cultural activities. 14. Environmental protection and management 15. Protection of government land, open space, park, and playground. 16. Tree plantation and afforestation. 17. Garbage and waste disposal and management. 18. Birth and death registration. 19. Maintaining law and order. 20. Natural disaster management such as flood, fire, cyclone, heavy rainfall. 21. Social security. 22. Agricultural, fishery and livestock development.

Note: Compiled by Author from the Local Government (UP) Act, 2009.

2.3.3 Citizen Participation in UP

Citizen participation has been introduced in UP since the beginning of its established. For example, at the early stage during 1800s, there were autonomous and self-sufficient local bodies popularly known as 'Village Republic' where the common people had access to involve in decision-making process (Litvack et al., 1998; Siddiqui, 2005). The concept of village republic was later transformed to 'Village *Panchayat*' where local people could discuss their affairs with the *Panchayat* members during 1870s.²⁴ After that, under the Bengal Local Self-Government Act of 1885, the 'Union Committee' was formed. Later this committee was renamed as 'Union Board' under the Bengal Village Self-Government Act, 1919. Both systems were substantiated to ensure people's

²⁴ *Panchayat* means assembly (council). Village *Panchayat* means assembly in village level.

participation at the grassroots level (Uddin, 2019) although there were no formal mechanisms or institutions for participation (Rahman et al., 2004). The four tiers of local government system were introduced under Basic Democracy Order in 1959. The Union Council, consisting of elected representatives from each unit, was the foundation for people’s participation (Uddin, 2019).

Since the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, the significant changes have been continuing in the structure and functions of local government due to continuous reform efforts aiming to increase participation in governing process (Panday & Rabbani, 2011), especially in case of UP. But such reforms could not address the issue of participation formally, which results the low effectiveness of participation (Aminuzzaman & Sharmin, 2006). Among various reforms over the time, adoption of Local Government (UP) Act, 2009 was a milestone initiative (Uddin, 2019), which created specific provisions of citizen participation in planning and budgeting processes. According to the provisions of this Act, citizens have opportunities to participate through different committees, forums, meetings and events. The spaces of citizen participation of UP are presented in Table 2.4.

Table 2.4 Spaces of Citizen Participation in UP.

Participation Spaces	Participants (including Citizens)	Major Activities/Responsibilities
Ward <i>Shava</i> (Ward Meeting)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Solely a citizens’ forum consisting of at least 5% voters. • Women member of the Ward will be the Adviser of Ward <i>Shava</i>. • Open Ward <i>Shava</i> will be held twice a year. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Providing information for planning and budgeting. • Project/scheme prioritization and budget estimation • Making beneficiary list of different social protection programs. • Encouraging people to unite for eliminating social problems. • Organizing social awareness events, sports and cultural programs. • Monitoring the progress of development programs/projects/schemes.
Standing Committee	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Issue-based 13 Standing Committees. • Each Committee comprised by 5-7 members and among them 3-5 are citizens. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mainly supervision of the activities of UP.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A Member of UP will be the Chair of the Committee. • Every two months a meeting of the Committee will be held. • There is a specific Committee on Finance responsible for formulation of PB. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensuring delivery of services after assessing demand in consultation with beneficiaries. • Identifying problems in service delivery and submitting report to UP in every two months.
Union Development Coordination Committee (UDCC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A 28 members Committee where a good number of citizens are members. Such as: representatives of School Management Committee, Community Association, Business Association, religious leader and two women. • Committee sits for meeting in every two months. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordination of UP development plan formulation and implementation. • Reviewing the progress of development project/schemes. • Supervising law and order situation. • Reviewing the conditions of service delivery. • Formulating recommendations for overall development of citizens.
Open Budget Session	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A citizen participatory session opens to all. • Minimum 5% voter/citizens participate. • The Session is held every year in May. • Draft budget is made based on prioritization by the Ward <i>Shava</i>. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Presenting the income and expenditure of previous fiscal year, progress of current year and draft budget of next year. • An open discussion is facilitated for getting opinions and feedbacks from the citizens. • Based on the feedback budget must be revised/reformulated.
Village Court	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A 4 members committee headed by UP Chairman, where 2 members are citizens. • Court sits for once a week. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Civil and criminal nature cases are handled. • Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR).

Note: Developed by Author's based on various documents including Local Government (UP) Act 2009 and UP Operation Manual 2018.

2.4 Pourashava: The Urban Local Government

Pourashava is the first tier of urban local governments. It is also one of the oldest local government institutions in Bangladesh after the UP. From the beginning, during British period, under the 'Bengal Municipal Act 1884', Pourashava was established in urban agglomerations, where total population was 3,000 with a minimum density of 1,000 per sq. mile, where a three-fourth of the population should be engaged in non-agricultural activities (Siddiqui, 2005). From that time, Pourashava had authority to levy and collect various taxes, fees, tolls and manage its own public works. Through subsequent reforms over the time (in 1896, 1919, 1932, 1957, 1959, 1968, 1976, 1983 and 2009) the present structure of Pourashava has been established.

At present, Pourashava has become one of the important local government bodies in delivering public services to the country's majority of urban population. Due to attraction of employment opportunities rural-urban migration are continued and urban areas are rapidly increasing (Bhattacharya et al., 2013). Such rapid urbanization demands more revenues in their budgetary tasks for infrastructure, water supply, garbage management, construction of roads and creating public facilities. Pourashava supposed to use own local resources to provide these services, which are mostly depended on the financial ability (Rab & Biswas, 2016). Pourashava's financial ability is not strong enough and they have higher dependency on central government's grants (Ahmed, 2014; Rahman & Ahmed, 2015; Reza et al., 2016). Although Pourashava is not using PB remarkably, it has potentiality for effective expansion of PB in the urban areas.

2.4.1 Structure of Pourashava

Due to rapid economic growth, urbanization has been increasing rapidly in Bangladesh. In 2018, the share of urban population was approximately 36.63% (Statista, 2020).²⁵ According to World Bank, in 2019 urban population growth rate was 3.13%,²⁶ whereas overall population growth rate was only 1.04%.²⁷ In 2011, approximately 48.05 million people were living in urban areas, which was increased to 64.81 million in 2020.²⁸ It is projected that urban population will be more than 84 million in 2030 (Statista, 2020; UN, 2018; World Bank, 2019).²⁹ In this situation, better governance is expected to ensure delivery of public services efficiently. And PB could be an efficient tool for strengthening urban governance in effective distribution of resources in a participatory way.

²⁵ <https://www.statista.com/statistics/761021/share-of-urban-population-bangladesh/>


²⁶ <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.GROW?end=2019&locations=BD&start=1961>

²⁷ <https://www.statista.com/statistics/268715/population-growth-in-bangladesh-1990-2008/>

²⁸ <https://www.statista.com/statistics/603402/bangladesh-urban-population/>

²⁹ <https://www.un.org/development/desa/publications/2018-revision-of-world-urbanization-prospects.html>

Figure 2.3 Organizational Structure of Pourashava.



Note: Developed by Author based on the information available in the Home Page of Local Government Division, Government of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh. <https://lgd.gov.bd/>

According to Local Government (Pourashava) Act 2009 and Pourashava Operation Manual 2018, a Pourashava is defined those urban areas which three-fourth population are engaged in non-agricultural activities and have 33% non-agriculture land. A Pourashava must has more than 50,000 population with an average density of 1,000 per sq. km. The Pourashava Council will be headed by an elected Mayor with the numbers of Councilors and Reserved Woman Councilors. Every Pourashava does not have same number of Wards and Councilors as like as UP as the

number of Ward varies according to land area and population.³⁰ Other than the elected representatives, there are administrative, financial, and technical officials responsible for delivering public services. Sometimes, central government officials are also dispatched to Pourashava for better administrative management.³¹ The organizational structure of Pourashava is shown in Figure 2.3.

2.4.2 Functions and Responsibilities of Pourashava

Pourashava has to perform diversified activities to ensure delivery of public services. The article 50(2) of Local Government (Pourashava) Act, 2009 specified the functions of a Pourashava. Moreover, the functions are detailed out under 12 thematic categories, such as (1) public health; (2) water supply and sewerage; (3) food; (4) livestock; (5) city planning; (6) building construction; (7) roads; (8) public safety; (9) trees, parks, gardens; (10) education and culture; (11) social welfare; and (12) planning and development. Among these categories, PB is supposed to be adopted and implemented under the last thematic category of planning and development.³²

2.4.3 Citizen Participation in Pourashava

Participation of citizen in decision-making process of Pourashava is not very much evident by documents. Many literatures are not available on citizen participation and PB of Pourashava. Local Government (Pourashava) Act 2009 created provisions for participation of general citizens in different forms, but does not specifically mention about PB. Based on the Act and Pourashava Operation Manual 2018, the spaces of citizen participation are presented in Table 2.5 to identify the potentiality of widely adoption of PB.

³⁰ Pourashava's Ward numbers are determined by the Local Administration based on the by-laws and other criteria defined by the guidelines.

³¹ Article 74 of Local Government (Pourashava) Act, 2009.

³² Functions of UP are detailed out in Schedule 2 of Local Government (Pourashava) Act, 2009.

Table 2.5 Spaces of Participation in Pourashava.

Participation Spaces	Participants (including Citizens)	Major Activities/Responsibilities
Ward Level Coordination Committee (WLCC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A 10 members' committee where 7 are citizens. Among them 3 are urban poor, 2 are general citizens, and 2 are representatives of professional society. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Discussion with participation of citizens twice a year on prioritization of citizen's needs and formulating budget. • Discussion on the implementation progress of the projects, their quality, and problems at Ward level. • Organizing Ward level open meeting in participation of citizens.
Town Level Coordination Committee (TLCC)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A 50 members' committee where almost 50% (24 members) are citizens, e.g., 12 general citizens, 7 urban poor, and 5 representatives of professional society. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Motivating citizens to participate different planning process and taking initiative to formulate development plan. • Supervising progress of development project and monitoring.
Standing Committees	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 10 standing committees on different specific issues. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No decision can be made without the consent and opinion of these thematic committees, especially in budgeting, taking projects under ADP, making masterplan. • <i>This committee is powerful after the Pourashava Council. But it does not allow direct involvement of citizens.</i>
Participatory Planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A ward level meeting with the participation of citizens. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Making different plan and masterplan, land development, social development, and other development planning. <i>It does not clearly mention about PB.</i>

Note: Developed by Author's based on various documents including Local Government (Pourashava) Act 2009 and Pourashava Operation Manual 2018.

As shown in the Table 2.5 there are scopes for citizens to participate in various forums. But there is no representation of citizens in standing committee, which is an important decision-making forum. At the same time, in participatory planning forum, the issue of PB is not clearly mentioned. PB was also not explicitly guided by the Pourashava Act 2009,³³ but only in Pourashava Operation Manual 2018. So, PB process was not visible from the beginning, and it could not be established as a participatory process at Pourashava level.

³³ Article 92 of Local Government (Pourashava) Act, 2009 mentions about budget, but does not mention about participation of citizens in budget or PB.

2.5 PB Implementation Situation in Bangladesh

Although PB has been practicing since long in local governments of Bangladesh, evidence and literature are not well-developed. Contemporary empirical studies are also few. So, extensive analysis of PB implementation situation is difficult in some extent. Current implementation situation of PB of both UP and Pourashava are discussed from the few available previous research to get an overall picture.

The project-based practice of PB started about three decades ago at UP level in pilot basis. For example, the first project ‘Sirajganj Local Government Development Fund Project (SLGDFP)’ was jointly implemented by Government, UNDP and UNCDF to introduce PB. This project organized PB processes in few selected UPs of Sirajganj district until July 2000 (Rahman et al., 2004). Later, in some other areas, some NGOs³⁴ also organized small scale PB projects in different names, for example, ‘one day open-budget session’, ‘open-budget hearing’, ‘participatory planning and budgeting’ etc. (Rahman, 2005). The processes and the results of these PBs were not extensively studied. So, the previous research and evidence are limited except few reports under different titles, such as civic participation in sub-national budgeting, people’s participation at local budgeting, and people’s budget initiative etc. Disappointingly, research on PB of Pourashava is almost rare.

The key concepts that are used in this research are PB actors and their roles and behaviors, citizen participation, participatory budgeting, local government system/local government institutions/local government bodies of Bangladesh. It is highlighted in the previous sections of this chapter that among the rural local governments, UPs are key units and among the urban local governments, Pourashavas are key units and both of them directly deal with the citizens demands,

³⁴ The NGOs who started to facilitate PB are Shamunnay, The Hunger Project, Agragati Sangstha, Social Development Foundation, CARE Bangladesh, ActionAid Bangladesh etc.

and PB is basically practiced in these two units of local governments. As this dissertation primarily discusses PB of UP, and secondarily PB of Pourashava, the PB processes of both local governments are highlighted.

2.5.1 PB of UP

2.5.1.1 PB Implementation Experience of SLGD Project

Although PB has been implementing by local government UPs since long, PB literature is not well-developed. Recent extensive research are also limited. Rahman, Kabir and Razzak (2004) write on ‘Civic participation in sub-national budgeting in Bangladesh’, which seems to be one of the pioneer research works on PB.³⁵ They discuss some examples of participatory planning and budgeting implemented by SLGDF project and NGOs and identified the main features including some functional factors affecting PB, but they do not specifically discuss the role of PB actors. As they discussed, the major events of participatory planning and budgeting were public discussion, open-budget session, mass gathering, community level small group discussion. Participatory planning process of SLGDFP was organized mainly at Ward level,³⁶ where certain number of citizens were also represented (Rahman et al., 2004).


The steps of participatory planning and budgeting of that project were infrastructure mapping, problem identification and prioritization, schem/project³⁷ identification and prioritization, and scheme short listing through participatory processes (Figure 2.4). Citizens were used to engage in all these steps, which were common to all UPs under implementation of PB. The processes include two or three-day long participatory meetings at ward level. (Rahman, 2005).

³⁵ The paper was published in the Book “Participatory Budgeting” published by the World Bank in 2007.

³⁶ Organized by the Ward Development Committee-WDC (presently Ward Committee).

³⁷ ‘Scheme’ means the small project.

Figure 2.4 Participatory Planning Process of SLGDF Project.



Source: Rahman et al. (2004).

PB was limited only in organizing ‘open-budget session’ where officer-prepared budget was presented mainly to inform, and had limited scope to discuss. Despite such limitations, open-budget session of PB created an opportunity for local citizens to address their actual needs through access to decision-making process by the major stakeholders’ committees.³⁸

On that time, PB was very initial level and UP was not comfortable to engage citizens in their governmental activities. Moreover, the participatory processes were controlled by some selected politically affiliated people (Rahman, 2005) that denied inclusion of general citizens. Although there were limitations, Ullah and Pongquan (2011) demand that this new system of participatory planning and budgeting has been facilitating democratization of local planning including a process of decision-making. Such effects create local ownership and stake in project selection and implementation with local knowledge. That means, if there is space for citizens to express their own ideas, they play better role to contribute for sustainable outcomes of PB in case of Bangladesh.

³⁸ Committees are Union Development Committee (UDC), Ward Development Committee (WDC) and Scheme Supervision Committee (SSC).

To understand current implementation status of participatory planning and budgeting, the above-mentioned study also focuses on weak areas: local socio-political issues including political biasness towards participation, exclusion of marginalized and disadvantage people, lack of knowledge of citizens on preparation of plan and budget. They also found that open-budget session brought diverse views among the local people. The open-budget session induced local people into sharing ownership of development projects as well as having a learning forum of resource and expenditure planning (Ullah & Pongquan, 2011). So, among the different processes of PB, open-budget session had contribution in mobilization of local people to participate more in PB.

2.5.1.2 Functions of PB of UP

PB of UP has various functions towards mitigating demands of citizens. First, PB considers the bottom-up approach that gathers information of actual needs from the community (ward) level.³⁹ Citizens are the main source of such information and that is why engagement of citizens is crucial. This way, mapping of priorities is done from ward meeting with the active participation of citizens of that ward. Secondly, citizens also desire outcomes of their participation in PB regarding achievement of projects for development of their own communities. Because if they participate there will be more likely to realize projects (Moynihan, 2007; Wampler, 2007). This is the means of incentivized citizens to increase and enhance participation. Thirdly, elected representatives aspire to fulfill such demands as much as possible for attaining legitimacy and recognition of their tasks and increasing their popularity to be reelected. Fourthly, the officials facilitate PB process and engage citizens as a legal binding and to mitigate bottom-up demands. All these functions are basically focused to the effectiveness of PB through active participation of citizens, promotional

³⁹ Ward Shava (Ward Committee) is to engage citizens in community level at the very firsthand.

activities of elected representatives, and facilitation of engagement by officials. Among these, the perspective of citizens in achieving projects for local community development is the central function of PB. Because the ultimate outcomes of PB is to benefit citizens through their active participation with the proactive roles of actors, such as elected representatives and officials . These functions are expected to be reflected in the defined PB processes of UPs so that desired outputs and outcomes could be achieved.

2.5.1.3 PB Process of UP: Ten Steps of PB

Hossain (2019) develops framework of functional steps of PB based on the ‘UP Operational Manual 2018’ (Figure 2.5). The steps of PB process are divided into two phases: (a) formulation phase, (b) implementation and review phase.⁴⁰ To understand the basic principles of PB process, each step and its functions are discussed as follows:

(a) Formulation Phase:

Among the ten steps of PB process, this formulation phase has eight steps, where main functions of PB are performed. The foremost and very important step is about identification and prioritization of schemes/projects in small groups at the community level. Citizens have better opportunity to engage in such informal forums that can ensure grassroots participation and inclusiveness. The second step is to finalize the identified priorities by citizens. This step creates opportunity for citizens to realize their own demands. Main deliberation over PB could be done in this step to reflect the precise demands of citizens. Therefore, the second step of PB process is most significant in terms of effective participation.⁴¹

⁴⁰ Hossain (2019) identifies 10 steps in his framework. These steps are grouped into two phases here for discussion and further analysis.


⁴¹ Also see the discussion in Section 5.3.1.1 in Chapter 5.

The third step is about formally opening up of budget to public. The main features of budget are summarized and displayed on the notice board of UP so that everyone can watch and give feedback or put complain anonymously. The fourth step is about informing citizens for attending open-budget session. This step is to disseminate information widely so that maximum participation can be ensured in the open-budget session. This step is also important to inform and invite citizens. The fifth step is about open-budget session. In this mass participation of citizens can be done. Moreover, citizens may have louder voice to argue, discuss and agree or disagree with the declared draft budget. This step is also significant in attaining mass participation of citizens. After open-budget session, PB is revised based on received feedbacks.

The budget is approved in sixth step by council members in a council meeting of UP where few citizens may be allowed only as observer and not to participate in discussion or voting during approval process. The seventh step is a formal administrative process for checking by Upazila Administration. After that in eighth step final budget is declared by the UP officials. The last two steps are mainly official procedures and there is no scope for citizens to participate.

Arguably, the most significant point of PB process is formulation phase where citizens should have more scope to engage and play their substantive roles in materializing their utilities in terms of benefits. At the same time, local officials and representatives also can get information from the formulation phase. Therefore, this phase is crucial for ensuring effective participation as well as performing the main activities of PB process. This system is different from the SLGDF project, where budgetary amount was not included in formulation and prioritization. But SLGDF project was initiator of PB process formally at UP level and there is similarity between their basic concepts. For example, open-budget session was basically initiated by SLGDF project (Rahman et al., 2004) and continued later by the UPs themselves.

Figure 2.5 PB Process of UP.



Source: Hossain (2019).

(b) Implementation and Review Phase

Step nine and ten are about PB implementation. Those includes quarterly and half-yearly reviews of budget. Although these two steps are done by UP itself, citizens have scopes to participate. These steps are also important to justify transparency and accountability in implementation. The implementation of PB is started from the first day of July when the fiscal year is started.⁴²

⁴² Fiscal Year starts on 1st July and ends on 30th June in Bangladesh.

So, it is clear from the above discussion that citizens have scope to play various roles and functions in different steps of PB of UP. But the *first*, *second* and *fifth* steps, respectively community meeting, ward meeting and open-budget session are most significant points of PB process where citizens have better spaces and opportunities to participate and contribute. These three processes are seemed to be more effective and contributory to engage citizens in greater extent. The participation of citizens in different processes of PB will be examined detail in chapter 5 with empirical evidence.

2.5.1.4 Issues of PB Implementation Experiences in UP

From the discussion of previous sections, the overall implementation status of PB is not satisfactory. The following issues could be identified from the situation analysis of PB of UP:

- (i) The major problem in implementation of PB is decreased level of participation of citizens. As we have seen in the previous sections, although PB process of UP is clearly institutionalized, citizens participate only in few specific steps. From the viewpoint of citizens utility for PB, reflection of own demands in policy and implementation of project could be incentives to participate, but it is still question what influences of their behavior have.
- (ii) UPs have not been taking enough initiatives for expanding PB in the grassroots level of UP. The main actors in the local government are elected representatives and officials. Both have their own utility in PB, such as political stability and policy implementation based on real demand of citizens respectively. How they behave to realize their own utilities is another issue of actor's behaviors related with PB process of UP.

2.5.2 PB of Pourashava

2.5.2.1 Initiation of PB in Pourashava

PB of Pourashava is supposed to be implemented with the participation of two citizen participatory committees, such as: (1) WLCC⁴³ comprised by maximum 11 members, where one-third of them should be citizens; and (2) TLCC⁴⁴ comprised by maximum 50 members, where one-third members of this committee should be citizens.

Pourashavas have failed to create opportunities for participation in policy dialogue and service delivery (ADB, 2015) before enacting Local Government (Pourashava) Act 2009. PB of Pourashava has not been institutionally established and systematically implemented like UP, due to the lack of operational policies and guidelines. However, there was possibility of expanding PB in Pourashava as the survey under this research found that ratio of participation in PB was 45.0%, while this ratio for UP was 39.2%.⁴⁵

The present implementation experiences of PB of Pourashava are mostly project-driven, which bear sustainability crisis. For example, citizen participation and PB was implemented first by an Asian Development Bank supported project, namely ‘Urban Governance and Infrastructure Improvement Project’ in some selected Pourashavas. One of the main components (*Component 1*) of this project was ‘citizen participation and accountability improvements’. Under this component ‘open-budget’ system was introduced in those selected Pourashavas by this project. At present, Phase-3 of this project is under implementation that includes some activities of budgeting under the component of ‘citizen awareness and participation’. Another project supported by the World

⁴³ WLCC refers to Ward-level Coordination Committee.

⁴⁴ TLCC refers to Town-level (Pourashava) Coordination Committee.

⁴⁵ See Table 5.2 in Chapter 5.


Bank namely ‘Municipal Governance and Services Project (MGSP)’ is under implementation, which has also some focus on the participatory planning and budgeting.⁴⁶

2.5.2.2 PB Process of Pourashava and Current Conditions

Although PB was not clearly guided by the Pourashava Act 2009, based on other documents of different sources (ADB, 2015; GOB, 2009; World Bank, 2017), Pourashava’s PB process is illustrated in Figure 2.6. The *first step* is to make draft of the budget by the concerned officials of Pourashava. Generally, PB starts from project prioritization and selection by citizen before drafting budget, and similar process is observed in case of PB of UP. But, this process is absent in Pourashava’s PB. In *second step*, Pourashava official-made draft budget is shared at the WLCC meeting in ward level, which includes citizens. This committee is similar to the ward committee of UP and also similar to neighborhood meeting of other countries PB process. But other study finds that WLCC committee was not formed or not functional (Chowdhury & Akteruzzaman, 2016). Even if this committee is formed and meeting is held, there is limited scope to deliberate, debate and negotiate by citizens rather to endorse the draft budget. The *third step* is basically a TLCC meeting. A part of this meeting is open-budget session, where few selected citizens are allowed to participate as legal compliance. But this event does not allow mass people like the open-budget session of UP. Step *four* is about approving the final draft budget by the municipal council, which is formal approving process of PB budget and citizens have no scope to participate in this step. The *fifth* step is upper level official procedure of approval by the higher authority, the head of regional administration, the Divisional Commissioner. The sixth step is about publishing the main part of final approved budget on the notice board of Pourashava.

⁴⁶ Source: <https://projects.worldbank.org/en/projects-operations/project-detail/P133653>

Figure 2.6 Pourashava PB Process.



Source: Developed by Author based on Pourashava Operational Manual 2018, ADB (2018), and World Bank (2017).

As discussed above, citizens have limited scopes of participation in the whole PB process of Pourashava. There is provision of participation by citizens in the WLCC and TLCC meetings. But WLCC meeting is not regularly held, and in many cases, committee is not formed. Although TLCC invites citizens to open-budget session, but number of participants are few and limited. So, the entire PB process is not comprehensive to encourage participation of citizen like the PB process of UP. Moreover, the Local Government (Pourashava) Act. 2009 does not specifically mentioned about PB and its implementation process.

This research conducted survey among 80 citizen respondents of 8 Pourashavas and it is found that ratio of participation in the PB of Pourashava is 45.0%⁴⁷ in Pourashava, while the ratio of UP is 37.8%,⁴⁸ which refers to the low degree of participation in PB of both local governments. Participation in PB of Pourashava is comparatively higher, which implies that there is potentiality of expansion of PB in Pourashava within their limited scope. From the discussion of PB processes and related issues of implementation of both UP (Section 2.5.1) and Pourashava (Section 2.5.2) the remarkable differences in PB processes are found as follows:

- (i) PB process of UP has more provisions as well as scopes for participation by citizens than the PB process of Pourashava. Because citizens can participate in four steps of the PB of UP, but in the PB of Pourashava citizens can participate only in two steps.
- (ii) In general, basic principles of PB is to prioritization of projects in community level followed by prioritization of demands, selection of projects, and budget estimation with the participation of citizens. UP follows almost similar procedures, but Pourashava's draft budget is made by the official first and it is shared with the citizens later. So, the scope of project prioritization is absent in Pourashava's PB
- (iii) Open-budget session of UP is exactly open to all citizens without restriction and it is taken place with the wider participation of citizens from all parts of UP. But Pourashava's open-budget session is held as an extra-ordinary TLCC meeting with the participation of invited participants only.

⁴⁷ See Table 5.2 in Chapter 5.

⁴⁸ *ibid* 47.

2.6 Summary and Remarks

This chapter discusses the situation of the implementation of citizen participation and PB in the local government context of Bangladesh. The structures and functions of UP and Pourashava are discussed to understand the institutional characteristics as well as characteristics of actors. The chapter also has identified the scopes of participation by citizens and their roles in the participatory processes in both UP and Pourashava. The differences in the PB processes are also discussed from the viewpoints of legal provisions and role of actors. The situation analysis of PB in terms of implementation status is done in view of understanding the functional aspects and revealing the gaps between policies and practices.

This dissertation is to discuss the role and behavior of actors that influence PB process in local government context of Bangladesh. The individual actor behaves rationally to maximize their own utilities which is also linked with the outcomes of PB and these ideas have some theoretical interpretation. The utilities of elected representatives are legitimacy and recognition by citizens, utilities of officials are the holding precise demands and reflecting bottom-up demands, and utilities of citizens are to achieve projects and developing their communities (Knight & Itai, 1996; Peters, 1999; Ostrom & Ostrom, 1971). The detail actor-specific utilities will be discussed in perspective of the theory of ‘rational choice institutionalism’ and their behavior to participation will be discussed in perspective of the theory of ‘participatory governance’. The discussions of this chapter lead to contextualize ideas to identify the lacunas of research in Chapter 3.

Chapter 3: Literature Review and Conceptual Framework

3.1 Introduction

This dissertation is to discuss actors' role and behavior in PB process in the way of its effectiveness. Based on the identified research problems in Chapter 1 and issues in Chapter 2, this Chapter reviews the relevant literature related to the identified issues in case of PB of Bangladesh. The literature review focuses these issues and research problems to identify the research gaps under the theoretical frameworks of the theories of 'participatory governance' and 'rational choice institutionalism' to develop a conceptual framework for this dissertation. The first theory is used in this dissertation to discuss the behavior of actors in playing their roles in the PB process, and second theory is used to link the objective of individual actor in performing collective actions around the PB process to achieve desired outcome in terms of utility.⁴⁹

3.2 Citizen Participation in Democracy and Governance

3.2.1 Citizen Participation in Democracy: A Broader Concept

Citizen participation is a political principle and practice that seeks to facilitate the involvement of citizens in the process of democratic governance. The norm of participation holds that citizens who are affected by a decision have a right to be involved in the processes of decision-making to influence and contribute (Barlow, 1995) to be benefited. Direct participation of citizens in governmental decision-making has a long history in both political theory and policy practice (Abers, 2000). Consequently, over the last few decades, 'participation', 'democracy' and

⁴⁹ Detail on the application of these two theories; participatory governance theory and rational choice institutionalism theory are discussed in section 3.3 and 3.4 of this chapter respectively.

‘governance’ have become the common catchwords in the political discourses (Hirst, 2000; Roche, 2014).⁵⁰ Anja Roche (2014) quotes from Blondiaux (2008), who mentions direct participation as a ‘new spirit of democracy’, which is not only characterized by a new discourse but also a diffusion of various participatory initiatives (Cain et al., 2006; Font, 2003; Saward, 2000; Smith, 2009). Other recent literature, such as Makinen (2018) similarly claims that popularity of participation and participatory practices are in growing trends in democratic governance practices.

Citizen participation is usually seen as a vital aspect in enhancing quality of democracy (Michels & Graaf, 2010) from the view of participatory governance. It is also considered as an essential element (Dahl, 2015) of democratic citizenship as well as democratic decision-making (Michels & Graaf, 2010). Such direct participation by ordinary citizens in policymaking is to improve governance, promote citizen empowerment, encourage social justice and deepen quality of democracy (Boulding, 2010). In relation to empowerment of citizen, Abers (2000) argues that modern political theories have focused that participation is not only a matter of transferring public responsibilities to citizens but also improving the capacity of ordinary people to understand and decide about issues affecting their lives to ensure social justice.⁵¹

Hence, recently, participation has become a virtual mantra to the development scholars and international agencies in promoting both democracy and development (Evans, 2004). For its advocates, benefits of participation consist primarily strengthening of citizen and civil society (Baiocchi, 2002; Nylén et al., 1995), improving state responsiveness and accountability (Ackerman, 2004), or both (Evans, 1996; Fung & Wright, 2001). Arguably, the concept of deepening democracy builds on the ideas, particularly those emphasize potential to mutually

⁵⁰ The concept of participation in the democratic governance has a focus on the linkage between state and society (citizens), which are directly linked to the human rights and development.

⁵¹ Regarding ‘social justice’ Oquaye (1995) argues that through the democratic right of participation social justice is likely to be attained when people are able to raise their voices.

empower state and society (Roberts, 1998), which is also articulated by Benjamin Goldfrank in different a way that deepening democracy as transforming residents from passive subjects to active citizens, who are aware of their rights of participation and legitimately raise their demands.

However, according to him, this direct practice of democracy does not mean replacement of representative democracy, rather it means that citizens have increased opportunities to participate beyond the traditional periodic election (Goldfrank, 2007). As it is well-known that present world is mainly governed by representative democracies where elected representatives decide (Michels & Graaf, 2010), which is essential in maximizing democracy (Dahl, 1956). But social choice theorists argue that it is impossible to define the wills of most citizens by the process of election (Michels & Graaf, 2010), while has been decreasing voter's turnout and increasing electoral volatility (Cain et al., 2006).

The practice of direct democracy extends citizens' participation beyond the electoral process and draws on the tradition of community participation in identifying local priorities, planning and implementing projects to position citizen as a key decision-maker in the processes of local governance (Cornwall & Gaventa, 2000). Among different forms of direct democracy, PB allows more meaningful democratic relationship between citizens and local governments than representative democracy (McGee 2003), where people decide on policies without any intermediary. PB is now mostly translated from theory to practice; a way of governance, *i. e.* 'co-governance'⁵² in the sphere of public management. Thus, this research focuses to the direct

⁵² Co-governance involves the principle of subsidiarity—taking decisions at the lowest possible level of authority and creating new checks and balances on the overall decision-making activities of the state. And inclusion of people in the decisions that directly affect them formalizes the process of governance and democratic oversight by closing the gaps between resource users and resource managers, producers and providers. Co-governance thus entails the development of non-centralized rules and institutions pertaining to the major questions of access, control, use and distribution of the wealth generated on a commons (Takao 2007).

democratic process of PB that deepen local democracy with the active participation of citizens (Fung & Wright, 2001).⁵³

In the second place, why shall this research focus on PB among various local government administrative processes? One of the core administrative processes in the local government is the budget-making process in which the principal actors such as the elected representatives, the officials and other stakeholders get engaged vividly. The budget process operation is highlighted because it shows how actors are functioning for the goal, the converged decision-making of the budget. In addition to that, the budget through PB process occupies the principal part of the total budget.⁵⁴ PB budget is composed of the regional development fund, which directly reflects the urgent regional development demand, such as infrastructure and it is also realized through direct participation of citizens. Therefore, through analyzing PB the function of citizen's participation can be figured out in an efficient manner. This is why this research focuses on PB process among the local government operations.

3.2.2 Citizens Participation in Governance: A Precise Concept

It is entirely or partially indistinguishable of democracy and governance because of their overlapping conceptual and functional aspects (Fukuyama, 2013), while both are complementary to each other. And governance is a contemporary concept in development discourse although the word 'governance' has been appeared and become ubiquitous since 1980s (Bevir, 2012). In other words, in a narrow concept, it is a matter of government's operation in a context of diminished possibilities for unilateral action (Heffen et al., 2000; Stoker, 1998). These arguments are closer to the concept of 'public governance', which refers to the formal and informal arrangements that

⁵³ Deepening democracy refers to strengthening of the democratic institution and enhance people's participation and control over the public policy decisions.

⁵⁴ PB budget occupies more than 95 percent of the total amount of the budget in case studies of Sylhet UPs. (See Table 6.1.)

determine how public decisions are made and how public actions are carried out (OECD, 2020).⁵⁵

Citizen participation in governance becomes a central agenda in democratization and development (Cornwall & Coelho, 2007), and it is claimed to bring government closer to the people (Blair, 2000). This agenda is promoted by the international and bilateral donor agencies, such as the World Bank and the UN during 1990s claiming that citizen involvement is necessary to enhance state accountability and responsiveness (Crook & Sverrisson, 2003; Goetz & Jenkins, 2004; Manor, 2004). By late 1990s, the issue of ‘participatory governance’ introduced widely in different countries by the above-mentioned supranational organizations (Gaventa, 2004). Many participatory governance scholars of that time (Avritzer, 2002; Cohen & Sabel, 1997, Gaventa, 2004; Mansbridge, 1999) came to a consensus that involving citizens more directly in governance process can make better citizens, better decisions and better government.⁵⁶ The discussion in this dissertation grounded mainly to the citizen-centered governance process of local institutions, which is PB and the role and behavior of PB actors.

The governance concept has been in a changing trend. That is why, the conceptualization of governance seems slightly confusing, because in the one hand, it refers to the empirical manifestations of state adaptation to external environment, and on the other hand, the role of the state in coordination of social systems (Pierre, 2000). The first one is labelled by Guy Peters (2000) as ‘old governance’, which is a state-centric approach. And second one is labelled by Jon Pierre (2000) as ‘new governance’, which is a society-centric participatory approach focused to self-governance manifested by the networks and partnerships (Rhodes, 1997).⁵⁷

In discussing the uses of governance, Paul Hirst (2000) identifies five main areas. The *first*

⁵⁵ Source: <http://www.oecd.org/investment/toolkit/policyareas/publicgovernance/>

⁵⁶ See Section 3.3 which depicts detail discussion on participatory governance theory and its implication in this dissertation.

⁵⁷ For more detail about old governance and new governance, see (Richardson, 2012).

one is ‘good governance’, which focuses to economic modernization, creating an effective political framework conducive to private economic action, the rule of law, efficient state administration, strong civil society, aware citizenry, and their participation. The *second* use of governance is international cooperation perspective, and argues it as the ‘governance without government’ (Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992), which could be termed as ‘global governance’, a tool to identify solutions of problems (Jang et al., 2016; UN, 2014). The *third* one is ‘corporate governance’, which is about improving accountability and transparency, mostly related to private sector (Clatworthy et al., 2000) although recently it has vast uses in public sector (Jordan, 2014). The *fourth* usage of governance relates to the ‘new public management (NPM)’ which means organizational and institutional changes and adaptations within the public sector (intra organizational focus), and this concept is later graduated to ‘new public governance (NPG)’⁵⁸ which means changing and adapting relations between governments and other actors (inter organizational focus) (Klijn, 2012). And finally, the *fifth* one is about new practices of coordinating activities through networks, partnerships, and deliberative forums, such as NGOs, social entrepreneurs and community groups to encompass democratic involvement of the grassroots citizens in building policy legitimacy (Hirst, 2000). This direct form of governance could be termed as ‘local participatory governance’ and PB has an equivalent stance of it. That is why, this dissertation considers to study PB and its actors’ role in strengthening participatory governance through enhancing level of participation as well as generating outputs in terms of utilities.

⁵⁸ New public governance-NPG is a paradigm of public service delivery is rooted firmly within institutional and network theory, which posits both a *plural state*, where multiple interdependent actors contribute to the delivery of public services, and a *pluralist state*, where multiple processes inform the policy-making system (Osborne, 2010).

3.2.3 Citizen Participation in Local Governance

Naturally, local government is a democratic venue for citizen participation (Dahl & Taft, 1976). Baiocchi et al. (2011) remarks local government as a critical domain of democratic life. As a small unit of government, local government is particularly favorable for innovation and development of democratic values (Smith, 1985), such as participation in local decision-making including budget-making process. Adoption of participatory mechanisms of PB is not automatic rather certain factors foster, for example: raising demand by citizens, enthusiastic local leadership and convinced local officials. (Bherer, 2010). Enabling citizens in direct engagement to local problem-solving activities, and to make their demands directly to state is believed to improve the quality of implementation of public policies and programs (Abers, 2000; Cohen & Sabel, 1997; Fung, 2003). Arguably, such ideologies are the main points for direct participation of citizens mainly at the local level, while PB is considered as the catalyst in this mechanism.

There are significant demands of democratic local government with a meaningful authority to local units that are accessible and accountable to local citizenry (Blair, 2000). Local governments are the main institutions responsible for delivering public services to the citizens where citizens suppose to have easy access to appeal of their demands. So, it is expected that local government representatives and officials should be pro-citizen in legitimating decision-making to create greater benefits for their citizens. In this purview, some authors believe that local government has wider scope to engage citizens within their sphere of responsiveness through recognizing local demands (Beetham, 1996). Similarly, Blair (2000) echoes that through participation, local government becomes more responsive to citizen's demands as well as effective to deliver public services.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ Efficient delivery of public services is central of PB. It also confers the niche of NPG in democratic realm.

Such direct engagement (Gaventa & Valderrama, 1999) has become a practice beyond the traditional liberal notion of political participation in local government where citizens become ‘maker and shaper’ with full agency in governance process. The practice of direct local democracy draws on the traditions of community participation in identifying local priorities, planning and implementing programs (Cornwall & Gaventa, 2000). Goetz and Gaventa (2001) argue that mechanisms for participatory local governance is needed to establish, with coinciding citizens’ demands. But capacity building is necessary for both local governments and citizens in establishing relationships of trust and cooperation. It is needed particularly for the section of society that was ‘historically been denied of access to public policy realm’ (Fung & Wright, 2001). PB deals with all these norms of inclusive governance of engaging marginalized people. Hence, this study focuses PB, which is entirely a process of inclusive local governance.⁶⁰

3.2.4 PB in Local Governance: A Rationale of Studying PB

PB is a participatory tool for engaging citizens into budget-making process towards deepening democratic governance for yielding greater inclusion at the local level. It is a participatory governance approach stands out not only as one of the most important experiments in participatory democracy, but also it represents a clear and distinct effort to transform state-society relationship (Baiocchi et al., 2011). That is why, PB becomes one of the most exciting innovations in the development of local democracy (Moynihan, 2007; Röcke, 2014; Sintomer, et al., 2010; Sintomer et al., 2013; Smith, 2009; Wampler, 2007) that represents ‘a departure from the traditional

⁶⁰ Inclusive governance effectively serves and engages all people; takes into account gender and other facets of personal identity; and when institutions, policies, processes, and services are accessible, accountable and responsive to all members of society. Fostering governance that is inclusive is essential to advancing democratic values, including peaceful pluralism and respect for diversity, human rights and equality before the law.

institutional architecture’ and goes beyond the ‘familiar institutionalized forms of citizen participation’ (Smith, 2009). So, this innovative approach works for creating better governance in localities where local government is the sole or primary actor in addressing public problems (Rodgers, 2010). In a broader sense, Gret and Sintomer (2005) describe that PB is a new form of local public management in principles of co-management with citizens and stakeholders in establishing participatory democracy, enabling citizens to discuss and to take part in the development of common good.

Moreover, PB is a direct-democracy⁶¹ approach that offers citizens opportunities to deliberate on the decision-making of public money allocation (Shah, 2007). Almost similar description is given by PB researcher Brian Wampler, who idealized PB as a decision-making process through citizens’ deliberation and negotiation over the distribution of public resources (Wampler, 2007). Furthermore, he argues that PB is noteworthy because it improves the performance of state through changing the institutional rules and enhancing the quality of democracy. This new form of citizen engagement outside the formal electoral system enables non-elected citizens to participate in allocation of public money (Sintomer et al., 2016). According to Donald P. Moynihan, PB aims to infuse the values of citizen involvement into the most basic and formal procedure of governance through the budget-making process (Moynihan, 2007). It refers to the variety of institutional arrangements in which public budget is opened up to binding decision-making by the general public (Johnson, 2014).

PB should be citizen-driven rather to be made by local government officials and council.⁶²

This process of community decision-making allocation of money is decided by the people who are

⁶¹ Direct democracy or pure democracy is a form of democracy in which people decide on policy initiatives directly. This differs from most currently established democracies, e.g., representative democracies.

⁶² PB should be a citizen-led initiative that enables them to decide directly how to spend some of the public money in their communities.

affected by a budget (Pinnington et al., 2009). In PB, citizens formulate their demands collectively, which is generally regarded as a path to social inclusion by participation and decision-making through redistributive policies (Montambeault, 2016). In more simple way, Baiocchi and Ganuza (2013) distinguish PB as a process where ordinary citizens should have direct say in local budget-making that impact them. In consistent with this definition, it can be said that PB involves people with the aim of increasing local engagement in the political process (Williams et al., 2017).

Arguably, when a governance process is citizen-centered and citizen-driven, it empowers citizens and provide a political stake for improving their social and economic environment. Similarly, PB is one of the growing practices of empowering citizens to be more active participants in their communities for contributing to decision-making of local governance (Gilman, 2016), and a tool for empowering citizens in strengthening their demands for good governance (Shah, 2007). Regarding empowerment, Wampler (2007) designates PB as a ‘citizenship school’ where participation empowers citizens to learn to be aware of their rights and responsibilities. Through raising the quality of life of local people, establishing a dialogue between citizens and authorities, and creating an efficient format of collaboration towards local development, PB becomes a powerful institution of empowerment in public policy indeed (Khutkyy, 2017). And such empowerment of citizen is linked with decentralization of institutional decision-making (Pin, 2007).⁶³

⁶³ PB is the direct allocation of a budget by residents, rather than politicians or bureaucrats, which is described as a means of deepening democratic practice and empowering residents through deliberative mechanisms.

If citizens have political power for contribution to decision-making, local leaders become more responsive to address citizens needs. In such way, PB can increase local government's accountability towards enhanced transparency through social control over public policies (de Oliveira, 2017), while transparency and accountability are the major goals of PB (Gordon et al., 2017).⁶⁴ Consequently, PB can help to reduce government inefficiency by curbing clientelism, patronage and corruption (Shah, 2007). PB also can create broader mobilization for redistribution of money (Folscher, 2007; Rocke, 2014). Similarly, PB promotes transparency especially in the developing countries, where corruption is very much evident (Folscher, 2007; Moynihan, 2007), as PB is designated a powerful tool of eliminating corruption (UN-Habitat, 2004). In more expectantly, Celina Souza mentions that there is a little doubt of PB's potentiality of increasing transparency (Souza, 2001). But such kind of generalization seems as biased rather to be empirically evidenced.

3.3 Actors' Roles and Behaviors in Context of Participatory Governance

3.3.1 Actors and Their Roles in PB Process

As it is discussed in the previous sections that PB holds all notions of participatory governance, where multiple actors are used to engage from their own perspective towards achievement of a common goal by building consensus collectively. Brian Wampler (2000) identifies the key actors of PB based on the Latin American cases. He argues that different political and social actors have different motivations for participating and promoting PB, the new venue of decision-making (Table 3.1).

⁶⁴ Transparency and accountability are the primary goals of PB. And it can be ensured through participation of citizens. Although this dissertation does not focus on these issues, it is implied that when citizens are engaged in public policy matters, such as PB, better transparency supposed to be ensured.

Table 3.1 PB Actors and their Motivational Roles.

Actors		Motivational Roles
1. Local Governments (both elected representatives and officials)		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political support • Equitable distribution of scarce resources • Learning lessons from citizens' perspective • Reduce bureaucratic inefficiency • Promote transparency
2. Citizens		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Access to information and decision-making and resolve problems together with local government authorities. • Get incentives and benefits • Development of their own communities
3. Civic Organizations	Voluntary associations and NGOs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mobilizations and gaining outcomes • Networking for negotiation of demands • Technical support to local government • Become implementing partner • Support citizens to capacity building and participate
	Business community	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contractors can fairly involve in implementation • Benefit directly avoiding bribery

Note: Developed by Author from Wampler (2000).

Arguably, as presented in the table, although citizens are invited actors (Hettings & Kugelberg, 2018), they should play direct and active roles in the core decision-making process, while local governments (both elected representatives and officials), civil society organizations (if any) play passive and supportive roles.⁶⁵

However, this research focus on the actors who are directly related with the budget decision-making. The budget process operation is highlighted because it shows how actors are functioning for the goal, the converged decision-making of the budget as stated in section 3.2.2. Therefore, concentrating on the specific actors, the elected representatives, the officials and the citizens is thought to be predictably effective in this research. That is why, this dissertation does not include civil society and business community as the PB actors.

⁶⁵ Similar ideas are illustrated in Figure 3.1 of this Chapter.

Gordon et al. (2017) describe from Rodgers (2010) that PB creates governance within the jurisdiction of a local government, where government is the sole or primary actor in addressing public problems along with involvement of public by the bureaucratic and technocratic support (Stone, 2012). PB has two sides: in one side there are elected officials and local government staffs and in the other side there are citizens. In these two sides, three actors are engaged to play their individual roles. The ideas of actor's role identified by Gordon et al. (2017) are summarized in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2 Actors and their Roles.

Actors	Supportive Roles
1. Elected Officials	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political will • Commitment and support • Learning lessons from citizens' perspective • Reduce bureaucratic inefficiency • Promote transparency
2. Municipal staffs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Technical support • Resource management • Responding citizens need
3. Citizens	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Civic capacity and interest • Individual or group influence PB outcomes

Note: Developed by Author from Gordon et al. (2000).

The above-discussed roles of actors are different than the roles identified in the previous section where voluntary organizations/NGOs and business community were included. In many cases worldwide, PB emerged as a civil society movement and mobilizations (Avritzer, 2002; Baiocchi, 2005), and act as the catalyst in implementing PB between the local government and citizens. In studying prospects of PB in developing countries, Moynihan (2007) argues that in improving inadequate participation civil society can play an important role. But later, civil society was excluded from the implementation process of PB of some countries including Bangladesh. At

present, PB in Bangladesh mainly administered by three actors: elected representatives, local government officials and citizens.⁶⁶

The focus of this dissertation is to examine actor's role in PB process to maximize the utility of their own interest with a discussion on their behavioral influences towards the effectiveness of PB in Bangladesh local government context. Depending on the discussion of the above and considering the present implementation situation discussed in Chapter 2 in light of actor's role and behavior, this dissertation defines actors of PB as elected representatives, local government officials and citizens. However, above defined roles of actors are guided by the institutional rules along with organizational competence. At the same time, actor's behavior, response and responsibilities are crucial for effective participation in PB process.

3.3.2 Actors' Behavior in PB Process: Application of Participatory Governance Theory


As actors of PB is defined in this dissertation as citizens, elected representatives and local government officials, who are interactively connected around a PB process and their behaviors have direct effects on the effectiveness of PB (Figure 3.1). This is a 'rule of the game' that sets the boundaries of choices, provides incentives, and sets payoffs for different actors and their behaviors become stable and patterned, or alternatively institutionalized, not because it is imposed, but because it is elicited (Bates et al., 1998). Hence, it is crucially important to consider the actor's behavioral activism to promote or set up the implementation of a PB (Rocke, 2014).

The Figure 3.1 depicts the individual actors and their major roles. It is needed to discuss how the individual actor behave to perform their roles and how their behaviors effect in the outcomes of PB in the theoretical context of 'participatory governance'. In the participatory

⁶⁶ Civil society/NGOs are not officially part of PB as the Local Government (UP) Act, 2009 does not specifically mention about engaging them in PB process. But there are some partnership practices of PB with NGOs for more effective implementation of PB.

governance approach, both local governments and citizens must have to play equal roles to collaborate each other in solving societal problems mutually for better citizens, better decisions and better government (Cornwall, 2004; Gaventa, 2020),⁶⁷ although citizens are invited in the process to provide feedbacks, inputs and producing decisions on the public money allocation (Gordon et al., 2017). Such behavior is related to the outcomes in terms of increased budgetary allocation to mitigate the citizens’ demands through developmental accomplishments that ultimately contributes to the establishment of bottom-up democracy.⁶⁸

Figure 3.1 Interactive Connectedness of Actors in a PB Process.



Note: There are three actors in PB process of the local government of Bangladesh. In an ideal situation, these actors are supposed to be independently and equally engaged in a PB process.

Source: Author’s Analysis.

⁶⁷ These ideas are related to the efficient and effective governance through the process of PB.

⁶⁸ These ideas are related to the outputs and outcomes of PB process, while the former is one of the main focuses of this dissertation.

Participatory governance has increasingly moved into a relational, and mutually constructive approach, suggesting how a state willingly share power (Melgar, 2014) with non-state actors,⁶⁹ and how they are empowered to influence and share control of processes of public decision-making that affect their lives (Malena, 2014). Traditional representative democracy has deficiencies specifically to uphold the citizens' voices and needs. Major portion of citizens are excluded in the gradually lower turnout of voters in election system and participatory governance tries to address such 'democratic deficit' (Wincott, 1998) by promoting citizen information, rights awareness, and participation (Malena, 2014). Participatory governance thus manifests a core attribute of governance theory in its attempt to engage with real problems and seek practical solutions (Chhotray & Stoker, 2009).

For the last three decades, participatory governance has become a common practice worldwide that reemerged during 1990s, although it has roots in ancient democratic ideas (Malena, 2014) as well as it has link with a wider range of theoretical discourses that deals with participation such as liberal democracy, communitarianism, populism, Freirean empowerment, new institutionalism and neoliberalism (Chhotray & Stoker, 2009). Arguably, the link of participation with the new institutionalism such as Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI hereafter)⁷⁰ theory sees individuals not only as citizens but also as beneficiaries, clients, and users. To analyze the functions and operation of PB applying the concepts of RCI to the budget-making process is considered to be an effective way.

And participatory governance approaches are based on the premise of such definitions of citizens who have both right and responsibility to participate in the processes of public decision-making. So, both local governments and citizens must have to play equal role to collaborate each

⁶⁹ Non-state actors are meant as citizens, community associations, bargaining groups, social forums etc.

⁷⁰ That is also a main theoretical focus of this dissertation.

other in solving societal problems mutually for better citizens, better decisions and better government (Cornwall, 2004; Gaventa, 2020). The potential benefits of participatory governance for local government actors are legitimacy, popularity and stability. At the same time, citizens can improve the quality and quantity of information fed into public decision-making, generate stronger awareness of citizens' needs and create pressure for necessary reforms to materialize their own well-being.⁷¹

Participatory governance mostly held in local government level. Hertting & Kugelberg (2018) more precisely refers it to 'local participatory governance' which they mean, government-sponsored direct participation between invited citizens and local officials in concrete arrangements, concerning the problems affecting them. It focuses on the deepening democratic engagement through participation of citizens in the processes of governance within the local community. The idea is that citizens should play more direct roles in public decision-making. The concepts of PB as a participatory governance approach holds the same notions and ideas that citizens are invited in the process to get feedbacks, inputs and producing decisions on the public money allocation (Gordon et al., 2017). That is why, PB is an established participatory governance approach recently.

This dissertation is to discuss actor's roles and behaviors in PB processes of UP and Pourashava of Bangladesh, which are governed by the elected representatives and administered by officials. Elected representatives and officials are supposed to be obliged and act by the created rules and policies in implementing PB. Effectiveness of PB is closely related to the behavior of those actors.

⁷¹ The participatory governance approach is directly related to the generation of outputs and outcomes. And PB as participatory governance mechanism holds same output-oriented notion.

3.4 PB Process and Theory of Rational Choice Institutionalism

3.4.1 Implication of RCI: From Theory to Practice of PB

PB is mainly a tool of participatory governance rather than to be a budgetary practice, while governance refers to a practice of linking objectives of diverse stakeholders, such as citizens, community groups, elected representatives and appointed officials (Lynn et al., 2000). It also refers to a set of institutions and actors, concerned to create the conditions for ordered rule and collective action (Stoker, 1998). In establishing governance, institutions matter- because they are legally established, and governed by elected representatives (mayor, councilors) accountable to citizens (Pawlowska & Radzik, 2006). In normative context, institution constitutes actors and provides a set of norms in which the reputation of actors acquires values (Katzenstein, 1997), and the actors are also meant as stakeholders that is mentioned above in the first line of this section. In echoing with the above arguments, it can be mentioned that participatory governance is an institutional mechanism that facilitates a democratic practice more substantively at the community level, initiates new rules and roles that restructure relationships among the actors (Johnson, 2014). Institution governs people's behavior and influences the success or failure. It is a widely conceptualized humanly devised 'rule of the game' in society that shapes and constrains human interaction and individual choices (North, 1991). This way, institutions reduce uncertainty by providing a structure to everyday political, economic and social life (Holland, 2013). Sometimes, the rules tend to emerge to support dominant ideologies and power relations in any given context (March & Olsen, 1989). Institutions enable powerful actors to retain their entitlements and opportunities. Those without power strive to invest in their assets and to build agency but often

lack opportunities to make effective choices in political, economic and social spheres because of uneven playing field of institution (Holland, 2013).⁷²

As PB is an institutional matter, it is important to explore how institutional rules and roles facilitate the process.⁷³ In this purview, the RCI theory is discussed, because this theory argues that actors use institutions to maximize their utility as described later section 3.4.2. However, actors face rule-based constraints provided by the institutional environment which influence their behavior (Knight & Itai, 1996). Institutions are conceptualized as collections of rules and incentives that establish the conditions for bounded rationality, and therefore establish a political space where the individual is expected to maneuver to maximize utilities. But individual's options are inherently constrained because they are operating within the set-off rules. The basic argument of the RCI approach is that utility maximization can and will remain the primary motivation of individuals, but those individuals may realize that their goals can be achieved most effectively through institutional action and find that their behavior is shaped by the institutions. Thus, in this view, individual's rationality of choice are in some extent constrained by their membership in institutions, whether that membership is voluntary or not (Peters, 1999).

RCI is an approach of 'new institutionalism' which is not only interest-based but also an institution-based policymaking approach.⁷⁴ RCI is the main interest-based approach in the public policy literature introduced by the political scientists in late 1970s to early 1980s (Novinsky, 2015). When rational choice theorists began to research possible explanatory factors for the paradox of collective action, they found that institutions mattered (Riker, 1982; Shepsle, 1979;

⁷² PB is a political agenda that deals with the economic and social development of communities through proactive local governance practices.

⁷³ PB itself is described as a democratic institution that fosters direct participation of citizens under the certain rules and norms.

⁷⁴ New institutionalism refers to the study of institutions that focuses on the constraining and enabling effects of formal and informal rules on the behavior of individuals and groups. New institutionalism traditionally encompasses three strands: sociological institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, and historical institutionalism

Weingast & Marshall, 1988). As an interest-based approach to policymaking, RCI places actors and their behaviors at the center of policy analysis. In this regard, it generally employs a set of characteristic of behavioral assumptions for individuals, conceiving human nature as rational and self-interested, and contending that human decision-making is driven by this nature and guided by a logic of consequentialism, which means the presumption that behavior is rational if and only if it is explicable by its consequences (Novinsky, 2015). Rational choice institutionalists believe that policy priorities and choices are affected not only by the structure or institutional arrangements of political system, but also by political interests. Building on these ideas of rationality of theory, rational choice institutionalists emphasize on the role of institutions in policy-making process and outcomes. They broadly define institutions as the rules that structure or influence behavior and that shape the strategic choices and interactions of policymakers and other actors (Steinmo, 2008).⁷⁵

In general understanding, institutions are the structures that affect the behavior of actors in collective units (Nillson, 2015). Similarly, Peter (2012) characterizes institutions as a structural feature of society, being relatively stable over the time affecting individual behavior. RCI perceives individuals as rational decision-makers who act according to their own preferences when making the decisions (Hindmoor, 2006; North, 1990). As individual actors have a fixed set of preferences and behave accordingly in attainment of the preferences, Hall and Taylor (1996) identifies two assumptions, such as (a) individuals create institutions because they perform functions, which are of values to their creators; and (b) that particular institutional forms are preferred to others on the basis of their capacity to deliver greater utilities to actors. If we consider

⁷⁵ Institutional rules are used by individuals for determining who and what are included in decision-making situations, how information is structured, what actions can be taken and in what sequence, and how individual actions will be aggregated into collective decisions (Kiser & Ostrom, 1982).

these assumptions are correct, that is why, Shepsle argues that both the etymology of institutional formation and questions of institutional robustness, or persistence remained under-theorized (Shepsle, 1989). It is often criticized for its simplistic view of human behavior and motivation (Cook & Levi, 1990; Mansbridge, 1990).

In a simpler way, overall summary of above discussion is that the individual actor is quite relevant in the policy process along with the institutions because institutions provide the context in which actors pursue their interests. Actors have a relatively fixed set of preferences, behave rationally in order to achieve these preferences with the best means. Institutions structure such interactions, by affecting the range and sequence choice of alternatives by providing information and enforcement mechanisms and rules to reduce uncertainty about the behavior. Rules that limit predatory and free-riding behavior are necessary to avoid suboptimal equilibria.⁷⁶ In general, rational choice institutionalists tend to understand the political process as a series of collective action dilemmas. This is so because individuals acting to maximize the accomplishment of their own preferences are likely to choose suboptimal outcomes for collectivity. Therefore, the political process is seen as the interaction among intentional individual constrained by the rules of institutions. Since actors are aware of the effects of those rules, they will attempt to maximize their utility or to manipulate the rules to achieve their most-preferred outputs and outcomes.

3.4.2 Application of RCI Theory in Analysis of PB Process

In discussing PB from RCI perspective, Goldfrank and Schneider (2006) argue that institutions are the ‘rules of the game’ that set boundaries for choices, provide incentives, and set payoffs for the actors. Institutions have an important causal role in constraining political actors to manage social

⁷⁶ Institutions provide information about present and future behavior of others, enforcement mechanisms for contracts, and penalties for defection.

change and provide stability. They further mention that institutions can be seen as intentional creations that actors choose to impose from one of several alternative equilibria. Actors do not choose just any institutions; they choose institutions that most favor their interests. RCI theorists provide rigorous tools to analyze the incentives and constraints institutions provide to political actors (Tsebelis, 1990).

This dissertation uses RCI theory in view of methodical analysis in studying characteristics of PB broadly. The core tenets of this theory related to core institutional approaches of PB are:

- (i) PB is a collective decision-making process where individual actors or stakeholders engage on their own interest within the institutional rules. RCI explains that individual enters to a decision-making process with determined preferences (Kerremans, 2001). And individual actions are aggregated by institutions into collective decisions (Kiser & Ostrom, 1982).
- (ii) Proactive institutional rules, roles and initiatives foster effective facilitation of PB so that citizens participate spontaneously. RCI claims that institutions must be helpful to actors in decision-making by providing information about rules and capabilities of institutions, that create procedures and provide specific course of actions, rights, duties for each of the participants and provide available alternatives and incentive structures (Hall & Taylor, 1996; North, 1990). They also provide enforcement mechanisms that help to protect the rights, to fulfill duties, and to respect procedural constraints. In this sense, they will not only constrain options but equally enable courses of action that are either unfeasible or too costly in the absence of institutions. They will equally affect the usefulness of resources that actors possess or control (Scharpf, 1997).
- (iii) Regarding participation of citizens in PB, it is expected that citizen should be aware and interested profoundly for achieving their individual interests. Citizen's awareness and

interests are related to the information they receive and accordingly how far they are capable to contribute. One of the assumptions of RCI is conscious choice, that means individuals make decisions based on obtained information and in line with their own preferences. This eliminates choice based on emotion, frustration, or any other non-rational factors (Johnston, 1991). RCI also focuses the self-interest which depends on the know-how of individual actor to behave consistently to obtain utility based on their preferences (Ostrom & Ostrom, 1971).

(iv) This dissertation, constraints that are mentioned in RCI theory, is meant as institutional rules and characteristics that influence the process of PB. Within these rules how actors such as, local government actors both elected representatives and officials play their roles, and citizens response to realize their demands and gain knowledge on the issues of PB. These issues were not explored in PB context by the previous studies under theoretical framework of RCI.

Based on those characteristics of the theory, this research applies it to the structure of PB; that is the background of setting up the conceptual framework to be described.

3.5 Conceptual Framework

The concepts of role and behavior of each actor in a PB process towards maximization of utility for development objectives is integrated to develop the conceptual framework (Figure 3.2). PB of Bangladesh are governed by the elected representatives and administered by the permanent officials within the legal and policy framework of local government. Citizens are main actors and they are ingredients in enhancing participation of PB. The individual actors behave rationally to maximize their own utilities, a concept of rational choice institutionalism, which is also linked with the effectiveness of PB. Effective citizen participation means, citizens have access to PB process,

and they are engaged with the empowered role to contribute to budgetary decision-making that helps to attain desired utilities. Effectiveness of PB is defined by the effective participation of citizens together with the other actor's active roles and behaviors that generate outputs and contribute to the outcomes.

The outputs of PB are defined in this dissertation as increased amount of PB budget and adoption of projects. And the ultimate effects of increased budgetary allocation as well and development projects enhance to achieve outcomes of PB, which will contribute to effective development policy and deepening of bottom-up democracy.

The behaviors of actors have certain influences on utilities and PB process, which generally follows participatory governance approach, focuses direct participation between citizens and local government actors in concrete arrangements concerning problems that lead to generate desired outputs and outcomes. Hence, the PB process and its engagement mechanism is crucial from the participatory governance point of view. Accordingly, this research focuses on the PB process as it is directly connected with the expected outputs of increased budgetary allocation to mitigate the citizens' demands and priorities through developmental accomplishment.

The utilities of elected representatives are legitimacy and recognition by citizens to strengthen their stability of leadership in the council. To achieve such utilities, elected representatives should aspire to engage citizens in the PB process. The aspiration of elected representatives is foremost not only to encourage engagement of citizens but also to promote and establish participatory processes of PB as a strengthened governance practice in local development policy. The utilities of officials are holding precise demands and reflecting bottom-up demands of citizens. So, they engage citizens for better reflection of citizen's demands in the PB policies. But their behaviors are controlled by the rules and policies of local government and PB institution and


therefore their utilities are also constrained. The utilities of citizens are achievement of projects and community development. So, citizens aspire to participate and express their demands in the participatory processes of PB. Besides, citizens can provide concrete information of local needs and priorities. But citizens need to be aware and interested so that they can participate regularly. They also need capacity to raise legitimate demands and negotiate for achieving projects of their own communities.

These ideas are depicted in the conceptual framework from the theoretical contexts of ‘participatory governance’ and ‘rational choice institutionalism’. The conceptual framework also includes different characteristics of local governments that influence to achieve PB outputs, and eventually outcomes of socio-economic development.

As shown in the Figure 3.2, the conceptual framework has two parts. According to the concept of participatory governance theory, the first part shows the actors and their roles around PB, where elected representatives support, local government officials facilitate, and citizens participate. That means, actors engage and play their roles toward a common goal, that is PB. Effective participation and implementation of PB depend on the role and behavior of actors from their individual stance. The elected representatives are required to commit to take proper initiative to implement with the discretionary decision-making authority, local government officials are required to have capacity to facilitate PB process as well as they need to be proactive to activate stakeholders, and finally, citizens are expected to be aware, interested and capacitated not only to participate but also to contribute to the decision-making on prioritization of demands. The actors behave to maximize their individual utilities of own interests from the perspective of rational choice institutionalism theory. The utility maximization process also effects on the behavior of actors in participatory governance process shown in the left side of conceptual framework. In the

second part, the characteristics of local government together with the participatory process and utility maximization procedure produce desired output of PB, that are increased amount of budget and adoption of projects under PB. The entire process of PB is expected to generate outcomes, such as satisfaction of citizens through implementing development policies for improved socio-economic conditions and deepening bottom-up democracy.

Figure 3.2 Conceptual Framework.



Source: Author's illustration.

As shown in the figure of conceptual framework, this research encompasses the dotted area and focuses on the relationship between the behaviors of actors and outputs of PB. It cannot reach the discussion of the relationship between the outputs and the outcomes of PB in both of qualitative and quantitative level; those discussions will merit further research.

The conceptual framework is also linked with the research question, sub-questions, and the assumptions of this dissertation.

Research Question:

- How does each actor in local government make use of PB institution for own utility to contribute to effective implementation of development policy of Bangladesh?

Sub-questions:

1. How does behavior of each actor influence participation process of citizens in PB?
2. How do local governments utilize PB process to contribute to socio-economic development of UP?

Assumptions:

Assumption 1:

Citizen's awareness, interest and capacity have influence on their participation process in PB.

Assumption 2:

The proactiveness of the actors of local government affects the process of PB.

Assumption 3:

Different characteristics of UP affect PB process and outputs.

Chapter 4: **Research Methodology**

4.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the adopted methods and approaches of this dissertation along with the data collection and interpretation techniques to response the research questions and discuss the assumptions. The main research question of this dissertation is ‘how does each actor in local government make use of PB institution for own utility to contribute to effective implementation of development policy of Bangladesh?’ and two sub-questions are: (1) How does behavior of each actor influence participation process of citizens in PB? and (2) How do local governments utilize PB process to contribute to socio-economic development of UP? And three assumptions of this dissertation are: (1) Citizen’s awareness, interest and capacity have influence on their participation process in PB; (2) The proactiveness of the actors of local government affects the process of PB; and (3) Different characteristics of UP affect PB process and outputs. At the beginning of this chapter, the research design is outlined followed by justification of selecting study areas and local governments. Then adopted methods and tools of data collection are detailed out with the sampling techniques and sample size. The data analysis methods are also described with a description of research ethics in the end of this Chapter.

4.2 Research Design and Strategy

The objective of this research is to examine behavior and characteristic of each actor of local government influencing PB process and find out how the PB operation can be improved for effective development policy in Bangladesh. To achieve the objective of the study, both quantitative and qualitative approaches are adopted.

Firstly, in participatory public decision-making like PB, citizens are the central and it is necessary to understand their attitude, behavior, and perception towards participation. They are also thought to make the principal roles in the decision-making structures based on their participation concepts among the actors. That is why, this study adopts quantitative approach of survey (Survey I) to citizens to explore their own perception and behavior on PB as well as their understanding on the role of local governments and its actors in Chapter 5.

Secondly, qualitative approaches are also adopted to understand the circumstances of participation and PB more deeply especially from the implementation perspectives. For this purpose, qualitative interview (Interview 1) was done with the organizational actors, such as elected representatives and local government officials to examine their roles and behaviors as well as actions regarding implementation and initiatives of PB. Elected representatives and local officials are thought to pursue their utilities through making use of PB. Therefore, both quantitative survey (Survey 1) and qualitative interview (Interview 1) were employed in order to figure out those behavior in Chapter 5. Moreover, Interview 2 was conducted with the key policy decision-makers of different levels of government, academics and civil society representatives for getting the wider views on the proactiveness of elected representatives and officials in Chapter 5.

Thirdly, different characteristics of UPs were assumed to contribute to the outputs of PB and perceiving the real condition gains understanding of PB's functions. Therefore, the quantitative analysis of statistical data was carried out in Chapter 6.

Besides, informal interview as well as discussion were done with various key personnel during the entire span of research to refer and justify the analysis in both Chapter 5 and 6. The nonparticipants observations were also done and used in analysis wherever it is required.

4.3 Selection of Local Governments and Study Areas

This research includes rural local government UPs and urban local government Pourashavas for studying of PB. The rationale for selection of these two local government bodies are: (i) both are considered as the basic local government bodies; (b) both are the smallest and lowest tiers in local government structure in rural and urban types; (c) both are currently implementing PB although Pourashavas have less experiences in this regard.

Table 4.1 Location-wise Distribution of Selected Local Government Bodies.

Local Governments	Number	Locations	
		<i>Barguna</i>	<i>Sylhet</i>
UP	32	16	16
Pourashava	8	4	4
Total=	40	20	20

Source: Author's

This research encompasses 40 local government bodies from two districts: Barguna and Sylhet districts. Among them, 32 are UPs and 8 are Pourashavas, selected using cluster sampling method. Cluster sampling method usually used in selection of samples on the basis of geography (Julien, 2008).

Rationale of Selection of Study Areas

This study is conducted over the local governments of two districts: Barguna and Sylhet. The following are the rationale of selecting the study areas:

- 1) As there is regional disparity, the eastern part is considered more developed than the other parts of Bangladesh considering the socio-economic background (see number 3 below). Barguna is located in the most-southern part and Sylhet is located in the eastern corner of

Bangladesh. It is assumed that implementation of PB may varies in separate locations, and it is aimed to investigate in chapter 6 with empirical evidence.

- 2) The physiography of Barguna is riverine lowland with coastal deltas of the Bay of Bengal and it is a disaster-prone area. And the physiography of Sylhet is combined with the small mountains and *haors*.⁷⁷ Physiographic conditions could be a determinant for regional disparity and development in influencing variations in PB outputs, which will be verified in chapter 6.
- 3) These two districts have distinct social and economic conditions. For example, the average poverty rate of Barguna and Sylhet is 32.1% and 18.0% respectively while the national average poverty rate is 24.3%⁷⁸. And literacy rate of Barguna and Sylhet is 58.9% and 53.7% respectively, while national average literacy rate is 73.9%.⁷⁹ Barguna has entirely agriculture-based economy and Sylhet has both agriculture and industries. These characteristics are also related to regional disparity.
- 4) Sylhet is almost three times larger than Barguna by area, population, and number of local governments. The population of Barguna and Sylhet are 0.9 and 3.4 million respectively⁸⁰ if there are variations between larger and smaller regions.

In analyzing the output of PB in chapter 6 based on the secondary data of PB and other socio-economic indicators, the above-mentioned criteria are considered.

⁷⁷ *Haor* is the wetland ecosystem in the north eastern part of Bangladesh, which is physically a bowl or saucer shaped shallow depression, also known as backswamp.

⁷⁸ Source: Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics. Preliminary Report on Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2016.

⁷⁹ Source: Statistical Year Book 2019. Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics.

⁸⁰ Source: District websites <http://www.barguna.gov.bd/> and <http://www.sylhet.gov.bd/> accessed on April 10, 2019

Table 4.2 List of Selected UPs and Pourashavas.

Name of District	Name of Upazila (Sub-District)	Population	Selected UP	Population	Selected Pourashava	Population
Barguna	1. Amtali	270,802	1. Arpangashia 2. Chaora 3. Haldia 4. Kukua	14,873 20,802 29,787 24,028	1. Amtali	17,311
	2. Barguna Sadar	261,343	5. Badarkhali 6. Burirchar 7. Gourichanna 8. Fuljhury	26,201 29,542 27,675 13,205	2. Barguna	32,253
	3. Betagi	117,145	9. Bibichini 10. Hosnabad 11. Kazirabad 12. Mokamia	17,347 16,276 14,247 14,165	3. Betagi	10,204
	4. Patharghata	163,927	13. Kakchira 14. Kalmegha 15. Kathaltali 16. Nachnapara	20,720 25,894 19,788 12,484	4. Patharghata	17,177
Sylhet	5. Beanibazar	253,616	17. Kurarbazar 18. Mathiura 19. Mollapur 20. Sheola	23,872 14,705 11,362 19,786	5. Beanibazar	42,030
	6. Golapganj	316,149	21. Bagha 22. Fulbari 23. Lakshmipasha 24. Paschim Amura	33,951 27,876 23,901 17,990	6. Golapganj	32,444
	7. Kanaighat	263,969	25. Bara Chotul 26. Jhingabari 27. Dakshin Banigram 28. Rajaganj	23,357 34,161 29,486 33,051	7. Kanaighat	27,078
	8. Zakiganj	237,137	29. Barothakuri 30. Kholachara 31. Manikpur 32. Sultanpur	23,285 20,759 32,557 26,062	8. Zakiganj	16,398
Total=		1,884,088	32	723,195	8	194,895

Source: Population and Housing Census 2011, Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics.

4.4 Data Collection Methods and Data Sources

The main instrument for gathering data includes survey, interviews, non-participant observations and secondary data of different sources. The Survey 1 includes general citizens, the Interview 1 includes local government officials and elected representatives, and the Interview 2 was done with different key informants. The questionnaire survey was administered using simple random

sampling technique, which is the most commonly used sampling technique (Kumar, 2011) and indispensable for larger survey. The purposive sampling technique is used for both interview 1 and 2 (Etikan et al., 2016). Purposive sampling can be more realistic in terms of time, effort and cost needed in finding informants (Seidler, 1974; Snedecor, 1939). The survey was conducted using close-ended questionnaire, and interview 1 and 2 were conducted using semi-structured questionnaire. Related documents on local governments, citizen participation and PB are analyzed and triangulated to confirm and cross-validate (Bowen, 2009; Creswell, 2009; Yin, 2009).⁸¹

4.4.1 Survey to Citizens

The research scope allows to adopt survey technique to look into the attitude and behavior of citizens toward participation in PB. Citizens are the beneficiaries of PB as well as they are also the important actors of PB process. So, it is crucial to examine how citizens perceive the issues of PB as a whole, how far their awareness and understanding are competing for influencing effectiveness of PB and how they play their roles in an institutional framework of PB. Hence, Survey I was conducted among the citizens of selected UPs and Pourashavas to respond the research questions and discuss the assumptions. Mainly survey data are used to discuss Assumption 1: Citizen's awareness, interest and capacity have influence on their participation process in PB; and Assumption 2: the proactiveness of the actors of local government affects the process of PB.

The face-to-face survey was conducted using semi-structured questionnaires. The questionnaire includes the issues of awareness, interest and capacity of citizen respondents in participation of PB and also the general perception about the participation behavior of citizens, not

⁸¹ The quality of a research is related to generalizability of the result and thereby to the testing and increasing the validity or trustworthiness of the research (Golafshani, 2003). Arguably, the generalizability is conformed with triangulation which is a strategy for improving validity and reliability of research.

the actual behavior of respondents. So, the outcomes Survey I are not the actual awareness and behavior of citizens but the concept or acknowledgement of citizen's thinking. These are the limitations of this survey. The distribution of survey questionnaire is as follows (Table 4.3).

Table 4.3 Survey Questionnaire Distribution.

Name of Local Governments	Number of Selected Local Governments	Number of Respondents per Local Government Unit	Number of Respondents
UP	32	10	32 x 10 = 320
Pourashava	8	10	8 x 10 = 80
Total=			400

Source: Author's

Selection of Survey Sample Size

The purpose of determining sample size is to determine a set of elements from larger population so that the characteristics of those elements reflect a fair trend of total population (Babbie, 2014). This study adopts the sampling method of Dixon and Leach (1977) in fixing sample size of large population using 95% confidence level with 5% confidence limit and assuming 50% variability. Using this technique, the sample size was calculated as 384 ($N=384$) (Table 4.4). For equal distribution of the samples among 40 studied local government bodies, the sample size was confirmed as 400 ($N=400$) to cover 10 samples per local government unit applying random sampling technique.

Table 4.4 Sample Size Estimation for Survey.

Confidence Limit (+/- %)	Confidence Level	
	99%	95%
1	16587	9604
2	4147	2401
3	1843	1067
4	1037	600
5	663	384
6	461	267
7	339	196
8	259	150
9	205	119
10	166	96
15	74	43
20	41	24

Source: Dixon & Leach (1977).

4.4.2 Interview to Elected Representatives and Local Government Officials

The qualitative data of this research were collected by interviews, which is the most widely employed qualitative data collection techniques (Bryman, 2012) to investigate subjective interpretations of social phenomena. The aims are interpretation and understanding of how and why, not 'fact-finding' or getting answers to questions of how much or how many (Warren, 1988). Considering the similar aim of this research, qualitative interviews (Interview 1) have been conducted with the elected representatives and officials of UPs and Pourashavas who are directly involved and engaged in implementation of PB. Interviews were conducted with the purposively selected participants mentioned in the table below (Table 4.5) using a semi-structured open-ended questionnaire. The contents of Interview 1 cover organizational role on PB facilitation and implementation along with the underlying constraints. The interview results are limitedly used and analyzed in Chapter 5 to explore the behavioral intension of organizational actors of local government in expanding PB in responding sub-research question 1: how does behavior of each actor influence participation process of citizens in PB? and in discussing assumption 2: the proactiveness of the actors of local government affects the process of PB.

Table 4.5 Category of Qualitative Interviewee.

Local Governments	Number of Selected Local Governments	Selected Interviewee from Each Local Government Unit	Number of Participants
UP	32	Chairman-1 Member-1 Women Member-1 <u>Secretary (Official)-1</u> <i>Sub-Total = 4</i>	4 x 32 = 128
Pourashava	8	Mayor-1 Councilor-1 Women Councilor-1 <u>Secretary (Official)-1</u> <i>Sub-Total = 4</i>	4 x 8 = 32
Total =			160

Source: Author's

4.4.3 Key Informants Interviews

Key informant refers to the person with whom an interview about a particular organization, social program, problem, or interest group is conducted (Lavrakas, 2008).⁸² The discussion of this research centered to PB and its process, which is a very much policy issue of local development; which are implemented through the participatory processes. Hence, it is important to understand the policy perspectives of PB. Therefore, it is significant to explore the views of relevant key officials responsible for policy decision-making in the different levels of government from central to local. Moreover, the experts of relevant field of citizen participation and PB, such as academics, scholars and civil society representatives, were also included in Interview 2 to understand the theoretical views and practical implementation experiences. An open-ended questionnaire was used for such interviews along with informal discussion with 28 key informants those were purposively selected. The opinions were transcribed and used in Chapter 5 and 6.

⁸² KIIs are qualitative in-depth interviews with people who know what is going on the subject matter. The purpose of KIIs is to collect information from a wide range of people—who have first hand knowledge, such as experts, with their particular knowledge and understanding, can provide insight on the nature of problems and give recommendations for solutions.

Table 4.6 Distribution of Key Informants for Interview.

Key Informants	No.
Local Government Division	4
LGSP-3 Project	1
MGSP Project	1
Deputy Commissioner (CEO of District)	2
Deputy Director (Local Government) based in district	2
District Facilitators of LGSP-3 Project	2
Upazila Nirbahi Officer (CEO of Sub-districts)	8
Experts (academia, NGO/INGO)	8
Total=	28

Source: Author's.

Table 4.7 Distribution of Key Informants for Interview.

Central Government Officials	District Level Officials	Upazila (sub-district) Level Officials
1. Ministry 1	5. District 1	9. Upazila 1
2. Ministry 2	6. District 2	10. Upazila 2
3. Ministry 3	7. District 3	11. Upazila 3
4. Ministry 4	8. District 4	12. Upazila 4
		13. Upazila 5
		14. Upazila 6
		15. Upazila 7
		16. Upazila 8
Government Projects	Academics	NGOs
17. Project 1	21. Academic 1	25. NGO 1
18. Project 2	22. Academic 2	26. NGO 2
19. Project 3	23. Academic 3	27. NGO 3
20. Project 4	24. Academic 4	28. NGO 4

Source: Author's.

4.4.4 Nonparticipant Observations

Nonparticipant observation is a data collection method to observe events, activities, and interactions with the aim of gaining a direct understanding of a phenomenon in its natural context (Liu & Maitlis 2010) without active participation.⁸³ It is different from participant observational methods because the researcher has no contact with the informant, but rather records a situation involving real individual reactions and behaviors (Giannelloni & Vernetto, 2001). In this context,

⁸³ It is relatively an unobstructive qualitative research strategy for gathering primary data about different aspects of social world without interacting directly with the participants.

nonparticipant observation is also important in studying citizen participation in PB. Because it enables the understanding how participatory processes are taken place, participant's behavior of opinion expression. During field work of this research, one participatory open-budget session and one ward level PB prioritization meeting was observed for getting real essence of PB process and to get deeper understanding of the role performance of actors. Prior to that author practically worked with the UPs and Pourashavas as a part of his official duty and attended several participatory meetings including open-budget sessions. Author specifically observed PB facilitation processes, local government officials' role, citizens' way of response in PB process. The findings of nonparticipants observations are used in the discussion of Chapter 5 and 6 and in addressing both assumption 2: the proactiveness of the actors of local government affects the process of PB, assumption 3: different characteristics of UP affect PB process and outputs.

4.4.5 Secondary Data Sources

The secondary data are used to discuss the characteristics of UPs that contribute to outputs of PB in Chapter 6. The data of PB budget UPs and their sectoral development priorities are collected from the database of LGSP project of Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives. The data of area, population, literacy, poverty, and other indices are collected from National Census and other survey database of Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, the national statistical organization. The data of voters' turnout and support to elected representatives (Chairpersons) are collected from the Bangladesh Election Commission. Other data, such as Chairpersons' education level, their duration of chairpersonship, number of participants of open-budget sessions and number of specific projects are collected directly by author from the individual UPs. The sources of data are cited in the footnotes as well as in the notes of Tables and Figures wherever is relevant.

4.5 Data Analysis

To achieve the research objective as well as addressing the research questions, the collected data through quantitative and qualitative techniques were analyzed. The survey data were analyzed using SPSS and Excel and interview data were manually summarized and categorized to relate the research questions and assumptions. The opinions were coded into common themes according to similarities or differences in conceptualizing citizen participation in local government budgeting under the big picture of research context (King, 2004). For interpretation of data, relevant graphical presentations and cross-tabulations were done. The document analysis was done to get descriptive information and cross-check with the findings of the research (Babbie, 2014).

4.6 Ethical Consideration

Ethical considerations have a particular resonance due to in-depth nature of the study process and it becomes more salient when conducting face-to-face survey and interview (Arifin, 2018). In conducting this research, ethical issues have been appropriately considered. Firstly, informed consent was followed strictly so that participants were fully aware about the main aspects of research and accordingly their written or verbal consent was obtained during the survey and interview (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). Secondly, the identity was kept confidential or anonymous and assurance was extended beyond protecting their names. And thirdly, in some extent being an insider of government system the researcher avoided any conflict of interests rather to take advantages of interpreting the context (Fleming, 2018).⁸⁴

⁸⁴ Major ethical considerations, such as informed consent, voluntary participation, do no harm, confidentiality, anonymity etc. have been strictly followed.

Chapter 5: Actors' Influence in Participatory Processes of PB

5.1 Introduction

The survey of this research is a sample inquiry and covers the limited number of respondents, and the analyses of this chapter are based on those case studies. This chapter analyzes perception of actors towards their behaviors in PB process, more specifically from the view of participatory governance approach. As per the conceptual framework of this dissertation, output of PB process is defined by increased amount of budget and adoption of projects under PB. Centered on the participatory governance theory, creating circumstances to enable citizen participation is foremost important in PB process. Actors of PB are defined as elected local representatives, local government officials and citizens of the constituency. The analysis of this chapter attempts to investigate actors' perception related to participation of PB by addressing following two assumptions of the research:

Assumption 1:

Citizen's awareness, interest and capacity have influence on their participation process in PB.

Assumption 2:

The proactiveness of the actors of local government affects the process of PB.

The collected primary data of survey to citizens are quantitatively analyzed and discussed in the first part of this chapter to address the Assumption 1. Data of sociodemographic features of survey participants are presented at the beginning of this chapter followed by the analysis of respondents' perceptions on their understanding, awareness, interest, and capacity on participation in PB. This is a sample inquiry and it has its own limitation of the credibility but it is thought to

offer some suggestions of the social situation and potential of Bangladesh society. Paying attention to those limitations the analyses shall be implemented cautiously.

Subsequently, to address Assumption 2, the analysis includes survey data along with data of interview to actors and key informants. The findings are discussed with observational remarks at the end of this chapter. The analysis limits its scope within the conceptual framework of this dissertation (Figure 3.2 in Chapter 3) and scope of the theory of ‘participatory governance’ and ‘rational choice institutionalism’ to discuss the behavior of actors in playing their roles in the processes of PB.

5.2 Socio-Demographic Features of Respondents


This research conducted a survey to examine the perception of citizen respondents regarding their understanding on PB and its processes as well as related factors that affect their participation. This section presents and discusses socio-demographic data of respondents. All the respondents of this survey are general citizens of selected local governments. The sample size of survey was 400 and out of them, 320 were from 32 selected UPs and 80 were from 8 selected Pourashavas applying random sampling technique.⁸⁵ Survey was conducted only with the respondents who were agreed to participate voluntarily, and their consents were adopted. The socio-demographic features of the respondents are presented below.

⁸⁵ The sample size was determined by exercising the popular sampling method of Dixon and Leach (1977) using 95% confidence level with 5% confidence limit and assuming 50% variability, and sample size was calculated as 384 ($N=384$) (Table 4.4 in Chapter 4). For equal distribution of the samples among 40 studied local government bodies, the sample size was confirmed as 400 ($N=400$) to cover 10 samples per local government unit.

5.2.1 Gender

From the frequency distribution of gender (Table 5.1), it is found that 78.2% are male and 21.8% are female (Figure 5.1). So, women participation in this survey is extremely low, because most of the women were not agreeable to participate and express their opinion, which is quite common in rural and suburban areas of Bangladesh. The recruited data collectors conducted survey visiting randomly the homes of citizens of selected UPs and Pourashavas.

Figure 5.1 Gender Distribution of Respondents.




Source: Author's.

5.2.2 Age

Most of the respondents are from the age group of 25-40, which is 50.7%. And 33.8% respondents are from 41-60 age group. Respondents from young and elderly people are less, because it is found that 9.0% are from the age group of 25 years and below and 6.5% are from the age group of 60 years and above. So, most of the survey participants are young to middle aged.

Figure 5.2 Age Distribution of Respondents.




Source: Author's.

5.2.3 Educational Background

There were varieties in educational background of citizen respondents. Majority of the respondents had secondary level of education, which is 26.3%. And 24.8% were primary educated, 18.3% are higher secondary educated, 11.0% are graduates and 2.8% has post-graduate level of education. But a considerable percentage of respondents has no education. That means there are illiterate respondents, which is 17.0%. For quantitative analyses, the level of education is further categorized into three groups: below secondary (includes 'no literacy' and 'primary') (41.8%), secondary (includes secondary only) (26.3%), and above secondary (includes higher secondary, graduate, and post-graduate) (32.2%). The educational background of respondents represents the general literacy level of the people of Bangladesh, while national adult literacy rate is 73.9%.⁸⁶

⁸⁶ Source: Statistical Yearbook 2019. Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics.

Figure 5.3 Educational Background of the Respondents.



Source: Author's.

5.2.4 Occupation

Citizens of diversified occupational background participated in the survey. Among different professional backgrounds of the respondents 23.0% are small businessmen at local markets, 11.8% are businessmen who are mainly the small and medium scale entrepreneurs, 11.8% are farmers, 10.5% are day-laborers engaged in agricultural tasks, and 9.8% are teachers of primary and secondary schools. Other respondents are 7.8% students, 5.3% fishermen, 5.5% salarymen engaged in government of private job, 4.5% NGO workers, 3.8% housewives, 3.5% mechanics of repairing different machineries, 3.0% village doctors and rest of 2.0% are from some other occupations such as religious leaders, tailors, barbers, carpenters etc. The distribution of occupations of survey respondents almost represents the general occupational trend of the people at local level, while 37.8% citizen's occupation is agriculture, 21.7% are industry, and 40.6% are engaged in service sector.⁸⁷

Socio-demographic features of survey participants are summarized in Table 5.1.

⁸⁷ Source: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/438360/employment-by-economic-sector-in-bangladesh/>

Table 5.1 Socio-demographic Features of the Survey Participants.

Demographic Features	F (N=400)	%
Gender		
Male	365	78.2
Female	35	21.8
Age		
<25 Year	36	9.0
25-40 Year	203	50.7
41-60 Year	135	33.8
>60 Year	26	6.5
Education		
No Literacy	68	17.0
Primary	99	24.8
Secondary	105	26.3
Higher Secondary	73	18.3
Graduate	44	11.1
Post-graduate	11	2.8
Occupation		
Small Business	92	23.0
Business	46	11.8
Farmer	43	11.8
Day-Laborer	42	10.5
Teacher	38	9.8
Fisherman	21	5.3
Student	31	7.8
Salaryman	20	5.0
NGO	18	4.5
Housewife	15	3.8
Mechanic	14	3.5
Village Doctor	12	3.0
Others	8	2.0

Source: Created by Author.

5.3 Citizen’s Behavior and Level of Participation in PB

Citizens are the main actors in a PB process. Their primary usage of PB is the development of their own communities by accomplishing development priorities and projects. To achieve such goals, citizens use various methods to maximize their benefits through the budgetary processes. PB is to incorporate citizen perspective into budget designation, to increase impact of public policy, enhance budget transparency and comply with citizens’ right to participate in their own governance. For meaningful participation of citizens to realize their own priorities and demands, their understanding and awareness, interest, capacity, societal cooperation, and scope of participation

are necessary. This section is to investigate how these factors affect the degree of participation in PB in local government context of Bangladesh through perceptual responses of citizens.⁸⁸

5.3.1 Degree of Participation in PB

5.3.1.1 Participation in the Processes of Participatory Planning and Budgeting

To examine the degree of participation in local level planning and budgeting, the survey respondents were asked whether they have ever participated in any participatory decision-making process including PB or not. The results are presented in Table 5.2, where it can be observed that 60.8% of the respondents never participated in any event of participatory planning or budgeting. That means, the ratio of non-participation is very high, which is almost two-third of total respondents. And only one-third respondents participated in different participatory processes including PB. So, the results reflect the low degree of participation in participatory planning and budgeting of Bangladesh. Such low degree of participation is observed in the PB processes of both category of local governments of UPs and Pourashavas. Therefore, a huge number of citizens are excluded from the participatory processes of PB, while participation by majority of the citizens is key to effective implementation. Such a big ratio of non-participation means that there is a general tendency of respondents not to participate in PB and consequently it results low degree of participation. There are various reasons for such low level of participation, that will be examined in the upcoming sections.

Table 5.2 Participation of Citizens in PB Processes.

Participated in PB	Total		UP		Pourashava	
	F	%	F	%	F	%
Yes	157	39.2	121	37.8	36	45.0
No	243	60.8	199	62.2	44	55.0
Total	400	100	320	100	80	100

Source: Created by Author.

⁸⁸ Perceptual response of citizens was obtained by survey. Also see Section 4.4.1 of Chapter 4.

The respondents who participated (39.2%) in PB process, has variations in the ratio of their participation according to their level of education. As shown in Table 5.3 below, the lower level educated respondents participated more than the higher-level educated respondents. Among three categories of education, 52.2% are below secondary, 29.3% are secondary, and 18.5% are above secondary participated in different PB processes once and or more times. Simultaneously, ratio of non-participation is high among the higher level educated than the lower educated. Therefore, the trend of participation of lower level educated is increasing and it can be mentioned here that PB is more sympathized towards lower level educated citizens, those are marginalized in the grassroots. In other way, it can be mentioned here that there is significant demand of PB among the grassroots level citizens (Rahman et al., 2004). Therefore, both local governments and citizens of marginalized in the community having lower level of education have positive gestures towards PB, which could be a new way of representing marginalized groups in the decision-making process to be extremely supportive for deepening bottom-up democracy in the local government level of Bangladesh.⁸⁹

Table 5.3 Participation of PB by Education Level.

		Education Level		
		Below Secondary	Secondary	Above Secondary
Participated in PB	Yes (N=157)	52.2% (82)	29.3% (46)	18.5% (29)
	No (N=243)	34.6% (84)	24.3% (59)	41.2% (100)

Note: N=400.

There are also variations in degree of participation of the respondents in the different processes and events of PB. As calculated in Table 5.4 below, among different processes of PB, as it is found that 47.2% participated at community meeting, 61.1% participated at ward level

⁸⁹ Strengthened democratic practices are observed mostly in the local level of Bangladesh.

meeting, 25.8% participated at UP/Pourashava level meetings, 31.9% participated at council meetings, and most importantly 79.5% respondents participated in the open-budget session. The first two PB processes, community meeting and ward meeting are most important points for effective engagement of citizens, which were also identified and discussed in Chapter 2.⁹⁰ Because main discussion and deliberation of PB are held in community and ward level meetings as well as projects are prioritized with estimation of resources in these processes. Approximately, half of the respondents participated in these two processes, which is not so much high of effective level. That means local governments do not properly organize and facilitate such meetings as well as citizens are not properly informed and invited (Chowdhury & Aketruzzaman, 2016). Moreover, these two committees have limited number of members. As a result, participation of citizens is also limited (GOB, 2018). These grassroot level committees are considerable here for exercising inclusive and strengthened decision-making over the budgetary resource management. This is also an opportunity for citizens to practice direct democracy by contributing their ideas in the process of local development. If there is increased participation in community and ward level meetings, the effectiveness of PB will be enhanced (Shah, 2007).

Participation of respondents in open-budget session is much higher than other PB processes as per data of Table 5.4 below. In open-budget session, local people can freely discuss on the proposed budget allocations and assert their comments and recommendations for the final budget (Rahman et al., 2004). The main reason for increased participation in this process is that everyone can participate in open-budget session as there is no restriction of the number of participants. Moreover, open-budget session is a well-known PB event to citizens as local governments disseminate information of this event widely to encourage citizens. So, general awareness of

⁹⁰ See Section 2.5.1.3 of Chapter 2.

citizens about open-budget session is higher and consequently ratio of participation is also high. It is observed⁹¹ during non-participatory observations by the author that some UPs organized open-budget session in a very festive manner followed by cultural events. Such arrangement is seemed attractive and general citizens feel encouragement to participate. Besides, open-budget session is usually held in the afternoon on the holiday when people have no work and have time to attend. Regardless the circumstances, it can be mentioned here that general citizens are much more aware about the open-budget session and accordingly their ratio of participation in open-budget session is significantly functional more than other processes of PB. Hence, open-budget session has become the main process of PB by which major participation of citizens in PB are implemented. The general goal of open-budget session is to show mass participation in PB although practical scope of deliberation is limited by citizens in this event.

The open-budget session was practiced from the time of starting PB in the local governments of Bangladesh.⁹² Rahman et al. (2004) mention that the open-budget session creates an opportunity to address their actual needs and demands of their development as well as access to the UP decision-making process. It creates scope for the UPs to generate more internal revenue by motivating local people to pay their taxes given very limited resources received from the outside. It also gives them an opportunity to get support from community in implementing development projects as they can show credible transparency and accountability in their activities through open-budget sessions (Rahman et al., 2004).

The open-budget session is a citizen engagement process that provides more scope to marginalized and poor people of grassroot level (Uddin, 2018; Ullah & Pongquan, 2011). Among

⁹¹ The open-budget session was observed at Haldia UP of Amtali Upazila in Barguna on February 3, 2019. The participation data of citizens in open-budget session was also collected from the same UP for specific case study.

⁹² This process was introduced by the NGOs at UP level before starting of formal PB implementation.

three categories of respondents' education levels, the lower level educated, such as below secondary level educated participated remarkably (38.6%) more than higher level educated, the secondary (32.4%), and above secondary (17.1%). This PB process is more accessible for the grassroots level citizens who generally have lower level of education. In an open-budget session, any participant can raise questions and provide feedbacks if they wish. The overall informal format of the event also meets the satisfaction of local people, where budget is openly announced and asked everyone to provide their opinions and feedbacks (Uddin, 2018).

Table 5.4 Participation in PB Processes by Level of Education.

PB Processes	Participation in PB Processes by Level of Education							
	Below Secondary (%)		Secondary (%)		Above Secondary (%)		% of Whole Respondents	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Community Meeting	19.9	24.7	21.0	21.0	9.3	9.3	47.2	52.9
Ward Meeting	27.7	19.3	25.7	17.1	14.0	6.2	61.1	38.9
UP/Pourashava Level Meeting	7.8	33.1	15.2	26.7	4.0	12.4	25.8	73.7
UP/Pourashava Council Meeting	10.2	28.9	15.2	22.9	6.2	12.4	31.9	68.1
Open Budget Session	38.6	9.0	32.4	10.5	17.1	4.0	79.5	20.5

Note: N= Community Meeting= 142, Ward Meeting= 149, UP/Pourashava Level Meeting= 133, UP/Pourashava Council Meeting= 129 & Open Budget Session= 151 among N=157 who responded 'yes' in Table 5.2.). And for Education Level, N= Below Secondary= 166, Secondary= 105, and Above Secondary= 129 among N= 400.

In discussing participation of respondents in above listed other PB processes by different education level of them, again lower level educated group participated more than higher level educated in all the processes except UP/Pourashava level meeting. Below secondary educated respondents' participation was 19.9% in community meeting, 27.7% in ward meeting, 7.8% in UP/Pourashava level meeting, and 10.2% participated in UP/Pourashava Council meeting. That means, engagement of lower level educated is significant in every PB processes of local government of Bangladesh.

Regarding participation of the citizens of lower-level education (literacy) during interviewing and discussing with the Chairperson of No. 2 Golapganj UP of Golapganj Upazila under Sylhet district, while he was mentioning that:

“...in different process of PB usually general people participate more, those have lower literacy level than the higher level educated. Especially, in the open-budget session, people of marginalized communities participate extensively even if they are not invited formally.”

Similar to the above opinion, a very recent conversation with the Secretary of No. 4 Haldia UP of Amtali Upazila under Barguna district, the following argument was uttered:

“...there is a general tendency of lower-educated citizen’s participation from ward level to UP level programs. It is easy to engage them as they become available when UP asks them to participate any meeting and discussion. But educated people always does not response to UP’s purposes.”

These opinions indicates that general people of having lower-level education have tendency to participate more as UP actors’ have sympathy to them.

5.3.1.2 Knowledge of Legal Rights and Participation in PB

Participation is meant a right by which someone can express view or behave toward the political system and governance (Mohammad & Farzana, 2018), and such right is established by laws and policies. The UP Act of 2009 has provided the right to citizens to participate in local government decision-making process through the mechanisms of PB. Article 4, 5, 45, 57, and 58 of UP Act clearly mentioned to formulate annual budget with the participation of citizens.⁹³ While legal

⁹³ Also see Section 2.3.3 of Chapter 2.

provisions are available, citizens are expected to know about provisions of their rights so that they can legitimately claim for their participation. The survey results on citizen’s knowledge of legal rights to participation are presented in Table 5.5 along with the rate of actual participation in PB.

Table 5.5 Knowledge of Legal Rights and Level of Participation in PB.

		Participated in PB	
		Yes	No
Knowledge of legal rights	Yes (N=109)	76.1% (83)	23.9% (26)
	No (N=291)	25.4% (74)	74.6% (217)

Note: N=400.

According to survey results, it is found that only 27.3% of the respondents have knowledge about the existence of laws regarding participation, while almost three-fourth (72.7%) of the respondents do not have such knowledge. This result indicates that most of the citizen respondents are unaware of the legal rights of participation in PB process. Among the respondents who have knowledge, 76.1% participated and 25.4% did not participate in the PB process. On the other hand, respondents who do not have knowledge, only 23.9% participated, where the rate of participation is one-fourth of non-participation. That means, the respondents who have knowledge, have more tendency to participate than the respondents who are not knowledgeable, which implies the general theory of participation. Basically, this is the political knowledge of citizens about the democratic rights of participation (Gaventa, 1995) in PB, which is much closer to the discourse of empowerment that is derived from the knowledge (Joo et al., 2019; Rocha, 1997).

In general, education enhances level of knowledge and it also increases participation in political decision-making (Mayer, 2011). But this may not always increase the degree of participation in PB. Education level influences citizen participation only in terms of how they perceive and carry out their involvement in public policies; but does not influence the fact that they are more or less participatory (Carreira et al., 2016), which is also found from the survey. The


data of educational background of respondents and their knowledge of legal rights of participation are presented in Table 5.6 and relationship of these two variables is examined by Chi-square test in Figure 5.4.

Table 5.6 Knowledge of Legal Rights and Level of Education of Respondents.

Education Level	Knowledge of Legal Rights	
	Yes (N=109)	No (N=291)
Below Secondary	67.0% (73)	32.0% (93)
Secondary	23.9% (26)	27.1% (79)
Above Secondary	9.2% (10)	40.9% (119)

N=400

Figure 5.4 Knowledge of Legal Rights of Participation by Level of Education.



N=400 ($\chi^2=48.49$, $df=2$, $**p=0.000$)

The Chi-square results ($\chi^2=48.49$, $df=2$, $p=0.000$) have been shown in the figure, which implies that there are significant differences of knowledges about participation among three categories of education: below secondary, secondary and above secondary. If we look into the figure, lower level educated respondents comparatively have better knowledge of legal rights of participation than the higher level educated as 67.0% of below secondary educated, 23.9% of secondary educated, and 9.2% of above secondary educated have knowledge of legal rights. This

result is in some extent unlike than general trend, since higher educated should have increased level of knowledges including knowledge of legal rights.

Educational background of participants always does not support in understanding level of participation as well as contribution to participatory process of PB as other studies, not specific of Bangladesh but PB in general, identified that educational attainment is less important determinant of participation than citizens' grasp of their right to engage in individual and collective action and to hold state actors to account (Folscher, 2007). In this sense, knowledge of rights does not depend on the educational background, rather it is a matter of awareness and capacity on budgetary mechanisms of individual or group of citizens that are supposed to be developed by the local governments before starting of PB process (Moynihan, 2007). It is also argued by other literatures that irrespective of formal educational background of citizens, communities that have provided training for building capacity on PB have seen significant improvement in the quality and quantity of contribution by citizens in PB process (Shall, 2007). That means, lower level educated citizens get better orientation of PB and related issues from local governments than the higher level educated as capacity building initiatives mostly targets the citizens having of lower-level education considering empowerment of them (Waheduzzaman, 2010), with a presumption that higher level educated might have knowledge on any issues.

Table 5.7 Level of Education and Knowledge and Experience of Participation in PB.

Level of Education	Knowledge of Legal Rights (Yes=109, No=291)		Experience of Participation (N=157) (More than once)	No Experience of Participation (N=243)
Above Secondary	Have knowledge	10 (9.2%)	10 (100.0%)	0 (00.0%)
	Don't have knowledge	119 (40.9%)	20 (16.8%)	99 (83.2%)
Secondary	Have knowledge	26 (23.9%)	22 (84.6%)	4 (15.4%)
	Don't have knowledge	79 (27.1%)	24 (30.4%)	55 (69.6%)
Below Secondary	Have knowledge	73 (67.0%)	51 (69.9%)	22 (30.1%)
	Don't have knowledge	93 (32.0%)	31 (33.3%)	62 (66.7%)

Note: The table calculates knowledge of legal rights by the level of education and experience of participation is calculated by the knowledge of legal rights of participation. The percentage of experience of participation is calculated based on the number of respondents having knowledge of legal rights or not.

Table 5.7 relates the levels of education that are contributory to knowledge of legal rights of participation and actual experience of participation. The relationship between education level and knowledge of participation is discussed in the previous section where it is observed that there is a general trend for increased participation by lower level educated than the higher educated. Here, it can be observed that although overall experience is low, there is a positive relationship between knowledge and experience of participation. Among the participants, who have knowledge of legal rights participated more than the unknowledgeable respondents. Hence, it can be argued that if knowledge level is increased the degree of participation might be increased, which does not necessarily depend on the level of literacy of the respondents but the level of knowledge (Gaventa & Valderamma, 1999).

Like the above finding, it is also observed in the previous section that higher educated respondents participated less than lower level educated. Knowing of the legal rights enhances participation irrespective of level of education of the respondents. Moreover, it is found that there was full participation of having knowledge of above secondary level educated respondents. The overall knowledge and participation of higher educated are low, which means they do not deny the importance of PB and its participation rather there is insufficient capacity initiatives for specific knowledge building of participation in PB as a legal right. In general, local governments direct benefits and incentives, such as social safety-net services are provided to the poor (Aminuzzaman, 2010) who generally have lower level of formal education.⁹⁴

⁹⁴ It is also observed during the field visit that the lower educated general people are much acquainted with the activities of UP. Specifically, when author visited the No.9 Daudpur UP of South Surma Upazila under Sylhet District on January 17, 2019.

5.3.2 Non-interest and Non-participation of Citizens

5.3.2.1 Reasons for Non-interest of Participation

In relation to previous section's discussion, the survey participants who have responded that citizens are not aware and interested (50.8%) as well as who responded that citizens are aware but not interested (13.0%) to participate were asked for responding the reasons for non-interest of citizens to the PB process. In discussing the interests of citizens toward participation, several characteristics are considered of different categories, such as citizen's capacity, expectation to local government, actions taken by local government authorities, and characteristics of PB itself. The statements of responses were taken in 5-point Likert Scale (strongly disagree=1, disagree=2, neutral=3, agree=4 and strongly agree=5). The mean value and standard deviations of Likert scale responses are presented in Table 5.8.

Table 5.8 Reasons for Non-Interest to Participation.


Reasons	Mean	SD
<u>Citizens' capacity:</u>		
Citizens have less capacity to participate	3.59	0.91
Citizens are ignorant to local government activities	3.74	0.77
<u>Expectations to local governments:</u>		
Citizens have less/no trust on local government	3.80	0.59
Citizens have less/no access to local government's activities	3.80	0.80
<u>Actions taken by local government authority:</u>		
UP/Pourashava officials do not promote participation in PB	3.66	0.86
Chairman/Mayor/Member/ Councilor do not encourage citizens	3.69	0.94
Community leaders are not active to motivate citizens	3.60	0.60
<u>Characteristics of PB itself:</u>		
There are no specific PB activities	3.37	0.86
PB is formulated but not implemented	3.34	0.82
Citizens have no direct benefits or incentives	3.65	0.59

Note: N=255 (who are 'not aware' and 'not interested'). 1=strongly disagree; 2=disagree; 3=neutral; 4=agree; 5=strongly agree (to negative statements).

The above-mentioned reasons identified by the respondents, are related to three actors, such as citizens, elected representatives and officials and PB institution itself. The reasons are thematically categorized to clarify their nature in relation to actors and institutional perspectives.

In reference to discussion of previous section about relationship of education and participation of citizens, here in Figure 5.5, the relationship of non-interest of respondents and level of their education are discussed. To examine the differences of the reasons for non-interest with the education level of respondents using ANOVA through Multiple Comparison Tests on the mean. The results show that four statements are statistically significant ($p < 0.05$ and $p < 0.01$) among three sub-categories of education level: below secondary, secondary, and above secondary.

Figure 5.5 Education of Respondents and Reasons for Non-Interest of Citizens.



Note: N=400. 1= strongly disagree; 2= disagree; 3= neutral; 4= agree; 5= strongly agree. Significance level: ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$.

As per the MCT⁹⁵ results, regarding statement of ‘citizens have less access to local government activities’ there is statistically significant mean difference between secondary and above secondary level of education. That indicates higher educated people tend to show more positive perception toward accessibility to local government activities. The statement of ‘elected representatives do not encourage citizens’ has statistically significant mean differences between below secondary and above secondary level of education. That means, the perception between lower educated and higher educated differs and lower educated are more agreeable to the negative statements, and imply that they idealized more positively about elected representatives’ behavior. Because, lower educated might have positive impression on the activities of elected representatives as they are closer to the local governments, that was identified from the analysis of previous section.

There is significant mean difference about ‘there is no specific PB activities’ between below secondary and above secondary, and also between secondary and above secondary level of education. The implication of this result is that lower level educated has more agreement to the negative statements than the higher educated and which also has meaning of consensus of higher educated in reverse and they think PB activities are visible at their local government. The similar findings are derived in responding to the statement of ‘PB is formulated but not implemented’ has significant mean differences between below secondary and above secondary education level. The implication of this result is also similar to the previous as lower level educated agreeable to negative statements. The overall observation on these four statements of reasons are that there is difference between the respondents of lower level educated and higher level educated. The lower level educated respondents’ perceptions on the reasons of non-interest to participation are more agreeable to the negative statements than the higher level of educated.

⁹⁵ MCT refers to Multiple Comparison Test, an inferential statistical analysis.

5.3.2.2 *Reasons for Non-participation in the PB Process*

It is discussed in the previous sections that 60.8% respondents never participated in any PB or related participatory process. To explore the reasons for their non-participation in PB process, respondents were asked to mention the reasons of their non-participation. The results are presented with the mean value and standard deviations of the responses in Table 5.9 below, which are further analyzed using SPSS.


Table 5.9 Reasons for Non-participation in the PB Processes.

Reasons	Mean	Standard Deviation
Not informed	3.62	1.08
Have no interest to participate	3.33	0.94
Participation has no real value	3.53	0.93
Have no time/busy with own job	3.85	0.95
Local government does not invite to participate	3.25	1.00
Do not allow opinions and do not listen to citizens	3.17	0.85
Mostly formality and limited discussion	3.21	0.76
Local government does not contact citizens except voting	3.14	0.84

Note: N=244 (those responded ‘no’ in the Table 5.3). 1= strongly disagree; 2= disagree; 3= neutral; 4= agree; 5= strongly agree (to negative statements).

It is examined in the previous section that almost two-third of the respondents did not participate and subsequently the reasons of non-participation are identified. The Figure 5.6 presents the significant differences of the reasons of non-participation with the education level of the respondents calculated using ANOVA through MCTs on the mean and results show that four statements are statistically significant ($p < 0.05$ and $p < 0.01$) among three sub-categories of education: below secondary, secondary and above secondary level of education.

Figure 5.6 Education Level of Respondents and Reasons for Non-participation.



Note: N=244 (those responded ‘no’ in the Table 5.3). 1= strongly disagree; 2= disagree; 3= neutral; 4= agree; 5= strongly agree (to negative statements). Significance level: **p<0.01, *p<0.05.

According to the results of MCTs, it is found that local government’s willingness in terms of inviting citizens for their engaging has statistically significant differences between below secondary and above secondary educated; secondary and above secondary educated; and above secondary has significance with both below secondary and secondary level of education of the respondents. That means, there are differences in perception among the respondent by their education level. The higher educated are less agreeable to the negative statements imply that they have positive impression about elected representatives’ role in inviting of participation. ‘Local government does not allow citizen’s opinion’ and this statement is statistically significant

difference between below secondary and above secondary level of education of the respondents, between secondary and above secondary educated, and between and among three education level.

Among the reasons for non-participation, the above mentioned four statements on the perception of citizen respondents have statistically significant differences between the lower and higher level educated. The explanation of such results is that higher level educated respondent's perception on the local government behavior is less agreeable to these negative statements of reasons, which implies more trust and relationship to PB activities.

5.3.3 Civic Capacity and Mobilization


Civic capacity means the capabilities of individual citizen and community to contribute in the PB process in reinforcing its effectiveness. It also refers to the capacity of citizens to contribute to the decision-making process of PB. And mobilization includes the elements that influence collective actions of citizens towards implementation of PB. The two parts of civic capacity entail both capacity of individual citizen and collective capacity among citizens, their neighborhoods, and communities. According to survey results shown in Figure 5.7, respondents agreed and strongly agreed with most of the statements that hamper capacity and mobilization of citizens, and consequently, participation of citizens is hindered from the point of demanding their rights.

Low literacy level of citizens is identified as one of the important constraints of capacity and mobilization as 57.1% respondents agreed and strongly agreed. The literacy in local level is low in general, while more than one-fourth of the population is illiterate (26.1%). Moreover, literacy is meant here as having knowledge on policy decision-making over the budgetary process under PB that empowers to negotiate and realize demands. Increased literacy level helps in empowering citizens to organize and raising their voices individually as well as collectively. It is found from the analysis of previous sections that level of education has low relationship with the

knowledge of rights and participation in PB. But here literacy/education is considered not only in participation but also contribution in PB process, while 61.7% agreed and strongly agreed that citizens are less capable to contribute to participate.

For mobilizing and claiming the demands, citizens need to be organized. But respondents think moderately that citizens are not organized well to claim their rights, while 44.0% agreed and strongly agreed. That means, there are lack of community harmony to associate together for achieving common goal of PB. Moreover, they think that capacity building in community group is not available as 43.9% agreed and strongly agreed. Other constraints are: ‘people are interested to materialize their own benefits’ is agreed and strongly agreed by 60.2%; ‘political grouping hampers mobilization’ is agreed and strongly agreed by 41.2% respondents. These two statements have focused on the citizens’ self-centric behavior, which hinders participation and creates social grouping that hampers collective decision-making of PB (Panday, 2019).

Figure 5.7 Perception of People to Level of Civic Capacity and Mobilization.



Note: N=400. 1= strongly disagree; 2= disagree; 3= neutral; 4= agree; 5= strongly agree.

The above discussion of this section mainly focused on the perception of behavior of citizens and degree of participation of PB through different variables such as awareness, interest and capacity. It is examined and found that overall ratio of participation in PB is low. But lower level educated belongs better knowledge of legal rights and accordingly participate more. It may imply that knowledge of legal rights has certain influence on PB process. The overall awareness of citizens is also low that contribute to increase non-interest in PB. Such analyses explore that PB in the local government of Bangladesh has various deficiencies in terms of participation of citizens in the different processes of PB as perceived by the respondents of the survey.

5.4 Usage of PB Process by Elected Representatives

In this research Assumption 2 sets: The proactiveness of the actors of local government affects the process of PB. The research especially focuses on the elected representatives among the actors. The definition of elected representative in this dissertation includes Chairman (Head of UP Council) and Member (Representative of a Ward of UP) and Mayor (Head of Pourashava Council) and Councilor (Representative of a Ward of Pourashava). The Interview 1 was conducted with 32 UP Chairpersons and 8 Pourashava Mayors along with the selected UP Members and Pourashava Councilors to understand their usage of PB process to maximize their own utilities, basically from the following three perspectives: political commitment and willingness, local initiatives, and decision-making authority. At the same time, citizens' perceptions about the role of elected representatives are also integrated and discussed in those three perspectives. The results of Interview 2 are also used for analysis of this section. Here, the following sub-sections and the next sections will be employed to analyze and discuss the research Assumption 2: The proactiveness of the actors of local government affects the process of PB.

5.4.1 Political Commitment and Proactiveness

There should be clear and publicly expressed political commitment of local government for materializing the outcomes of PB, which is also a precondition for enhancing policy coherence (Goldfrank, 2007; Shall, 2007; Wampler, 2007). Political commitment and proactiveness to PB is the key to its success; the program faced challenges when commitment faltered and the PB fell out of political favor (Abers et al., 2018). Goncalves (2013) investigates the usages of PB process and portrayed political commitment as a ‘commitment device’ for the elected politicians. This commitment could be national and local, while local commitment is more crucial (Avritzer, 2010).⁹⁶

The present government has been ruling the country for consecutive third period since 2009. During this long period of holding power, the present government have been involved in various legal and policy reforms as per their election mandate. At present, the main planning documents of the government is the Five Year Plan (FYP). Currently 7th FYP (2016-2020) is under implementation to meet SDGs. In this document citizen participation is mentioned as one of the priorities “...*further strengthening of the democratic governance through participation of all citizens and strengthening of the local government institutions based on a well-defined legal framework that assigns responsibilities along with commensurate financial autonomy* (GOB, 2015, p. 20)”. Moreover, other plans such as ‘Perspective Plan 2021-2041’ and ‘Delta Plan 2100’ also upholds citizen participation (GOB, 2018; GOB, 2020).⁹⁷ Besides, various programs and projects have been implementing under ADP⁹⁸ focusing and adopting participatory management approach. Above all, the Local Government Act 2009, is the most significant initiative that ensures the legal

⁹⁶ Although there is no specific difference between the words ‘commitment’ and ‘willingness’ this study considers two words as one terminology meaning same as each other.

⁹⁷ Perspective Plan 2021-2041 and Delta Plan 2100, published by General Economics Division, Bangladesh Planning Commission.

⁹⁸ ADP refers to Annual Development Program, which is the Development Budget of Bangladesh.

commitment of government for implementing PB both in UP and Pourashava level. Such legal and policy planning initiatives imply the political commitments of present government in ensuring participation of citizens. Although all such policy commitments of government are available, there are loopholes in implementation mainly due to the unwillingness of elected representatives, which is indicated by some studies (Chowdhury & Panday, 2018; Hossain, 2019; Hossain et al., 2014).

Some findings from the key informants interviews also indicate the gaps in local leadership; their political stance in implementation and personal willingness in promotion of PB. According to the opinion of *Interview 2 District 4*, while he expressed with disappointment that:

“...local elected representatives have lack of aspirations to understand government’s priorities. There is no accountability mechanism of elected leaders for not implementing the national policy priorities. That is why, many of them are reluctant to comply with the national development goals. They are also depended on the local administration and very seldom they work from their own development ideologies of concern constituencies.”

A similar expression was given by *Interview 2 Project 1* that:


“...at present most of the PB activities are doing under the LGSP project. UP does not have its own activities that can be called as their political commitment. But project also has limitation in terms of resources and capacity to cover all the issues that can ensure local political commitments especially encouraging local citizens for participating in PB. Inclusion of citizens from all classes of society can only be ensured by stronger political willingness of local elected representatives because they stay always with their own local electorates.”

Academic I also had a similar opinion but in other ways he expressed:

“...the local elected leaders’ capacity is not substantial. They are not conscious about their commitment sometimes as their know-how on local government is limited. They work mostly, what is guided and suggested by the Upazila administration and what is provided by existing projects. Although they commit many things during the election, they cannot do due to their own capabilities. At the same time, they are also suppressed by the local MPs and other political leaders at district and Upazila level and they have to implement projects as per the desire of those leaders.”

The survey of citizens also includes a specific question of their perception on the political commitment and willingness of elected representatives in engaging citizens to the PB process (Figure 5.8). Regarding the statement of Chairpersons of UPs and Mayors of Pourashavas have no specific initiatives for engaging citizens into the PB process which is agreed or strongly agreed by 50.3%. Similarly, 47.0.% agreed or strongly agreed that ‘members and councilors did not play role for increasing participation of citizen’. Almost half of the respondents perceive low political commitment of elected representatives.

Figure 5.8 Citizens’ Perception on Political Commitment of Elected Representatives.



Note: N=400.

From the above findings of both interviews and survey, it could be argued that local political leaders' commitment is limited, and it may cause ineffective implementation of PB, while their commitment is necessary for effective implementation of PB towards gaining of their own outcomes such as legitimacy and recognition for creating scope to be reelected. We observed that various policy supports are available for implementation of PB process. But due to the lack of strong political commitment and willingness in terms of setting the specific agenda and goals, creating congenial atmosphere for opening access of citizens to the local government operation and activities including PB are evidentially absent as per above results. Consequently, effectiveness of PB is not getting momentum. Elected representatives' commitment also affects the behavior of citizens and their level of awareness, interest, and capacity for claiming their rights and demands in an organized way that we observed in the previous section. Additionally, supports from the local government officials are required, which is seemed a problematic area that will be examined in the upcoming section. These are the structural impediments in achieving political commitment (Dias & Julio, 2018), while participation itself works as a commitment device (Hossain et al., 2016). From the above analysis it can be argued that strong PB needs stronger commitments from local leadership in power and especially commitments of elected representatives of concerned local governments.⁹⁹

5.4.2 Initiatives Taken by Elected Representatives


Local government's successful initiatives can overcome the systematic barriers (Shah, 2007) and create improvement in delivery of services (Moynihan, 2007) of PB towards better governance. So, it is also an indicator to justify the elected representatives' commitments and how they wish to

⁹⁹ Elected representatives are the main actors in a local government and they are the initiators of PB. So, the behavior of this crucial actor was investigated through Survey 1 and Interview 2.

maximize their utilities. To examine political commitment through local initiatives taken by elected representatives, this section analyzes both quantitative and qualitative data collected from survey and face-to-face interview of citizens and elected representatives.

The results of survey presented in Figure 5.9. The statement about the ‘few specific initiatives’ of elected representatives is agreed or strongly agreed by 72.3% respondents. That means the initiatives are not specifically visible in local government level as the respondents perceived. Otherwise, citizens may not inform about the initiatives. So, there are gaps from both sides. One of the important local initiatives is organizing ward level committees and arranging meetings regularly for informing and sharing PB activities which were not activated by local government as the respondents agreed and strongly agree by 52.5%. Consequently, project prioritizations are not done properly, which is agreed and strongly agreed by 54.8% respondents. Arguably, project prioritization is the core issue of PB process. As the prioritization was not properly done, detail item-wise budget was not shared with the citizens in the ward level meeting and or community level gathering.

Figure 5.9 PB Initiatives of Elected Representatives as Perceived by Citizens.



Note: N=400.

During the qualitative interviews with the UP representatives and officials, they were asked what kind of initiatives they have taken for engaging citizens into the PB process. The answers are thematically coded and summarized in the Table 5.10. Firstly, one of the most common initiatives of PB process as per their answers was ‘public announcement’ and total responses were 144 in number. The traditional public announcement tools: such as using *mike* (big sound-making tool) and announce loudly about the PB events across the jurisdiction of UP. Local government also distributed posters, leaflets, and banners with the information of PB meeting. These approaches are good if there are enough information in the leaflets, posters, and banners. But during the field visits it is found in an UP of Barguna that “it is one kind of notice for attending meeting, without substantial information of upcoming budget and benefits for their participation”.¹⁰⁰ Moreover, as majority of the rural citizens are illiterate and cannot read the information of leaflets, this initiative basically has low impact in increasing participation of citizens into the PB process. Additionally, some local government, mainly the Pourashavas published advertisements in the local newspaper as a part of public announcement. It also has low impact in information dissemination. Secondly, 94 interviewees said they organized ward level meeting at their local governments for sharing detail information of PB and events. This is the most effective initiative for informing and engaging citizens into the PB and it is the very first step of PB process (Hossain, 2019). Basically, participation of citizens starts from ward meeting, which is a small group meeting community level meeting to prioritize projects in a very deliberative way entirely with the local citizens.¹⁰¹ The basic of PB process is to prioritize projects at neighborhood or community level in case of other countries (Goldfrank, 2007; Moynihan, 2007; Wampler, 2007).

¹⁰⁰ Badarkhali UP of Barguna Sadar Upazila under Barguna District was visited in February 3, 2019.

¹⁰¹ Also see Section 2.5.1.3 of Chapter 2.

For formal invitation to attend PB meetings almost similar number of previous initiatives were taken by the local governments, which were 87 in number. They used to send formal invitation letters and or cards only to some pre-selected persons those have political affiliation as many elected representatives especially from Sylhet mentioned during interviews. According to them they used to send invitation to the ‘elite persons’ of the UP. Arguably, there is a clear biasness in engaging politically dominative and so-called elite citizens than the general folks such as poor, marginalized, and disadvantaged. Such elite control is very common in local government decision-making not only for PB process but also for other planning and policy formulation (Hofferbert, 1970), which is identified as a common barrier (Waheduzzaman et al., 2018) for democratic and inclusive participation in local level.

Table 5.10 PB Initiatives Taken by Elected Representatives.

Initiatives of Elected Representatives	No.
Public announcement by <i>miking</i> , posters, leaflets, banners and advertising newspaper	144
Organizing ward level meeting to inform, share and receiving proposals	94
Sending invitation letter/card to the selected and elite citizens	87
Inviting door-to-door by elected councilors and staffs	50
Inviting directly by mobile phone calls	34
Using community leaders, religious leaders and volunteers	22
Public awareness and motivational campaign through social media (Facebook)	14
Provide food incentive for participation	3
Total	448

Note: N=160.

Another initiative that is seemed to be effective that is about inviting citizens from door-to-door. 50 interviewees mentioned that they used to visit directly to the homes of local residents for inviting and motivating. Other staffs of local government also invite citizens for attending such meeting. This approach should be more effective because when a councilor of the local government visits a general citizen’s house, s/he becomes very obliged to attend the PB events and meetings. But this is not a common practice of all local government bodies. Moreover, local

councilors and officials call over the mobile phone to citizens for inviting them to participate in the PB process, which is now easy and popular method to reach out people. But in this case, the pre-selected people are usually called over mobile phone as some of the interviewee informally mentioned during interviews.

Recently, volunteering by religious leaders in behavioral changes of citizens and communities are getting popularity in Bangladesh, as their leadership and reachability instantly can disseminate development messages to a great number of people (Dutta, 2019). People usually respects and listens to the religious leaders. That is why, use of religious leaders is also done in engaging citizens to PB process. Local government UPs and Pourashavas are increasingly involving religious leaders especially '*imams*' of the local mosques. This initiative also has a positive effect in mobilizing citizens. Community leaders are also engaged for motivating citizens of their communities as they are influential. Some community leaders and citizens are directly involved in the PB process as volunteers. In engaging religious leaders, community leaders and volunteers 22 interviewees mentioned it as an effective tool for promoting PB.

Initiatives for motivation and awareness of citizens various cultural events are organized and it opined that usually open-budget session is held followed by a cultural event in the open space so that anyone can participate. It is observed during conduction of an open-budget session in a UP of Amtali Upazila of Barguna district, the researcher found that a cultural event was taken place after the meeting.¹⁰² It seems that people gathered for enjoying cultural event as well as for attending budget session. Recently, using of social media also have been increased and for such motivational campaign, and some UPs used popular social media Facebook. A few interviewees

¹⁰² The open-budget session was observed at Haldia UP of Amtali Upazila in Barguna on February 3, 2019.

also said that they provide food to the participants after the meeting for their attendance, one kind of incentive that helps to attract local people.

As discussed above, the overall perception of the respondents regarding local initiatives of elected representatives that present initiatives are not so much progressive to encourage citizens for their participation to be benefited. Moreover, taken initiatives also have not properly performed for increasing participation of citizens. The findings imply that local governments have reluctance in mass participation rather minimum level participation.

5.4.3 Decision-Making Authority

Classical decision theory sees decision-making as a problem of utility maximization, where probabilities and preferences associated with an option need to be evaluated (Jalonen, 2007). Here, this dissertation means decision-making authority as the decentralized system of governance, where the local government has discretionary political and financial authority in policy decision-making and implementing with a strong and supportive legal provision. This decentralized system also include the autonomy of local government. The concept of ‘autonomy’ simply makes sense as the combination of degree of freedom, discretion of legal authority and level of rational power regarding the actions and decisions of the local government in Bangladesh, particularly the budgeting decisions that they take in this context (Talukdar, 2019).

Bangladesh’s actual decentralization program began in 1997 with the Local Government Act, followed by the Upazila and Zilla Parishad Acts of 1998 and 2000 by which decentralized power and resources from central government to division, district, sub-district (*Upazila*), and union (UP) levels (Faguet, 2016). In doing so it brought government “closer to the people” and opened many new spaces for Bangladesh’s vibrant civil society to participate in local decision-making (Faguet & Ali 2009). The various reforms indicate that decentralization is continued but falls short

of the standard set-in other countries, such as India, Colombia and Bolivia, in terms of the scope of public authority devolved (Shami & Faguet, 2015). Because there might have inherent control over the local authorities by central government in practical.

Currently, there is substantive legal and policy support for making decision by their own elected council of UPs an Pourashavas. As mentioned in Chapter 2 and here reiterate that UP and Pourashava are regulated by the Act of 2009. The article 4 and 5 of this Act mentions to organize open meetings at ward-level with the participation of minimum 5% voters. Moreover, article 57 has a specific provision for preparation of budget of every fiscal year¹⁰³ on the basis of the citizens' prioritization followed by an UP-wide PB session. Besides, UP Operation Manual 2018 is also formulated. Article 92 of Pourashava Act also mentioned about budgeting. Above all, the National Constitution has provided power to local government for preparation of their own budgets, “...parliament shall, by law, confer powers on the local government bodies, including power to impose taxes for local purposes, to prepare their budgets and to maintain funds”.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, various rules, policies, strategies and actions plans are existed for both UPs and Pourashavas. So, the present legal provisions are sufficient and supportive for adoption and implementation of PB.


The results of the survey of citizen's perception show that the response on the substantive legal provisions is agreeable and strongly agreeable by 39.8% and nearly half (49.8%) taken neutral position as they cannot figure out whether the legal provisions are substantive or not (Figure 5.10). The implication of this result is that the existing legal and policy frameworks that are discussed above are somehow between of compatible to implement PB and congenial to the elected representatives for making decisions under PB. Although local governments are legally mandated, institutionally they have less power to make decisions and this statement was agreed

¹⁰³ Fiscal year starts on July 1st and ends on June 30 in Bangladesh.

¹⁰⁴ Article 60 of Bangladesh Constitution 1972.

and strongly agreed by 49.6% of respondents and statement about legally autonomous but functionally dependent to other authorities was agreed and strongly agreed by 59.8%. The meaning of these two statements may indicate that local governments are directly controlled by local administrations over their financial and administrative functions and also controlled by central government authorities, as they have dependency for budgetary demands, development funds and other special grants (Panday, 2011; Sharmin et al., 2012). Also, in collecting local level resources and revenue decision-making, local government need to consult with the *Upazila* administration (Chowdhury & Panday, 2018; Panday, 2011).

Figure 5.10 Citizen’s Perception on Characteristics of Decision-making Authority.



Note: N=400.

The findings from the *Interview 2* opinions relevant to autonomy and decision-making are presented here. The *NGO 3* expressed that:

“...local government leaders especially UP representatives are usually controlled by the Upazila administration although they are autonomous as per the law. Because the most of grants and funds are transferred to UP through Upazila administration. So, they are seemed dependent on the local administration.”

But the *Upazila 1* said that:

“...at present local government is enjoying full autonomy. Upazila administration never interfere in their activities, rather support in all the ways. Upazila administration just do some administrative procedures for channelizing the resources as per official rules. They are autonomous for their budgeting and expenditure as per the government rules and regulations. But using the devolved authority depends on the overall capacity of local government representatives.”

It can be identified from the above discussion that local governments have legally decentralized authority for every kind of decision-making irrespective of administrative and financial. But in practical, they are somehow controlled by local administrative authorities. Moreover, as the local governments are dependent on the central government for budgetary supports, their autonomy does not work in real sense. They also have incapability in materializing authoritative power.

5.5 Usage of PB Process by Local Government Officials

Local government officials as the actors of PB refer the permanent administrative, finance and technical staffs of UP and Pourashava in this study who works closely with the formulation, facilitation and implementation of PB. Basically, officials play role of intermediaries between other actors, the elected representatives and citizens. So, their roles in adoption, implementation and promotion of PB is extremely crucial. They are responsible for facilitating entire PB process and providing necessary technical supports. Their commitment also important as they work under the broader policy framework and when they believe and convince the better outcomes are expected because they know better about the input and output of resources. In many instances, citizen input is limited and the allocation of resources is still determined largely by officials (Shah,

2007). This section is going to analyze how the officials of local government use their own methods and play their roles under the institutional legal and policy framework, from the following four perspectives using data of Interview 2 and Survey 1.

5.5.1 Officers' Capacity and Skill

Budgeting is still the domain of public officials (Folscher, 2007) in many cases even there is participation of citizen, because officials are supposed to hold all technical aspects of PB. So, their capacity in terms understanding on legal and policy regulations, facilitation procedure of PB process, citizen engagement mechanisms, budgetary scopes are important to materialize the outcomes of PB. Moreover, they need to adept at facilitation, conflict resolution, and technical budgeting and such skills and quality of facilitation are seen as factors for widening participation and capitalizing its outcomes (Folscher, 2007).

General capacity of officials in local government of Bangladesh are not very efficient specifically on the facilitation of PB process. UP officials are not capable enough to manage all tasks including participation of citizen to budget making process (Hossain, 2019) and Pourashava officials also not enough efficient in budgetary management (Rab & Biswas, 2016). Regarding the officers' capacity, most of the interviewees of *Interview 2* also opined negatively. *Academic 1* critically uttered that:

“...UP has only few lower-level staffs including secretary. Their education level is not high. So, we cannot expect their high capacities and skills. And there is no specific capacity building initiatives on the PB and also general training scopes are not available. Although Pourashava has more staffs than UP but the finance and accounts staffs those are responsible to handle PB has no specific training. They are sometimes also hostile to the issues of citizens.”

Quite similarly, from the working experiences with the UP staffs, *NGO 2* shared very interesting issues regarding capacity. According to him:

“...when NGOs are involved with PB process, UP staffs are very much reluctant to do any tasks. They become dependent on the NGO officials. All tasks are done by the NGO staffs including preparation of resolution of meeting. We had arranged training for the officials of UP, but they do not attend training regularly as they are busy otherwise. It seems that they do not want to learn and increase their skills.”

PB of UP is monitored by the LGSP project staffs, who works closely with the UP and Pourashava officials. It is expected that they know most rightly about the capacity of officials. *Project 4* discusses a lot during the interview. He provided some specific ideas regarding the capacity officials he said that:

“...present officials of UP and Pourashava have limitations in efficiency of facilitation of PB. If there are regular training activities, these limitations could be overcome. The elected council members are now paid good amount of remuneration by the government, but their responsibilities are not specific, and contributions are not visible. They should be engaged full-time with the specific tasks for example facilitation of PB in their individual ward jurisdiction.”

The similar opinion, that means, there are lack of capacity and skill of local government officials, were given by other interviewees of *Interview 2* too. For example, *Ministry 3, District 4, and Upazila 6*. But the overall opinions of the interviewed elected representatives about the capacity of officials are mostly positive as most of the representatives expressed in different ways and according to them, officials are active, hard-working and honest. But such opinions could not be justified because in responding the problems of UP and Pourashava in facilitating PB, many of

the elected representatives opined capacity of officials as a problem and challenge. As observed during the field visit, the reason behind the positive statement by the elected representatives about the capacity of officials could be their dependence on the officers for every official task of the councils. Local elected representatives of Bangladesh have much lower level of capacity in local government operational aspects (Uddin, 2019), they are dependent on the officials, although officials' capacity is not substantive specifically in operationalization of PB.

5.5.2 Officers' Proactiveness

The idea of proactive governance (World Bank, 2015) is to deliver services efficiently through regular feedback receive mechanisms where local government officials need to be extremely proactive in listening to citizens' demands. It is also true in case of PB implementation mechanisms. Self-motivated local government officials are necessary to promote engagement of citizens into PB process. This section mainly looks into the Interview 2 data for analysis of proactiveness of officials. *Ministry 3* mentioned that:

“...if local government officers perform their duties perfectly than it will help in acceleration of PB process implementation. Officers cannot be proactive by themselves as there are regulations and they also cannot work against the desire of elected representatives. Officers' proactiveness depends on elected representatives' behavior, how they would like to utilize officers for what activities of PB. They are in between policy regulations and priorities of elected representatives.”

According to the view of *Academic 1*:

“...as the capacity of officers is questionable because of their educational and motivational level. So, how they could be proactive by themselves. They even do not

do their regular job properly. Many people complain about their responsibilities as they are not so much cooperative to citizens.”

Officers are officially controlled by the Upazila Administration, although they work under the local government council. UP officials are directly appointed and deputed by Upazila Administration. Regarding the proactiveness of officials, *Upazila 2* said:

“...There are only few staffs, but there are huge tasks of UP including activities of PB facilitation. They are not capable enough to handle so many tasks at a time. Elected representatives do not do any officials tasks by themselves. They are totally dependent of these few staffs of their local government bodies. Elected representatives are sometimes non-cooperative to the officials.”

And also, *Project 4* argued that:

“...local governments are recently, providing many activities to do every day in the community level from different national surveys to daily officials works. Moreover, they deliver aid, grants and services to general citizens regularly. They cannot manage to be extra careful about implementing PB process. In most of the cases, they only comply with the legal bindings, that cannot be avoided. So, they had to do mainly the paper works, rather to be focused on the participatory process more. As they are not capacitated enough, their proactiveness also is not so much evident.”

From the above discussions, officials' proactiveness depends on their capacity, which is also low as we have found in the previous section. At the same time, their duties are constrained by the official rules and regulations. They cannot be proactive by themselves in promoting PB if elected representatives do not allow them to do so. But gradually, officers are adopting more proactive citizen-centered approach than reactive hostile response (*Academic 2*).

5.5.3 Activating Stakeholders: Citizens and PB Committees

Here, stakeholders mean the individual citizens and the civic groups at the community and also committees that are created by law, such as Ward Committee (WC) and Union Coordination Committee (UCC) of UP and Ward Level Coordination Committee (WLCC) and Town Level Coordination Committee (TLCC) of Pourashava. One of the roles of officials around the PB process is to activate citizens in general, which includes engaging individual citizens and facilitating PB process and related activities. The grass-roots level general citizens cannot be organized commonly in a committee by themselves. These committees are created by the local government officials, only to facilitate and legitimate their activities under PB process. This section includes qualitative data for analyzing how officials should activate the different stakeholders of PB.

In activating citizens, communities, and committees and regarding the roles of local government officials, some important findings came out from the Interviews 2. One of the interviewees (*NGO 1*) mentioned that:

“...officers supposed to be responsible for supporting in formulation of committees at different level as per legal guidance of local government. As these committees are main grounds for participation of citizens in local budgetary mechanisms as well as PB, their full potentials should be utilized creating congenial environment for sharing individual stakeholders’ views in exercising democratic decision-making. But officers are seemed reluctant to utilize these committees for empowering citizens as well as legitimating decisions related to PB.”

In arguing similarly to the above, *Academic 2* also said that:

“...most importantly, ward level committees are foremost where to participate citizens easily and demand their needs with a stronger voice. This committees were incorporated in the law to encourage participation of local people. But unfortunately, these committees are not active in most cases although officially formed. Regular meeting is not held, and proper participatory process also does not follow. The committees at Pourashava are more inactive than the UP. Because of less or no support from the officers, these committees are becoming non-functional.”


From the above results of Interviews 2, a few critical points could be identified regarding functions of committees, such as: (i) the committees are the centers for engaging by different stakeholders; (ii) the ward level committee mainly coordinates citizen participation along with other stakeholders which is the significant body in the PB process (Rahman et al., 2007); and (iii) officers are not very fascinatingly using these committees for promoting participation of citizens and other stakeholders.

5.5.4 Information: Outward and Inward

Dissemination of information is an important precondition for inclusion of all citizens in PB. Meaningful participation in a PB process will require citizens to be able to access the necessary information and skills to make informed decisions about allocation of budget. Available information raises awareness and interest to citizens. It is evident from the research that most of the citizens do not get information of PB meeting and other activities and they cannot participate even if they are interested (Hossain, 2019). Information sharing is a reciprocal matter. This is an important incentive for citizens provide a broader understanding of government, governmental responsibility, policy, and policymaking. At the same time, officials also need to get information from citizens, which areas should get budget priorities.

The survey results are presented in Figure 5.11 from where it is found that ‘officers are not proactive to engage citizens’ properly as around half (47.8%) agreed and strongly agreed. At the same time, a substantial ratio of citizens perceive that officers are restricted minded to disclose information. As a result, citizen’s participation in PB process becomes low. This finding is similar to the finding of section 5.3.2.2 and Table 5.3.9 of this chapter presented in the beginning of this chapter. That means, unavailability of information of PB is a big constraint and denies the participation of citizens. More than half of the respondents (55.8%) agreed and strongly agreed that there is no specific responsible official to carry out PB process and promote it by increased engagement of citizens. The explanation of this result is that if official with specific responsibility of expanding PB is dispatched in the position, PB would be more participatory and effective.

Figure 5.11 Citizen’s Perception on Functions of Officials in Accelerating PB.



Note: 400.

Information is not only important for citizens but also is important for the local government officials. They can get the ideas of real scenario of the communities, where to develop and how much development support is required. So, information sharing by both of the parties is necessary toward effective participatory process of PB. The *Interview 2* with the *Ministry 2* clearly mentioned regarding information dissemination that:

“...many local government officials are not free to share information with some effective processes. They only provide notices of meetings, but which usually do not reach to the general people. The problem is that local governments do not have budget for wide range publicity of PB process. But there are at least 12 council members of UP and the Pourashava has more council members, who can disseminate information to the community level directly than the officials.”

Upazila 4 opined that officials need information from citizens for more inclusive decision-making. According to him:

“...officials should identify some information points of citizens from where they can get regular information not only for PB but also for other development and welfare activities. At the same time, using this system, the officials can disseminate their various information including PB.”

From the above discussion, it can be mentioned here that information is a tool both for local government officials and citizens for their own benefits in maximizing individual outcomes from the PB process. And importantly, responsibility of information sharing in this regard is officer-driven. But from the above discussion it is found that officials behave restrictively to share information of PB to citizens. Public decision-making could be meaningful if citizens are informed by the local officials mostly about the outcomes of their participation (Folscher, 2007).

Local government officials are catalysts in technical facilitation of PB process by holding precise demands and reflecting bottom-up demands raised by citizens. But local officials are not capable enough in engaging citizens to PB process (Hossain, 2019) as well as budgetary management (Rab & Biswas, 2016). Their behavior and proactiveness to engage stakeholders are also lacking along with their restrictive attitude of sharing information.

5.6 Findings and Discussions

The findings of the analysis of data of perceptual survey to citizens, interview to elected representatives and permanent officials and key informants' interviews have facilitated the discussions around the behavior of actors that influence citizens' participation process as well as effective PB. The actor-specific functions are analyzed under the theoretical concepts of 'rational choice institutionalism' to find out roles of actors. The behavioral characteristics of actors are analyzed under the theoretical concepts of 'participatory governance'. The findings are discussed with arguments and scholarly findings of other relevant literatures.

5.6.1 Findings and Discussions of Assumption 1

The research assumption about *citizen's awareness, interest and capacity have influence on their participation process in PB* is discussed by analyzing quantitative data collected by survey with the citizens. According to citizen's perception, it seems awareness, awareness, interests may have some influence on degree of participation, but not enough evidence. It is found that almost two-third of citizen respondents never participated in any PB process. Even remaining one-third attendees all of them have not participated in all of the sequential events of PB. Among those who participated, participation of lower level educated is significant as their ratio of participation is higher than the higher educated. That means PB is more sympathized to the citizens of lower level educated those are marginalized in the grassroots. Therefore, PB of Bangladesh creates space for marginalized groups to represent in the decision-making process that could be supportive to deepening local democracy. Moreover, among those who participated, participation in community meeting, ward meeting and open-budget session is much higher than other sequential events. These three processes are the key points of engaging citizens that can lead towards the effective implementation of PB. Furthermore, among these three key processes there is limitation of

engaging citizens in community and ward level as these two are small group forums. From the perspective of participatory governance, participation in community meeting and ward meeting should be more highlighted to ensure effective participation of grassroots from the very beginning of PB process. There are abundant scopes to be engaged in open-budget session. And it is found that participation in open-budget session is remarkable, which implies that open-budget session is more significantly functioning than the other events of PB. The participation of lower level of educated is also more in the open-budget session than the higher educated, which implies that general citizens have more access to open-budget session citizens are actively taking part. Moreover, the format of open-budget session, such as no restriction, open-space, wide announcement, festive mode with cultural event encourages general citizens more to participate. That means, local governments are more flexible to offer more scope to marginalized and poor people of grassroot level to participate in open-budget session. As per the view of respondents, PB in Bangladesh is supportive for deepening bottom-up democracy in local level. Higher level educated citizens do not deny the significance of PB, they avoid because of their time constraints.

There is a positive relationship between knowledge of legal rights and participation as it is found that those who have such knowledge participated three-times more than the unknowledgeable respondents. But interestingly, it is found that higher educated respondents have low level of knowledge and understanding on participation in PB and accordingly their rate of participation is low in PB as a whole and in the different processes in specific. However, higher educated respondents interest in local government initiative is higher than lower level educated. The analysis also finds that citizens perceive they have low level of capacity to participate in PB process, because of various constraints induced from internal and external environment of local governments and restrain citizens to organize and mobilize collectively.

5.6.2 Findings and Discussions of Assumption 2

In discussing assumption 2, *the proactiveness of the actors of local government affects the process of PB*, the functions of local elected representatives and officials were analyzed based on the perception of interviewees. Regarding the functions of elected representatives, commitment and willingness are foremost. It is found that political commitment in terms of specific promotional activities by elected representatives are limited although there is substantial policy support due to the structural impediments. The initiatives taken by the local government representatives in engaging citizens into PB process are seemed to be effective. But very few of them followed to take those initiatives for effective implementation of PB. It is important that a number of elected representatives organized ward level meeting, which is one of the most effective initiatives of PB process to engage citizens initially. Basically, participation of citizens starts from ward meeting, by prioritizing projects in deliberative way entirely with the local citizens, which is the basic of PB process (Goldfrank, 2007; Moynihan, 2007; Wampler, 2007). There is also biasness in engaging politically dominative persons so called elite citizens than the general folks such as poor and disadvantaged. Regarding decision-making authority of elected representatives, they have legally decentralized authority for every kind of decision-making irrespective of administrative and financial. But practically, they are controlled by the local administrative authorities.

Functions of local government officials are crucial because they play catalyst's role in adoption, implementation, and promotion of PB and facilitation with technical support by their relevant capacity. According to the results of Interview 2, it is found that there is lack in capacity and skill of officials in facilitating PB process. There is lack of proactiveness of officials in expanding PB by activating committees for promoting participation of citizens as well as sharing information. But it is found that there is restrictive behavior of officials in sharing information.

Chapter 6: Characteristics of UP in Determining PB Outputs

6.1 Introduction

This chapter analyzes the characteristics of UPs and how these characteristics effect the outputs as well as outcomes of PB towards its effectiveness in the local government context of Bangladesh. These characteristics are mainly the structural issues of PB institution having different features of local government bodies and their relations to the effectiveness of PB. These characteristics include three aspects: social, economic, and political elements in broader sense. The discussion of this chapter uses quantitative data of different socio-economic variables, collected from secondary sources, along with the qualitative data of Interview 2. The analysis of this chapter attempts to discuss assumption 3 of this dissertation.

Assumption 3:

Different characteristics of UP affect PB process and outputs.

The assumption 3 indicates how the different characteristics UP, such as political, economic, and social aspects effect PB process and outputs. In this chapter, it is defined and analyzed the characteristics of political aspects in terms of local political culture, strength of local leadership; characteristics of economic aspects in terms of budgetary outputs; and characteristics of social aspects in terms of UP's size, area, location, geographical conditions, physical accessibility, livelihood and developmental priorities determined by citizens through the PB process. These characteristics of UP are analyzed to examine their relationship and contribution in budgetary outputs. The outputs of PB are defined in this dissertation as increased amount of PB budget and adoption of projects. And the ultimate effects of increased budgetary allocation as well and

development projects enhance to achieve outcomes of PB, which are meant as improved socio-economic conditions of communities and deepening of the bottom-up democracy. The improved socio-economic conditions of communities include results and achievement of PB, which are increased level of citizens' lives through reduction of poverty, steady development of infrastructure facilities and addressing the other social welfare services. And this all are resulted by the active participation of citizens who are provided the scope for practicing such democratic rights, which is a citizen-centered political process practiced in the community level for building the consensus on the common issues with a democratic engagement mechanism.

6.2 Characteristics of UP and Outputs of PB

6.2.1 Local Political Culture

The outputs of the engagement of citizens in a PB process is influenced by the political environment and culture of a local government body (Goldfrank, 2007; Heimans, 2002; Wampler, 2007). Local political culture is composed of the attitudes, beliefs, and values of society that relate to the political system and political issues. More precisely, Dahl (1956) sees political culture as citizen's orientation to problem-solving, collective action and the political system. Political culture and tradition influence the output of allocation of resources in budgeting and ensure accountability. Knowledge of the local political setting is crucial in understanding the factors that drive accountability mechanisms (Lakina, 2008). In relation above, the effects of PB are determined by the political culture of the local governments. When the political culture is not policy based and local officials and office holders have no real interest or incentive to align policy spending according to citizen preferences (Folscher, 2007).

From the *Interview 2* this study tries to understand the local political culture of local government in the context of participation of citizens in planning and budgeting at UP level. In relation to this, the *Academic 1* mentioned that:

“...local government of and specifically UP has a congenial political culture as there is competitive election comparatively by fair voting. This strength of legitimacy needs to be capitalized for realizing outputs not only for PB but also general operation of UP. UP leaders cannot properly utilize this congenial local political culture for strengthening participation of citizens in the PB process. They engage citizens as per the legal mandate but some of them have tendency of avoiding citizens and feel troublesome of engaging citizens.”

Elected representative's role is crucial in accelerating PB and increasing outputs. Although they play role in maximizing their own utility, it directly effects to the outputs of PB. They never deny the importance of engaging citizens in the processes of PB, but some of them are conservative. Elected representatives have no scope to avoid PB, while it is mandatory by law for adoption and implementation.¹⁰⁵ Within the congenial political structure, there are some factors that hamper participation of citizens in PB process. One of them is affiliation to political party. Regarding the effects of party affiliation, *NGO 4* said:

“...party affiliation in local government negatively effects to the outputs of PB especially in case of UP. The fraction among the political groups or communities are sometimes very much evident. The opposition party affiliated citizen's access is mostly denied. As a result, inclusiveness of participation is deteriorated and outputs of PB are hampered.”

¹⁰⁵ Local Government (UP) Act 2009.

Local elections including election of UPs were not political party-based until government amended the ‘Local Government UP Act 2009’ on October 12, 2015, which introduced partisan polls (GOB, 2015). It is argued that partisan local election may lower the quality of elected representatives (Majumdar, 2015), although political party is to enhance democratic process through electoral process. Participation beyond election, like direct participation under PB has different notion, where participation is considered a neutral issue to ensure inclusiveness irrespective of political affiliation of participants. In PB, elected representative, especially Chairperson has tendency to engage people of his affiliation, which denied inclusiveness. Similarly, *District 4 of Interview 2* mentioned:

“...from the last election of 2016, local government representatives are elected under one political party, but their personal identity and image are more important than their belonging parties. Irrespective of political party affiliation, they have scope to prove themselves personally as pro-citizen. Recent changes in option of local government election that encourages political party affiliation of candidates have been getting much identical, which is considered as a limitation for candidates to get support of all folks of the constituency. Party affiliation of candidates also result divisions in the community that disempower UP leadership. For effective participation there should have community harmony that can empower local leadership to reign in the council for longer time by reelecting for several consecutive periods.”

From the above opinions of *Interview 2*, it is seemed that existing local political culture and political parties are supportive in some extents, in the context of participation of citizens in planning and budgeting. But political partisan hampers inclusive engagement of citizens into the process of

PB and accordingly limits the budgetary outputs of UP. The implication of such opinions is that outputs of PB is limited in the UPs as per the demands.

6.2.2 Strength of Local Leadership in Maximizing PB Output

The stance of leadership plays an important role in achieving performance targets in government, including budget performance (Forrester & Adams, 2014). Leadership styles are linked to policies, priorities for setting performance targets, and budgeting processes (Moynihan, 2004). Leadership in public budgeting is embedded in the executive as well as the legislature (Meier, 2000). And the ownership by local leadership is critical, which requires strength and dynamism (Folscher, 2007) of the head of local council (Chairperson of UP here) with values of pluralism and political activism.¹⁰⁶ As the citizens are invited actors (Hettings & Kugelberg, 2018), the local leadership is responsible for inviting citizens and ensuring their participation, strengthening inclusion, enhancing representation, making participatory decisions, and maintaining relations with the central government as well as local administration. To maximize the outputs of PB, local leadership should be willing to embrace reforms and practices (World Bank, 1998) with a stronger relationship of political hierarchy for gaining power for getting resources in utmost development activities towards deepening legitimacy and popularity for further reelection in the council. Arguably, such reforms and practices are not necessarily related only to policy issues but more closely related to the stronger initiatives.

Local leadership in Bangladesh has multi-dimensional deficiencies as it is discussed in Chapter 5 and observed that the level of political commitment of elected representatives of UPs are not satisfactory for promoting PB extensively (section 5.4.1). Moreover, the interviewees also

¹⁰⁶ Strength of local leadership is important for evaluating effectiveness of PB, because it is one of the preconditions for successful implementation (Goldfrank, 2007).

idealized local leaderships as troublesome practices. Regarding the strength of local leadership, the *Academic 1* of *Interview 2* expressed frustration that:

“...people those have quality of strong leadership does not come to be elected as council Member or Chairperson. That is why, many of UP representatives do not have leadership quality to extract maximum outputs by their activities under PB. Specifically, Ward Members of UP do not perform any role by themselves unless Chairperson asks them to some activities. Moreover, Members are less educated and have low level of understanding about PB mechanisms. Many Chairpersons also do not want members’ proactiveness, which may diminish their supremacy of exercising power at the UP council.”

Project 3 of *Interview 2* identified some crucial issues related to the problems in local leaderships in maximizing outputs of PB:

“...local leadership are not grown under any political institution as most of the local leaders of UP are not affiliated with political parties although recently option is created to be elected under political party’s banner. Practically, local leaders do not have scope of learning and practicing leadership under political institution. Educated people do not want to be elected because the position of UP Chairperson and Member are not attractive in terms of political power and financial benefits, as there is no monthly salary except a small lumpsum amount of allowance. As a result, the people who are elected as council members of UP usually have low leadership enthusiasm for taking new PB initiatives to produce better outputs.”

A UP women member of Kanaighat upazila of Sylhet district argued on the capacity of her UP Chairperson and angrily expressed that:

“Chairperson of this UP does not understand the normal process of government and how to get more budget from central government because he is not well educated. He is also not enthusiastic to maintain relationships with the local administration so that UP can get more budget as per the demands made by citizens through PB process. The other members of the council cannot fulfill the demands of their localities. He is not regular and comes to UP once or twice a week. So, not only budgetary activities are distracted but also other regular activities of UP are hampered. Citizens always complain about such behavior of Chairperson.”

The observation from the above opinions of key informants, although there are lacking in strength of some local leadership, but their stance of expanding PB and accelerating outputs are fundamental.

6.2.3 Role of Local Leadership in Allocation of PB

6.2.3.1 Analysis of PB Allocation of Studied UPs

Roles of local leadership are examined with the allocation of PB of UPs that are related to the outputs in terms of increased budgetary amount of PB to mitigate citizens’ needs and priorities through developmental accomplishments. This section analyzes PB allocation of studied UPs to examine the trends in budgetary outputs of PB. The share of PB budget for the last four consecutive Fiscal Years (2016-17, 2017-18, 2018-19 & 2019-2020) are presented in Table 6.1 and 6.2. Furtherly, PB amounts of UPs are illustrated in Figure 6.1 and 6.2 to show the trend of changes over the years.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁷ The budget data of UP including share of PB budget are collected from the LGSP Project of Local Government Division, Government of Bangladesh.

UP budget has two parts: (i) self-fund; and (ii) development fund. The expenditure sectors of self-fund are general establishments and administrative costs that includes the salary and allowances of UP elected representatives and officials. The development fund mainly includes the infrastructure costs, education, health, social welfare services etc. The main coverage of PB is the development fund and it is the main part of the budget of UP consists 80.0%-90.0% of total amount. This part of budget is usually discussed to prioritized development projects in participation of citizens through various deliberative processes of PB at community, ward, and UP level.


Table 6.1 Budget and PB Amount of UPs of Sylhet for FY 2016-17 to 2019-20.

Name of Upazila	Name of UPs	Budget (in million BDT ¹⁰⁸)											
		2016-17			2017-18			2018-19			2019-20		
		Total	PB	%	Total	PB	%	Total	PB	%	Total	PB	%
Amtali	Arpangashia	7.6	5.0	66.0	12.0	11.6	96.4	23.0	22.3	96.7	20.5	20.0	97.5
	Chaora	7.8	7.1	91.0	4.3	3.9	91.4	15.2	14.4	94.3	20.3	20.0	98.6
	Haldia	9.8	8.9	91.6	16.8	16.7	98.9	30.2	29.1	96.5	31.0	30.5	98.2
	Kukua	8.2	7.0	85.8	12.7	11.4	89.4	21.8	20.6	94.6	23.6	23.3	98.4
Barguna Sadar	Badarkhali	8.7	8.3	95.6	18.2	17.6	96.7	35.3	34.2	96.9	37.0	36.2	97.8
	Burirchar	7.1	6.6	92.7	20.2	19.2	94.8	32.7	31.2	95.6	36.1	35.2	97.7
	Fuljhury	5.6	5.2	92.5	11.3	10.9	96.2	19.6	19.2	97.8	18.9	18.7	99.1
	Gourichanna	6.5	5.8	89.7	20.0	18.8	93.8	25.4	23.9	94.1	32.7	30.9	94.4
Betagi	Bibichini	3.9	3.7	95.6	13.5	12.9	94.6	10.2	9.3	91.4	7.6	6.3	83.1
	Hosnabad	6.6	6.2	93.5	13.6	13.1	96.0	18.2	17.2	94.7	13.7	13.0	95.4
	Kazirabad	4.1	3.8	93.8	9.2	8.7	95.1	15.3	14.8	96.2	18.0	17.7	98.2
	Mokamia	4.0	3.6	89.4	12.8	12.3	96.2	9.2	8.8	95.3	18.9	18.5	97.9
Patharghata	Kakchira	7.4	6.9	92.4	16.3	16.0	98.0	23.2	22.7	98.2	28.4	28.0	98.8
	Kalmegha	8.7	8.1	93.7	26.6	26.2	98.5	25.8	25.3	98.1	31.0	30.5	98.2
	Kathaltali	13.2	12.6	95.7	17.4	16.9	97.2	23.7	23.1	97.6	30.2	29.9	98.8
	Nachnapara	8.4	8.0	94.9	10.5	9.7	92.3	22.2	21.1	94.8	21.3	20.8	97.7

Note: These budget data was collected from the LGSP Project databases. Local Government Division, Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives.

¹⁰⁸ BDT = Bangladeshi Taka (Currency of Bangladesh).

Figure 6.1 PB Amount of UPs of Barguna for FY 2016-17 to 2019-20.



Source: Author's.

If we look into the development budget (PB amount), in most of the UPs of Barguna district, the amount of PB has been increasing in trend over the four FYs as PB of 13 UPs were increased out of 16. For example, PB of Arpangashia UP has been increased and had almost double in FY 2018-19 to the previous FY 2017-18. Few of the UPs PB also decreased a little. For example, Bibichini UP's PB has been in decreasing trend over the FYs. This reversed variations in trend of allocation of PB might happened due to the distinct bargaining capacity of UP representatives especially the capacity of UP Chairperson using their leadership, introducing new initiatives of PB, officials' strength in implementation and raising more demands by citizens. Similar to this, the interviewees' opinions are also supportive to the above statements as *District 3* of *Interview 2* pronounced that:

“...among the UP chairperson, who are politically powerful, try to grab more budget by initiating more projects. At the same time, some UPs are also capable to spend more budget and implement projects under PB timely. So, usually more resources are allocated to those UPs. The amount does not only depend on the size of population or area of UP but also on the demands raised by the Council.”

Moreover, if we look into the PB amount of 4 UPs of ‘Barguna Sadar Upazila’, total budget were not only increasing but also amounts are much higher and even double than some UPs of other Upazilas. For example, Badarkhali, Burirchar and Gourichanna had higher amount of PB in all consecutive four FYs from 2016-17 to 2019-20.¹⁰⁹ So, it can be argued that there are significant differences in the amount of PB allocation between the UPs of remote rural areas and UPs of sub-urbanized areas. Regarding such differences in getting of budget as well as PB, *Academic 1 of Interview 2* said:

“...all UPs do not get similar amount of budget due to biasness of local administration. Simultaneously, UPs of suburban areas are more influential to manage more budget from the authority as their number of populations is higher and require more services and infrastructure supports. The low profiled Chairperson cannot influence the administration and as a result they get less amount of budget under PB.”

The implications of these opinions of the interviewees regarding the outputs of PB in relation to the leadership quality and capacity of UP Chairpersons are related with the allocation of PB, while leadership is a key element in the complex game of local government and is essential in order to serve the public good (Coulson, 2007). A case study research shows that decision-

¹⁰⁹ *Sadar* Upazila means the area located near to the district headquarters but beyond the boundary of municipality, which can be called sub-urban or peri-urban areas.

making of local leaders is a core factor in the success or failure of local government, where arguably, budgetary resources are main factors, and the study shows that strongly-led leadership of the local governments were found to exhibit more success in resulting effective outputs of their initiatives with more inclusionary process of participation (Shalom, 2015). Effective leadership needs to establish and develop commitment to an agreed course of action, such as PB, particularly among the constituency (Franek, 2005; Haus & Sweeting, 2006; Svara, 2006). Another case study research on the local government of Thailand, shows that local government chief executive must have education and knowledge for better management and knowledge include portfolio of leadership among other criteria (Boonleang et al., 2010).

It is found that UPs located in suburban areas managed more budget allocation under PB. According to regional budget principles and criteria, allocation depends on the structural marginalization considering equity and effectiveness (Rajhi, 2014). The UPs those are located near the urban areas are densely populated and allocation of PB per head is higher than other UPs (Table 6.7). In discussing political, economic, social, and legal environments of local budgeting, Robert L. Bland (2014) identified that change of population is a determinant in expanding budget amount. Moreover, suburban UPs have more demands of infrastructure development, which requires high amount of budget investment as it is shown in Table 6.2.10 where sectoral priorities of individual UP are analyzed. And suburban UPs' economic activities include small industrial agglomeration. So, local tax bases of these UPs are stronger than more ruralized UPs. As a result, budgetary amount of PB gets higher. The priorities of individual UPs are decided through PB process and PB becomes a point of matching of urgent administrative demands and the reflection of citizens' bottom-up demands.¹¹⁰

¹¹⁰ The location and other conditions that affect in output generation are discussed in Section 6.2.7.

Table 6.2 Budget and PB Amount of UPs of Sylhet for FY 2016-17 to 2019-20.


Name of Upazila	Selected UPs	Budget (in million BDT)											
		2016-17			2017-18			2018-19			2019-20		
		Total	PB	%	Total	PB	%	Total	PB	%	Total	PB	%
Beambazar	Kurarbazar	7.3	7.0	95.8	11.2	10.1	89.7	13.2	12.3	93.3	13.6	12.9	95.0
	Mathiura	4.8	4.1	86.9	8.8	7.6	85.7	8.6	8.2	95.4	8.3	7.9	95.6
	Mollapur	4.4	4.2	95.6	2.2	1.9	86.7	8.6	7.5	87.2	9.8	8.6	87.4
	Sheola	4.8	4.7	97.7	8.9	7.4	83.1	7.2	6.2	85.6	5.6	14.9	87.3
Golapganj	Bagha	9.7	9.2	95.6	17.5	10.9	62.7	9.0	8.4	93.4	11.4	11.1	97.5
	Fulbari	8.8	8.1	91.9	11.8	9.4	79.0	8.7	8.1	92.8	7.4	6.9	93.0
	Lakshmpasha	6.5	6.3	96.8	8.9	6.5	73.1	11.2	9.1	81.3	4.9	4.1	83.8
	Amura	5.6	5.4	97.0	9.2	7.4	80.3	9.8	9.5	96.7	7.9	7.7	97.6
Kanaighat	Bara Chotul	9.6	9.2	95.6	17.1	14.0	81.7	24.1	22.8	94.9	18.1	17.4	96.2
	Jhingabari	13.1	12.8	97.1	20.6	17.3	84.3	6.7	6.1	91.1	16.3	15.6	95.8
	Banigram	10.6	10.5	99.1	17.0	14.2	83.4	14.8	13.8	93.7	11.0	10.4	95.1
	Rajaganj	8.0	7.9	98.5	16.8	13.9	82.5	14.1	12.6	89.6	7.0	17.8	75.9
Zakiganj	Barothakuri	9.2	8.6	93.9	14.2	11.5	80.5	11.9	11.3	94.8	15.4	15.0	97.5
	Kholachara	9.6	9.2	96.5	11.5	10.7	93.5	12.8	12.0	93.7	13.5	12.8	94.9
	Manikpur	12.3	11.5	93.5	14.0	12.9	92.5	16.4	15.5	94.0	14.2	13.6	95.8
	Sultanpur	9.3	8.9	95.7	12.4	11.3	89.7	5.5	5.0	91.2	10.4	9.6	95.0

Note: These budget data was collected from the LGSP Project databases. Local Government Division, Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives.

In case of the PB of UPs of Sylhet district, as shown in the Table 6.2 and Figure 6.2, the trends in the amount of both total budget and PB have differences than the UPs of Barguna districts. The most of the UPs' budget and PB were fluctuated or decreased over the FYs. Out of 16 UPs 10 UPs' budget were fluctuated or decreased. At the same time, the PB of UPs of Sylhet are relatively lower than the amounts of the UPs of Barguna. The average PB in FY 2019-20 of the UPs of Sylhet was less than 10.0 million while it was more 20.0 million in the UPs of Barguna. For example, Banigram UP of Kanaighat Upazila of Sylhet received 10.9 million in FY 2019-20 and in the same FY in a UP of Barguna named Haldia received 31.0 million, which is three-times higher. Another difference was on the share of PB budget (development fund), which was less than or around 90% in the UPs of Sylhet and it was more than 95% in the UPs of Barguna.¹¹¹

¹¹¹ As PB is the mandatory for UP, majority of the fund covers by PB budget, which is the PB part

Figure 6.2 PB Amount of UPs of Sylhet for FY 2016-17 to 2019-20.



Source: Author's.

6.2.3.2 Capacity of UP Leadership and Allocation of PB

As discussed above differences of budgetary outputs depend on the capacity of UP leadership. Capacity also depends on the educational qualification of the head of the council i.e., UP Chairperson. Table 6.3 presents the educational qualification of UP Chairpersons of studied 32 UPs, and per head allocation of PB for FY 2016-17, 2017-18, 2018-19 and 2019-20. Among 32 studied UPs, 17 UP Chairpersons have BA degree and or above, and 15 UP Chairpersons have lower educational qualifications, which is less than BA degree. The per head PB allocation is comparatively higher in the UPs of higher educated Chairpersons, which imply that the education level of UP leadership influences the outputs of budgetary allocation of PB.

Table 6.3 Educational Qualifications of Chairpersons and PB Allocation Per Head.


Sl. No.	Name of UPs	Educational Qualification of Chairpersons		PB Allocation Per Head (FY 2019-20)
		Degree	Given Score for Degree	
1.	Gourichanna	MA	5	1,116
2.	Kazirabad	MA	5	1,239
3.	Mokamia	MA	5	1,310
4.	Arpangashia	BA	4	1,346
5.	Chaora	BA	4	962
6.	Haldia	BA	4	1,023
7.	Kukua	BA	4	968
8.	Badarkhali	BA	4	1,382
9.	Burirchar	BA	4	1,190
10.	Kakchira	BA	4	1,421
11.	Kalmegha	BA	4	1,177
12.	Kathaltali	BA	4	1,509
13.	Mathiura	BA	4	538
14.	Amura	BA	4	428
15.	Banigram	BA	4	354
16.	Barothakuri	BA	4	645
17.	Kholachara	BA	4	617
18.	Fuljhury	HSC	3	1,416
19.	Bibichini	HSC	3	240
20.	Nachnapara	HSC	3	1,665
21.	Sheola	HSC	3	517
22.	Bara Chotul	HSC	3	744
23.	Rajaganj	HSC	3	55
24.	Sultanpur	HSC	3	368
25.	Hosnabad	SSC	2	801
26.	Fulbari	SSC	2	247
27.	Lakshmipasha	SSC	2	172
28.	Kurarbazar	SSC	2	541
29.	Mollapur	SSC	2	754
30.	Jhingabari	SSC	2	458
31.	Manikpur	SSC	2	417
32.	Bagha	Primary	1	327

Note: PB amount per head for FY 2019-20 calculated (in BDT) from Table 6.8 and compared with educational qualification scores (MA=5, BA= 4, HSC=3, SSC=2 & Primary=1). *Source:* Educational qualifications of UP Chairpersons are collected from the individual UP (as of February 2021).

To confirm this relationship, correlation and regression analysis is conducted between educational qualification of Chairpersons and per head allocation of PB and it is found that there is a moderately positive correlation, as $r= 0.54$ and p value of regression is 0.001 (<0.01) (Figure 6.3). It indicates that the higher educated Chairpersons have better capacity of administering PB process as well as capable more in gaining output of budgetary allocation per head. Educational

qualification matters in fiscal performance as educated mayors tend to obtain a higher percentage of discretionary transfers (Rocha et al., 2017) and individuals with better educational background are gradually getting elected more in local governments of Bangladesh in recent years (Uddin, 2016). The quality of local representatives' decision-making largely depends on their qualifications and experiences of education and leadership (Papcunova & Gecikova, 2014).

Figure 6.3 Educational Qualification of Chairpersons and PB Allocation.



Source: Author's Analysis.

Hence, the level of personal academic qualification along with personal leadership capacity are necessary for advancing the outputs and sustainability of PB by initiating and implementing successful projects. It is also found from Interviews 2 in the previous section of this chapter (section 6.2.2) that UP representatives have low level of understanding on the overall operation of

PB process due to their low level of academic career. Similar findings related to the capacity of local leadership were observed in Chapter 5 (section 5.4.1). In many cases, Mayors have lack of professional knowledge on administrative and governmental issues, and therefore need to depend on the advice of officials of municipality (Shalom, 2015).

The discussion on the educational qualifications of Chairpersons and PB allocation per head, the findings and the facts suggest that leaders' capacity as the educational career might has the effect on the functions of PB, although it is not evidentially very strong. From the above discussions, it can be argued that the implementation, outputs and effectiveness of PB varies due to the strength and capacity of local leadership (Folscher, 2007; Shall, 2007; Suwanmala, 2004). It is argued by other literatures that weak leadership of elected municipal officials, which accompanies this shortage of qualified personnel (Kanoute & Som, 2018) clearly lead to non-effectiveness of PB.

6.2.4 Stability and Support to UP Leadership in Changing PB Allocation

6.2.4.1 Trend of Changes in PB Allocation

PB is mainly an approach to governance in local level, which is linked with the allocation and distribution of resources. So, PB is not possible without financial resources that should be available. Using stronger political leadership, proactiveness of officials and contributing citizenry; UPs can generate more financial resources for implementing the demands listed by the PB process. Although studied UPs of Barguna and Sylhet districts have been continuing PB practices, PB allocation among the UPs were varied. It is found that PB of different years of different UPs were increased, fluctuated and also decreased. And also, the amount of annual budget allocation and its increment were not taken place equally to all UPs in relation to their population size and areas, but mostly it depends on the role of elected representatives and officials as well as their leadership and

proactiveness in implementing PB widely. So, there are clear variations in allocation of PB among the studied UPs of two separate locations.

Table 6.4 Trend of Changes of PB Allocation of UPs.

No.	District Name	Name of UPs	PB Allocation (in million BDT)				Trends of PB Changes
			2016-17	2017-18	2018-19	2019-2020	
1.	Barguna	Arpangashia	5.0	11.6	22.3	20.0	<i>Increased</i>
2.		Badarkhali	8.3	17.6	34.2	36.2	
3.		Burirchar	6.6	19.2	31.2	35.2	
4.		Fuljhury	5.2	10.9	19.2	18.7	
5.		Gourichanna	5.8	18.8	23.9	30.9	
6.		Haldia	8.9	16.7	29.1	30.5	
7.		Kakchira	6.9	16.0	22.7	28.0	
8.		Kalmegha	8.1	26.2	25.3	30.5	
9.		Kathaltali	12.6	16.9	23.1	29.9	
10.		Kazirabad	3.8	8.7	14.8	17.7	
11.		Kukua	7.0	11.4	20.6	23.3	
12.		Nachnapara	8.0	9.7	21.1	20.8	
13.	Sylhet	Barothakuri	8.6	11.5	11.3	15.0	<i>Increased</i>
14.		Kholachara	9.2	10.7	12.0	12.8	
15.		Kurarbazar	7.0	10.1	12.3	12.9	
16.		Mathiura	4.1	7.6	8.2	7.9	
17.		Mollapur	4.2	1.9	7.5	8.6	
18.		Rajaganj	7.9	13.9	12.6	17.8	
19.	Barguna	Chaora	7.1	3.9	14.4	20.0	<i>Increased</i>
20.		Hosnabad	6.2	13.1	17.2	13.0	
21.		Mokamia	3.6	12.3	8.8	18.5	
22.	Sylhet	Amura	5.4	7.4	9.5	7.7	<i>Fluctuated</i>
23.		Bagha	9.2	10.9	8.4	11.1	
24.		Bara Chotul	9.2	14.0	22.8	17.4	
25.		Jhingabari	12.8	17.3	6.1	15.6	
26.		Lakshmipasha	6.3	6.5	9.1	4.1	
27.		Manikpur	11.5	12.9	15.5	13.6	
28.		Sheola	4.7	7.4	6.2	14.9	
29.		Sultanpur	8.9	11.3	5.0	9.6	
30.	Barguna	Bibichini	3.7	12.9	9.3	6.3	<i>Decreased</i>
31.	Sylhet	Banigram	10.5	14.2	13.8	10.4	
32.		Fulbari	8.1	9.4	8.1	6.9	

Note: Data collected form LGSP Project databases of Local Government Division.

Annual Budget of UP has two parts: self-fund and development fund. Self-fund covers mainly the revenue expenditures and development-fund covers all development expenditures. This development fund is mainly discussed with citizens under PB processes. Table 6.4 presents the allocation of PB (development fund) of four consecutive fiscal years: FY 2016-17, 2017-18, 2018-

19 and 2019-20. The sources of development funds are various transfers from ADP of government, central government umbrella projects/programs, other grants and special grants including LGSP project. Among these transfers a major portion comes from the LGSP BBG and PBG grants.¹¹² PBG is a grant of performance-based budgeting, which is allocated maximum 65.0% UPs based on the performance of the outputs of UPs in different phases of FY (GOB, 2021). Differences in PB allocations of UPs are examined and analyzed to find out trends in changes and underlying facts. The trends are categorized and shown in the right-most column of Table 6.4.

These three categories are: tend to be increased, fluctuated (one year increased and another year decreased), and tend to be decreased. Among 32 studied UPs, PB allocation was increased for 18 UPs over the four consecutive FYs, fluctuated for 11, and decreased for 3 UPs. Among the UPs those PB allocation was increased, No. 6 Haldia's PB was increased approximately two times in consecutive two years from 2016-17 to 2017-18 and to 2018-19, and the amount were respectively 8.9, 16.7 and 29.1 million. And it was also continued to increase to 30.5 million in FY 2019-2020. Similarly, in case of No. 3 Burirchar UP, PB was also increasing trends and from FY 2016-17 to FY 2017-18 and increased approximately three times more from 6.6 to 19.2 million. In the next fiscal year 2018-19, the increment of that UP was one and half times (31.2 million) more than and the previous FY. In FY 2019-20 the budget was also increased substantially (35.2 million). If we look into one more example, No. 9 Kathaltali UP had PB 12.6 million in FY 2016-17, which was increased to 16.9, 23.1 and 29.9 million respectively in FY 2017-18, 2018-19, and 2019-20. Increasing trends of PB is also there in other 15 UPs as categorized in the table. So, 18 UPs' PBs are in increasing trend, which is more than half (56%) of the total UPs. Moreover, total amount of budget was increased for 16 UPs which is also half

¹¹² LGSP = Local Governance Support Project, BBG = Basic Block Grants, PBG = Performance-based Block Grants,

(50.0%) of the total UPs (Table 6.1 & 6.2). So, it can be mentioned here that due to the continuation of implementation of PB, the amount of PB budget and total budget were increased.

PB allocation was fluctuated for 11 UPs. For example, No. 21 Mokamia UP had PB 3.6 million in FY 2016-17, which was approximately four-times (12.3 million) increased in the next FY 2017-18. But in the FY 2017-18 PB allocation was decreased to 8.8 million and again it attained to more than double in FY 2019-20. That means, PB amount was fluctuated and quite unusually and abruptly. Similarly, No. 25 Jhingabari UP's PB was also fluctuated abruptly. Such as in FY 2016-17 it was 12.8 million and increased to 17.3 million in FY 2017-18. Again, the amount goes down to one-third (6.1 million) in FY 2018-19 and further amount was raised to 15.6 million in FY 2019-20. To find out the reasons for such unusual and abrupt increase and decrease of budget, both of the UP Chairpersons were interviewed over telephone and it is found that chairpersonship were change during these periods after by-elections in those UPs.¹¹³

And unexpectedly, 3 UPs PB was decreased over the FYs. The UPs are No. 30, 31, and 32 mentioned in the Table 6.4. In case of No. 30 Bibichini UP although budget was increased in FY 2017-18 than FY 2016-17 but next three consecutive FYs the amounts were continuously decreased, which were 12.9, 9.3 and 6.3 million in FY 2017-18, 2018-19 and 2019-20 respectively. The observation is here that the decreases were happened very sharply over the years. Similar to this, No. 32 Fulbari UP's PB was 8.1 million in FY 2016-17 which was little increased (9.4 million) in immediate next FY, then the amounts were decreased consecutively in FY 2018-19 and FY 2019-20 which were 8.1 and 6.9 million respectively. Such decrements are also unusual considering the overall budget trends not only for PB and local government but also for national budget, as both local and national budgets of Bangladesh were in increasing trends for last couple

¹¹³ Source: Informal interview with the Chairpersons of UPs.

of decades (GOB, 2020). The reasons for such unexpected budget decrements could be failure of proper planning of PB process, delayed submission of budget to the authority by the UP officials, and deficit in income and expenditure followed by the unusual budget revisions. Usually both local and national budget are revised in Bangladesh, not only for fiscal deficit but also for incremental demands and surrender of budget due to non-spending (GOB, 2020). The relationship of variations in PB allocation, stability and support to UP leadership will be examined in the following section.

6.2.4.2 Stability and Support to UP Leadership

The representative indices of leadership of UPs are experiences of leadership (duration/term of Chairpersonship) and political support by citizens in terms of stability (share of received votes).¹¹⁴ These two indices are compared in Table 6.5 with the trend of budgetary allocation under identified three categories of trends of PB changes: increased, fluctuated and decreased.

In relation of trends of PB changes have a relationship with the duration of chairpersonship of UPs. The average duration of Chairpersonship for the UPs of increased budget is 10.5 years and for fluctuated budget is 6.6 years. So, among the 18 UPs of increased budget, 14 (77.8%) Chairpersons have been in their positions for long term more than the average years of Chairpersonship of increased budget, and 4 Chairpersons have been in their positions for only the current terms (5 years), which will be ending in early 2021. And among the 11 UPs of fluctuated budget only 3 Chairmen have been in their positions for more than ten years and 8 (80.0%) UPs have been in their positions for 5 years. Finally, among 3 UPs of decreased budget only 1 Chairperson have been in their positions for long term that is 14 years and 2 Chairmen have been in their positions only for one term. The implication of such results is that PB is more incremental and sustainable when UP Chairperson rules for longer terms.

¹¹⁴ An electoral term for UP is five years.

Table 6.5 Relationship of PB Allocation, Chairperson’s Duration and Voter’s Support.

No.	District Name	Name of UPs	Trends of PB Changes	Average PB Allocation	Duration of Chairperson ship (Years)	Voters’ Support in Election 2016		
						Total Voters	Received Vote	Ratio of Vote (%)
1.	Barguna	Arpangashia	<i>Increased</i>	14.7	19	15,647	7,995	51.1
2.		Badarkhali		24.1	5	14,729	8,262	56.1
3.		Burirchar		23.1	10	16,079	15,485	96.3
4.		Fuljhury		13.5	15	8,039	4,261	53.0
5.		Gourichanna		19.9	10	14,266	8,062	56.5
6.		Haldia		21.3	14	12,587	7,935	63.0
7.		Kakchira		18.4	10	9,805	5,901	60.2
8.		Kalmegha		22.5	5	12,867	6,985	54.3
9.		Kathaltali		20.6	10	10,801	6,952	64.4
10.		Kazirabad		11.3	15	8,045	4,419	54.9
11.		Kukua		15.6	15	9,654	4,678	48.5
12.		Nachnapara		14.9	5	6,463	4,770	73.8
13.	Sylhet	Barothakuri	<i>Fluctuated</i>	11.6	10	9,920	5,246	52.9
14.		Kholachara		8.2	15	10,153	5,997	59.1
15.		Kurarbazar		10.6	9	11,623	6,267	53.9
16.		Mathiura		6.9	10	6,461	2,930	45.3
17.		Mollapur		5.6	5	11,261	5,438	48.3
18.		Rajaganj		13.1	7	15,957	8,849	55.5
19.	Barguna	Chaora	<i>Fluctuated</i>	11.4	10	13,256	5,986	45.2
20.		Hosnabad		12.4	5	8,839	5,312	60.1
21.		Mokamia		10.8	5	7,904	3,335	42.2
22.	Sylhet	Amura	<i>Fluctuated</i>	7.5	5	9,742	4,231	43.4
23.		Bagha		9.9	5	11,563	5,832	50.4
24.		Bara Chotul		11.8	5	10,847	4,522	41.7
25.		Jhingabari		9.3	5	14,425	4,978	34.5
26.		Lakshmipasha		6.5	18	10,721	3,924	36.6
27.		Manikpur		13.4	5	13,038	5,718	43.9
28.		Sheola		8.3	5	9,554	3,395	35.5
29.		Sultanpur		8.7	5	11,226	3,449	30.7
30.	Barguna	Bibichini	<i>Decreased</i>	8.1	5	9,825	3,935	40.1
31.	Sylhet	Banigram		12.2	14	12,719	4,447	35.0
32.		Fulbari		8.1	5	9,213	3,570	38.7


Sources: Bangladesh Election Commission (2021) and Table 6.3 & 6.4.

In relation to the support of voters in the election of UPs held in 2016 and trends of PB allocation, the UPs those budgets were increased, had more supports by voters than the UPs of less UPs of fluctuated and decreased allocations. The average received votes of UPs of increased budget is 58.2%, UPs of fluctuated budget is 42.2% and UPs of decreased budget is 37.9%. It clearly indicates that there is relationship between voter’s support and allocation of PB and it also indicates the stability of UP leadership that result positive with the outputs. Out of 18 UPs 15 (83.3%) UP Chairmen got more than 50.0% votes. Among these 15 UPs, 5 UP Chairmen got more

than 60.0% votes. On the other hand, out of 10 UPs of fluctuated budget only 2 UPs got more than 50.0% votes and remaining 8 UPs got around 40.0% votes. More interestingly, 3 UPs those budgets were decreased got less than 40.0% votes. So, it can be mentioned here that there is an relationship between the changes of budget and support of electorates.

The larger the development fund per capita, the more stable situation of the leader. And the development fund is determined through PB process. In other words, the adoption of PB itself is not a driving power for stability. However, the interlaced efforts of the leader who try to expand the development fund and appropriate reflection of citizen’s demand to the budget contents through PB process bring about the political stability. To confirm this relationship, correlation analysis is conducted between ratio of voters’ support and average allocation of PB, and it is found that there is a strong positive correlation, as $r= 0.66$, which indicates that the support of voters to the UP leadership has an effect on determining increased budget under PB. The support of people helps to make firm decisions and implement projects of citizens choice with stronger validation.

Figure 6.4 Correlation Between Voter’s Support and Average PB Output.



Source: Author’s.

Increased amount of PB seems to affect strongly by the higher supporting ratio of citizens, because it reflects the legitimacy through citizen's trust in elected officials in representing public interest (Swaner, 2017). The concept of support, developed from systems theory (Easton 1965), that correspondences legitimacy. The legitimacy may depend on the performance at different stages of policy process, whereas trust and support primarily feature the input side of the system (Lidstrom & Harald, 2016). Arguably, legitimacy of UP leadership resembles supports of citizens and which in return ensure public interest, which is meant here as increase resource outputs of PB.

6.2.4.3 Stability and Increased Amount of PB: A Case Study of Haldia UP

As it is found that there is a relationship in trend of PB allocation depends on UP leaders' strength in terms of their duration in stable chairpersonship and support of voters of their constituency, it is necessary to examine this relationship more intensely. Hence, a case study of Haldia UP under Amtali Upazila of Barguna is presented here for detail investigation of relationship between stability of chairperson and increased amount of PB.

Table 6.6 Stability, Support, Increased Participation and PB Allocation in Haldia UP.

	Fiscal Year				Duration of Chairpersonship	Support Ratio of Voters
	2016-17	2017-18	2018-19	2019-20		
PB Amount (in million BDT)	8.9	16.7	29.1	30.5	14 years	63.0%
Number of participants in open-budget session	164	175	196	215		
Number of projects implemented	131	145	157	167		

Note: Data of participation in open-budget session is collected from Haldia UP. Source of voter's support ratio is Bangladesh Election Commission. Source of PB data is LGS Project, Local Government Division.

The Chairperson of Haldia UP was interviewed (special interview) on February 3, 2019, and subsequently recent online conversation as well as detail discussion was held on March 21, 2021, with the officials responsible for facilitating PB process. Moreover, other relevant data and

information on participation in PB process, such as open-budget session is also considered as the evidence of support to UP leadership. Based on the previous interview, recent discussion and other data and information following interpretations are remarked:

- (a) It is explored that Chairperson has been continuing implementation of PB since 2009 immediately after proclamation of legal mandate. As per his statements, due to his continuous practice over the years, PB has been a supportable effort for increasing demand and realizing PB resources for development of his UP. He also has taken many initiatives and projects as per citizens' demands and implemented accordingly. The performance of implementation of projects is supportive for increasing amount of budget. That is why, PB amount has been increasing trend over the years (Table 6.6). People recognized his development activities (projects) that has been taken under PB and his popularity has been increased as UP secretary mentioned. Arguably, such proactive governance in fulfilling citizens' demands through implementing initiatives, PB has become a tool for his political stability, which ultimately results increased amount of allocation in PB.
- (b) Participation in the PB process especially in open-budget session is increasing trend over the years. At the same time, PB amount is also increasing trend in the same fiscal years as it is shown in Table 6.6. These findings indicate that there may have a relationship between participation and budget increase. Otherwise, increased participation in PB may results increased output of allocation.
- (c) The number of projects under PB is also increasing trend over the year. That means PB is expanding in this UP over the year by number of projects and amount of allocation. Increase of projects depends on the performance of UP, which is crucially depends on the

initiative of UP leadership, such as Chairperson and his stable regime with stronger support of constituents.

- (d) During field visits and interview to local people it is observed that peoples have positive impression about the activities of UP Chairperson because of his enthusiastic and proactive behavior in realizing citizen's demands, which also might have an effect in increasing trend of budget of that UP.
- (e) The current UP Chairperson has been serving for last 14 years, which is quite long as chairpersonship. It is three terms since he has been elected in the first time, although there is huge uncertainty in pollical leadership as well as competition among the candidates to be elected. It implies that current Chairperson has strong leadership capability to attract local people's support, which may lead to increased participation in PB processes as well as gain increased budgetary output.

6.2.5 Effect of Local Government Size by Population and Areas in Allocation of PB

This section is to examine whether there are differences in outputs of PB due to the size of UPs in terms of number of population and the physical area or not. This section will look into more details of population size and physical area, such as trend of PB allocation by size of population of UPs, relationship between population size and PB allocation, relationship between area and PB allocation, relationship between population density and PB per head, characteristics of population and relationship of PB allocation.

Now, we analyze the above individual trend of PB budget allocation in context of population size of the UPs based on Table 6.5 and following cross tabulation findings in Table 6.7. Here, three types of changes in the trend of PB allocation, such as: increased, fluctuated, and decreased are compared with their population size. Based on the population size, UPs are classified

into three categories: small (<20.00 thousands), medium (20.00 to 27.00 thousand) and large (> 27.00 thousands). As per these categories of population size, 11 are small, 11 are medium and 10 are large among 32 UPs. Among the UPs of small population size, PB amount was increased remarkably for 72.7% UPs, and no UPs' PB was decreased. And PB amount was increased for 54.5% UPs of medium population size. On the other hand, PB amount was mostly decreased for large population size UPs. Therefore, PB amounts of smaller populated UPs are remarkably in increasing trend than larger populated UPs.

Table 6.7 Trends of PB Outputs by Population Size of UPs.

Changes of Budget	Population Size of UPs (Thousand)						Total	
	Small (<20.00)		Medium (20.00-27.00)		Large (>27.00)			
	F	%	F	%	F	%	F	%
Increased	8	72.7	6	54.5	4	40.0	18	56.3
Fluctuated	3	27.3	4	36.4	4	40.0	11	34.4
Decreased	0	0.0	1	9.1	2	20.0	3	9.3
Total	11	100.0	11	100.0	10	100.0	32	100.0

Source: Author's Analysis.

At the same time, in cross-analysis from the context of allocations of 32 UPs, PB amounts were increased for 18 UPs and majority of them has smaller population, while is 44.4% are small and 33.3% are medium. So, PB amounts of smaller populated UPs are remarkably increasing in calculation of this way too. Most importantly, from both sides of calculation, no smaller UPs PB amounts were decreased. That means, PB is also stable more in smaller UPs than larger UPs by the size of population. From the above analyses, it is clear that PB amounts are significantly increasing more in smaller UPs than the larger by their size of population.

Hence, the trends in PB amount allocations have a relationship with the size of population, which is meant that smaller populated UPs are remarkably significant in generating increased and stable outputs of PB allocation than larger populated UPs. Because smaller populated UPs'

priorities are more concrete and manageable to implement, that results better performance leading to increased PB. On the other hand, budgets are fluctuated for medium and larger populated UPs than smaller, and PB amount mostly decreased for larger populated UPs. So, it is expected that smaller the population, bigger the budget outputs and reversibly larger the population smaller the budget outputs. Because population size plays a key role in budgetary performance and outputs of PB (Frances et al., 2018). In a smaller community, citizens are usually more connected to each other and feel more self-actualization with PB. Therefore, PB is used to be the interface between citizens and the local governments that works more competently in a compact society. Moreover, in a small-sized local government, efficiency in governance could be ensured more with greater involvement of citizens. Similarly, other literature also identified that small size local government unit is suitable for effective decision-making and producing better results under PB, large size of local government discourages the collective action (Goldfrank, 2007; Nickson, 1995; Peters, 1996).

For more cross-analysis of population and areas of UPs presented with population density, PB per kilometer, and per head PB of FY 2019-20 are presented in Table 6.8. Here, size of UPs by area and population are compared with PB per square kilometers and per head to examine relations between size of UPs and budgetary outputs in terms of allocations. Then by area, the allocation of the amount of PB per square kilometers are categorized into three ranges in million BDT; low (L= <0.50), medium (M= 0.51-1.00) and high (H= >1.00) and PB per head are also categorized into three ranges in BDT; low (L= <500), medium (M= 501-1,000), and high (H= >1,000) and identified in the respective right column of each UP.

Table 6.8 Size of UPs by Area and Population and Outputs of PB.

No.	Name of UPs	PB 2019-20 (million BDT)	Size of UPs		Population Density (Per sq. km)	PB (per sq. km.)	Categorization of per sq. km. PB* (L= <0.50, M= 0.50-1.00, H= >1.00)	PB (per head in BDT)	Categorization of per head PB* (L= <500, M= 500-1000, H= >1000)
			Area (sq. km.)	Population (Thousand)					
1.	Arpangashia	20.0	34.9	14.9	426	0.57	M	1,346	H
2.	Chaora	20.0	41.4	20.8	502	0.48	L	962	M
3.	Haldia	30.5	89.7	29.8	332	0.34	L	1,023	H
4.	Kukua	23.3	45.7	24.0	526	0.51	M	968	M
5.	Badarkhali	36.2	30.8	26.2	851	1.18	H	1,382	H
6.	Burirchar	35.2	35.0	29.5	844	1.00	H	1,190	H
7.	Gourichanna	30.9	26.8	27.7	1,033	1.15	H	1,116	H
8.	Fuljhury	18.7	21.2	13.2	623	0.88	M	1,416	H
9.	Bibichini	6.3	25.2	26.3	1,044	0.25	L	240	L
10.	Hosnabad	13.0	26.0	16.3	626	0.50	M	801	M
11.	Kazirabad	17.7	19.9	14.2	716	0.89	M	1,239	H
12.	Mokamia	18.5	20.9	14.2	678	0.89	M	1,310	H
13.	Kakchira	28.0	26.3	19.7	749	1.07	H	1,421	H
14.	Kalmegha	30.5	50.3	25.9	515	0.61	M	1,177	H
15.	Kathaltali	29.9	23.4	19.8	846	1.28	H	1,509	H
16.	Nachnapara	20.8	22.5	12.5	555	0.92	M	1,665	H
17.	Kurarbazar	12.9	16.7	23.9	1,429	0.77	M	541	M
18.	Mathiura	7.9	14.9	14.7	987	0.53	M	538	M
19.	Mollapur	8.6	11.4	11.4	997	0.75	M	754	M
20.	Sheola	14.9	27.2	28.8	1,059	0.18	L	517	M
21.	Bagha	11.1	39.5	34.0	860	0.28	L	327	L
22.	Fulbari	6.9	21.2	27.9	1,315	0.32	L	247	L
23.	Lakshmipasha	4.1	17.5	23.9	1,366	0.24	L	172	L
24.	Amura	7.7	20.3	18.0	886	0.38	L	428	L
25.	Bara Chotul	17.4	46.2	23.4	506	0.38	L	744	M
26.	Jhingabari	15.6	61.8	34.2	553	0.25	L	458	L
27.	Banigram	10.4	35.0	29.5	842	0.30	L	354	L
28.	Rajaganj	17.8	44.1	33.1	749	0.04	L	55	L
29.	Barothakuri	15.0	24.6	23.3	947	0.61	M	645	M
30.	Kholachara	12.8	27.6	20.8	752	0.46	L	617	M
31.	Manikpur	13.6	39.7	32.6	820	0.34	L	417	L
32.	Sultanpur	9.6	22.1	26.1	1,179	0.43	L	368	L

Sources: Population and Housing Census 2011, Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics. LGSP Project databases. Local Government Division, Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives.

The average PB per square kilometers of studied UPs, it is found that almost 50.0% (15) UPs had low (L) amount of distribution of PB per square kilometers, medium (M) PB amount was allocated to 37.5% (12 UPs) and only 15.6% (5 UPs) PB allocation per kilometer was high (H) as per the categorization of above table. Therefore, most of the UPs' PB allocation was low to medium according to this definition. That means, distribution per square kilometers does not have any effect on the PB allocation of UP. Statistically, these two variables are also negatively


correlated as $r = -0.33$ and $p = 0.06$ ($p > 0.05$ but very close to significance level). This finding is complementary to the previous section's finding where we have seen that smaller populated UPs PB allocation had more amount than larger-sized UPs.¹¹⁵

In distribution of per head average budget, it was high (**H**) for 12 UPs, medium (*M*) for 9 UPs and low (*L*) for 11 UPs. On an average, most of the UPs' per head PB was high to medium or it can be said that it was tended to be high. Statistically, this relationship is also negatively correlated while $r = -0.44$ and $p = 0.01 (< 0.05)$. That means, population size and allocation of budget per head had significant negative relationship. This finding is similar to the previous sections findings of smaller populated UPs got more average budget than the larger populated UPs.

In analyzing relationship, it is compared between allocation of PB and the area of UP using data of FY 2019-20 of individual UP, it is observed that there is a tendency toward that the larger size UPs received higher amount of budget compare to the smaller size UPs. The reasons for such trend might be that in a large area UP there are more demand and needs of improvement of infrastructural facilities as PB amounts are mostly invested for physical development to cover the large area of local government unit. However, the correlation coefficient is 0.41 with 0.02 (< 0.05) p value, which means that there is weak positive relationship between PB allocation and size of UP by area (Figure 6.5). This result indicates that there is a tendency to follow the general rule of budgetary resource allocation that larger areas should receive bigger amount.

¹¹⁵ Also see Section 6.2.5 and Figure and Table 6.7.

Figure 6.5 Correlation Between Area and PB Allocations.



Source: Author's Analysis.

6.2.6 Poverty and Allocation of PB

6.2.6.1 Extend of Poverty in Determining PB Output

A substantive ratio of population in rural areas of UPs living under poverty. So, poverty is also an important social indicator to consider in analyzing the outputs of PB as it is considered one of the development indicators. The national budget formulation policy of Bangladesh has a special focus and priority to reduction of poverty in line of sustainable development goals (SDGs both in local and national budget. As per annual budget data of Bangladesh collected from the Ministry of Finance, in FY 2020-21, poverty reduction expenditure as a percentage of total budget was 55.61%¹¹⁶. That means, a significant ratio (more than half) of the national budget is dedicating for reduction of poverty. To compare relationship between extend of poverty and allocation of PB,

¹¹⁶ Source: Budget Documents 2020-21, Finance Division, Ministry of Finance, Government of Bangladesh.

Table 6.9 presents UP-wise PB allocation and poverty of belonging Upazila of UPs since poverty data of individual UP are not available from authentic sources.

Table 6.9 Rate of Poverty and Allocation of PB.

Name of Districts	Name of Upazila	Name of UPs	PB Allocation 2019-20	Average PB per Upazila	Rate of Poverty (HCR* %)
Barguna	Amtali	Arpangashia	20.0	23.5	31.5
		Chaora	20.0		
		Haldia	30.5		
		Kukua	23.3		
	Barguna Sadar	Badarkhali	36.2	30.3	30.1
		Burirchar	35.2		
		Gourichanna	30.9		
		Fuljhury	18.7		
	Betagi	Bibichini	6.3	13.9	31.1
		Hosnabad	13.0		
		Kazirabad	17.7		
		Mokamia	18.5		
	Patharghata	Kakchira	28.0	27.3	29.5
Kalmegha		30.5			
Kathaltali		29.9			
Nachnapara		20.8			
Sylhet	Beanibazar	Kurarbazar	12.9	11.1	13.8
		Mathiura	7.9		
		Mollapur	8.6		
		Sheola	14.9		
	Golapganj	Bagha	11.1	7.5	10.5
		Fulbari	6.9		
		Lakshmipasha	4.1		
		Amura	7.7		
	Kanaighat	Bara Chotul	17.4	15.3	16.0
		Jhingabari	15.6		
		Banigram	10.4		
		Rajaganj	17.8		
	Zakiganj	Barothakuri	15.0	12.8	17.1
		Kholachara	12.8		
		Manikpur	13.6		
		Sultanpur	9.6		


Note: Age specific segregated data were calculated from Population and Housing Census 2011 (National Report, Vol-2): Union Statistics (published in March 2014), Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics. Average of PB of individual four UPs of selected Upazilas are used with the rate of poverty of Upazilas. Source: Poverty Maps of Bangladesh 2016 (published in December 2020), Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics. *HCR= Head Count Ratio.

To examine the relationship between poverty and PB allocation, the poverty rate of the Upazila of each four studied UPs are compare with the average PB allocation of four studied UPs. If we compare PB allocation with the poverty rate, Upazilas of Barguna have higher amount of average PB allocation as there is higher rate of poverty. On the other hand, the Upazilas of Sylhet

have lower amount of average PB allocation as there is lower rate of poverty. Therefore, PB allocation follows regional extend of poverty as a determinant.

To examine the relationship between poverty and PB allocation, correlation analysis has been done (Figure 6.6). The results of correlation analysis shows that there are significant and strong positive correlation between rate of poverty and PB allocation as $r=0.78$. The meaning of that result is that while rate of poverty is high allocation of PB is also high and vice-versa. Therefore, PB is more expanding in the poverty-stricken UPs. In analyzing the determinants of budgeting in the developing countries including Bangladesh, Norton and Elson (2002) discuss that social goals of budget and identifies pro-poor budget initiatives as a successful in redistribution of public money with equity and argue that citizen engagement in budgetary process can enhance inclusion of the poor. Hence, poverty is a determinant of PB allocation of UPs. Therefore, implication of this findings is that if there is more poverty, there is more allocation of PB.

Figure 6.6 Correlation Between Poverty and PB Allocation.



Source: Author's Analysis.

6.2.6.2 Regional Dynamics of Poverty and Variation in Distribution of Budget

There are regional dynamics in ratio of poverty in Bangladesh as it is varied significantly by different regions. The rate of poverty of the regions of studied UPs is also varied, while 25.7% and 13.0% population live under poverty in Barguna and Sylhet respectively (BBS, 2020).¹¹⁷

(a) Legal and Policy Framework for Regional Development in Relation to Poverty

The regional development in relation to poverty has a legal mandate as “Government Finance and Budget Management Act 2009” clearly focuses that “national budget will ensure regional equity by providing priority allocation to the poverty-stricken regions” (Article 4 of the Law). National Perspective Plan of Bangladesh, 8th Five Year Plan (2020-2025) has given priority of decreasing regional disparity of development by alleviating poverty from the poorest districts (p. 105 & 109). Among the various suggested measures by the plan, it importantly stresses on increasing Annual Development Program (ADP), which is the main part of development budget of Bangladesh for the regions of increased poverty. It also emphasizes to increase allocation of ADP and special block grants (part of development fund) for the local government institutions (LGIs).

(b) Macroeconomic Target of Budget Allocation in Poverty-stricken Regions

Medium Term Budgetary Framework (MTBF), which has an objective of allocation of government financial resources based on strategic priorities of government (MOF, 2019). The MTBF also integrates national perspective plan such as, Fiver Year Plan. And one of the priority areas of perspective plan is to allocate more resources to the poverty-prone areas to decrease regional disparity. Budget Speech of 2020-21 presented in the Parliament, has also mentioned that how national budget addresses the poverty by allocating budget of various sectors considering the regional priorities (MOF, 2020).

¹¹⁷ Source: Poverty Maps of Bangladesh 2016 (published in December 2020), Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics

An analysis on the public expenditure of Bangladesh, World Bank shows that poorer districts tend to receive higher per capita allocations of budget (World Bank, 2003). Moreover, the national planning instruments 8th Five Year Plan (2020-25) clearly focused on the pro-poor and inclusive growth, which includes reduction of regional disparity (GOB, 2021), which indicates that more resources are needed to allocate to the poor regions.

The level of poverty is significantly considered in determining PB of UPs, while both local and national budgets of Bangladesh have priorities to poverty. Besides, development policies government have special strategies of poverty reduction and minimizing regional development gaps between the poverty-stricken and well-off regions. Similar to this finding, a research on spatial analysis of regional dynamics of allocation of development budget, identifies the variations in budget of different districts of Bangladesh using the Location Quotient (LQ) analysis. It is found that LQ of Barguna and Sylhet fall in the ranges of 0.47-9.92 and 1.63-3.56 (Jobaid & Khan, 2018). It indicates that there are variations in allocation of development budget in these two districts, which has a direct effect on the local government budget allocation too.

Regions with higher poverty, and less infrastructure or government services receive a higher proportion of resources than better-off and wealthier neighborhoods (Wampler, 2007). This is a general rule of budgetary prioritization. The similar practice is there in PB allocation of UPs too. Poverty is not only linked to the income of citizens but also it is a matter economic and political disempowerment that led to structural injustice (Sobhan, 2010). That means, non-development of roads and physical access are also compounded to unequal access to assets and deepen the level of poverty of certain regions. Therefore, PB follows to reduce such poverty related structural gaps including direct benefits. Hence, more amount of PB goes to the poverty-stricken UPs, as PB is considered as an inclusive process of governance for equitable distributing resources (Shah, 2007).

The contents of PB also are related to other indices, such as infrastructure, human resources development, water supply and sanitation, and agriculture. The UPs those have increased poverty rate, have lacks in infrastructures including roads. That is why a major amount of PB is allocated for roads and construction of infrastructures in rural areas because such infrastructures development contributes to poverty reduction (Khandaker et al., 2006; van de Walle, 2008). In a study using quantitative techniques Khandaker et al. (2006) shows that rural road investments reduce poverty significantly through higher agricultural production, higher wages, lower input and transportation costs, and higher output prices in poverty-prone areas. Moreover, other indices such as HRD is directly related to the development of human skills in increasing productivity through employment. Bangladesh Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2005 mentioned HRD as one of the main strategic blocks of reducing poverty (GOB, 2005). And recent 7th Five Year Plan (2016-2020), 8th Five Year Plan (2021-2025) and Delta Plan 2100 also stress on the human development for eliminating poverty from Bangladesh. Water supply not only ensure household usage but also it helps in irrigation to agriculture fields, farming, and industrial uses. It is also related to the human health and physical wellbeing and access to clean water reduces poverty faster (World Bank, 2018). Moreover, agriculture is the main income sources of people at the rural level. So, considering PB advantageously for agricultural development can help to reduce poverty primarily.

Therefore, increased amount of PB amount follows the UPs of increased poverty and other infrastructures. The larger amount of PB is allocated in the poverty-prone regions. Moreover, it is found that PB per capita is determined by urgent demand for regional development focusing to the above indices. Poverty level itself is not a driving force for growth of PB, while it advantageously allocates fund, which is the target of PB process. Thus, PB budget both of the output and outcome that are reflected in urgent regional demand and outcome of citizens' bottom-up demand are

significant considering the contemporary socio-economic conditions of the rural areas of Bangladesh.

6.2.7 Locations, Physiography, Economic Activities and Outputs of PB

This section discusses how the geographical locations and features and major economic activities in the jurisdiction of local government UPs determine outputs of PB. Table 6.10 compares the different geographical features of UPs of two districts situated in two distinct locations.

Table 6.10 Location, Physiography and Economic Activities.

No.	Name of UPs	PB Budget 2019-20 (million in BDT)	Categorization of per sq. km PB Budget* (L= <0.50, M= 0.50-1.00, H= >1.00)	Categorization of per head PB Budget* (L= <500, M= 500-1000, H= >1000)	Name of Districts	Geographical Location in Bangladesh	Physiographic Condition	Major Economic Activities
1.	Arpangashia	20.0	M	H	Barguna	Southern-most	Coastal riverine lowlands	Agriculture/industry
2.	Chaora	20.0	L	M				Agriculture/industry
3.	Haldia	30.5	L	H				Agriculture
4.	Kukua	23.3	M	M				Agriculture
5.	Badarkhali	36.2	H	H				Agriculture
6.	Burirchar	35.2	H	H				Agriculture/industry
7.	Gourichanna	30.9	H	H				Agriculture
8.	Fuljhury	18.7	M	H				Agriculture
9.	Bibichini	6.3	L	L				Agriculture/industry
10.	Hosnabad	13.0	M	M				Agriculture
11.	Kazirabad	17.7	M	H				Agriculture/fishing
12.	Mokamia	18.5	M	H				Agriculture
13.	Kakchira	28.0	H	H				Agriculture/fishing
14.	Kalmegha	30.5	M	H				Agriculture/fishing
15.	Kalthali	29.9	H	H				Agriculture
16.	Nachnapara	20.8	M	H				Agriculture
17.	Kurarbazar	12.9	M	M	Sylhet	Northeast-corner	Plainlands with small hills	Agriculture
18.	Mathiura	7.9	M	M				Agriculture
19.	Mollapur	8.6	M	M				Agriculture/industry
20.	Sheola	14.9	L	L				Agriculture
21.	Bagha	11.1	L	L				Agriculture
22.	Fulbari	6.9	L	L				Agriculture/industry
23.	Lakshmipasha	4.1	L	L				Agriculture
24.	Amura	7.7	L	L				Agriculture
25.	Bara Chotul	17.4	L	M			Flood-prone wetlands	Agriculture/fishing
26.	Jhingabari	15.6	L	L				Agriculture
27.	Banigram	10.4	L	L				Agriculture
28.	Rajaganj	17.8	L	L				Agriculture
29.	Barothakuri	15.0	M	M				Agriculture
30.	Kholachara	12.8	L	M				Agriculture
31.	Manikpur	13.6	L	L				Agriculture
32.	Sultanpur	9.6	L	L				Agriculture/industry

Note: Author's analysis based on various sources include Banglapedia, National Encyclopedia of Bangladesh; Islam & Paul (2020).

From this table, it can be observed that studied 32 UPs are located in two districts of separate locations. Barguna district is located in the most southern part of Bangladesh in the coastal boundary of the Bay of Bengal. The overall physiographic conditions of UPs are coastal riverine lowlands of estuaries with limited cultivable plain lands. On the other hand, Sylhet district is located in the north-eastern corner of Bangladesh near the Indian border. The physiography of UPs is mostly plainlands with small hills and swampy wetlands with floodplains. Regarding major economic activities in Barguna, peoples are mainly engaged in agricultural activities along with small industrial works and fishing in the rivers, estuaries, and the sea and in Sylhet district most of the people are engaged in agriculture, which is common to everywhere in Bangladesh. Because two-thirds people in rural areas are directly employed, and about 87.0% of rural households rely on agriculture for at least part of their income (World Bank, 2016).

In the context of regional location, it is found from Table 6.8 that PB per sq. km. and PB per head, the high amounts are allocated in the UPs of Barguna district, because coastal areas need to develop infrastructures due to less accessibility, such as roads and bridges. On the other hand, most of the UPs of Sylhet had low allocations, because this plainland has less infrastructural development rather they invest more in education sectors. So, there are clear variations in PB allocation considering the regional location. Simultaneously, if we look into the specific geographical locations, the southern-most UPs of Barguna allocations per sq. km. and allocation per head PB is higher than the northeast-corner's UPs of Sylhet district. Among 16 UPs of Barguna, 12 (75.0%) had high (**H**) PB per head and 5 (31.3%) had high (**H**) PB per sq. km., which are the highest in number among other categories. In the UPs of Sylhet, there was no high (**H**) allocation of both PB per head and PB per sq. km., but majority are low (**L**). The findings indicate that PB is more stable in the UPs Barguna located in southern region of Bangladesh with a physiological

condition of coastal riverine lowlands. Among the main factors that influence local government budgeting, geographic region is one of them (Duncombe et al., 1992).

The difference of PB allocations due to the geographic locations also quantitatively analyzed using T-test of Paired Two Sample Means. From the result of T-test it is found that there are statistically significant differences of PB allocation between two separate geographic locations.¹¹⁸ So, in allocation of PB there are differences between the UPs of southern and eastern corner region.

Physiographic conditions also have a significant relationship with the regional locations. Such as, the UPs of coastal riverine lowlands of Barguna district PB budget allocations are higher than other physiographic conditions of plainlands with small hills and flood-prone wetlands of Sylhet district (Table 6.10). At the same time, from the result of ANOVA, it is found that there are significant differences of physiographic conditions and PB allocation as well as physiographic conditions and PB per head.¹¹⁹

The main challenges of PB in respect of regional location is to ensure equal distribution of resources for ensuring inclusiveness, which are the cores of PB discourse. There are various reasons for such differences in PB allocation in two different geographical locations and physiographical conditions. The main reasons are physical accessibility (Moynihan, 2007) of UPs that are related to infrastructural facilities of road and transportation communications, presence of

¹¹⁸ The p value is $p=0.000$ (<0.001) and $t=4.48$ with a mean value of 17.7. This differences also been established in Independent Sample Test of means of total PB allocations of two geographic locations, while equal variances assumed and not assumed show significant differences ($p=0.000$ & $p=0.000$), and similarly means of PB per head of two geographic locations, equal variances assumed and not assume show same significant differences ($p=0.000$ & $p=0.000$).

¹¹⁹ The p value of difference of physiographic condition and PB allocation is $p=0.000$, and physiographic conditions and PB per head is $p=0.000$. Moreover, according to Multiple Comparisons Tests (MCTs) of PB allocation, among three physiographic conditions, coastal riverine lowlands has statistically significant differences with other two geographic conditions ($p=0.000$ & $p=0.004$), plainlands with small hills have statistically significant differences with coastal riverine lowlands ($p=0.004$), and flood-prone wetlands areas have statistically significant differences with coastal riverine lowlands areas ($p=0.004$). Similar to these, according MCT of per head PB allocation, coastal riverine lowlands have significant differences with other two categories ($p=0.000$ & $p=0.000$), plainlands with small hills have significant differences with flood-prone wetlands areas ($p=0.000$), flood-prone wetland have significant differences with riverine lowland areas ($p=0.000$).

vibrant citizenry capable to raise their voice and realize their demands (Folscher, 2007), income level of citizens while lower level of income relates to poverty (Wampler, 2007), proactive elected representatives empowered to implement PB effectively (Moynihan, 2007), and capacitated officials to facilitate the PB process (Hossain, 2019).

6.2.8 Development Policy Priorities of PB Allocation

PB amount is generally used for the developmental activities of UPs and other welfare services as we discussed in section 6.2.4. From the PB allocations of FY 2019-20 of 32 studied UPs, sectoral policy priorities are shown in Table 6.11 and analyzed based on the budgetary allocations of different sectors. Three priority sectors of PB amounts are shown here sequentially. The major sectors are: (i) road and construction sector, which are mainly the infrastructure development and public works related activities to increase physical accessibility and cultural facilities; such as roads, culverts, parks, open spaces, play grounds etc.; (ii) water supply sector encompasses supplying of drinking water at the home of citizens by installing deep tube wells; (iii) education sector means various supports to education institutions including supply of educational and sports materials; (iv) health sector includes primary health care and immunization; (v) agriculture sector encompasses all activities related to agriculture and cultivations of crops; (vi) sanitation sector is about establishment of hygienic toilets and drainage; (vii) human resource development sector is about various skill development trainings; and (viii) natural resources management sector, such as conservation of natural forest, waterbodies and environment. Among these, the sector no. (i), (ii) and (vi) are also related to the construction of infrastructure.

Table 6.11 Major Sectoral Allocations of PB Budget FY 2019-20.

No.	Name of UPs	Priority Sector 1	Allocation (million BDT)	Priority Sector 2	Allocation (million BDT)	Priority Sector 3	Allocation (million BDT)
1.	Arpangashia	R & C	3.32	WS	1.05	Education	0.69
2.	Chaora	R & C	2.63	WS	1.01	Agriculture	0.74
3.	Haldia	R & C	3.97	WS	2.26	NRM	1.65
4.	Kukua	R & C	4.23	WS	2.31	Agriculture	0.67
5.	Badarkhali	R & C	4.39	HRD	1.20	Agriculture	0.38
6.	Burirchar	R & C	3.83	HRD	1.20	Agriculture	0.80
7.	Gourichanna	R & C	3.73	HRD	1.80	WS	0.80
8.	Fuljhury	R & C	2.79	Sanitation	0.20	WS	0.20
9.	Bibichini	R & C	4.98	-	-	-	-
10.	Hosnabad	R & C	3.32	Agriculture	0.14	Health	0.10
11.	Kazirabad	R & C	4.51	-	-	-	-
12.	Mokamia	R & C	3.95	WS	0.25	-	-
13.	Kakchira	R & C	2.46	Education	0.83	Health	0.56
14.	Kalmegha	R & C	4.81	Education	1.16	Agriculture	0.61
15.	Kathaltali	R & C	3.87	Education	0.46	Health	0.42
16.	Nachnapara	R & C	2.06	Education	0.24	-	-
17.	Kurarbazar	R & C	4.70	WS	0.39	Education	0.14
18.	Mathiura	R & C	3.79	Education	0.21	HRD	0.14
19.	Mollapur	R & C	2.03	Education	0.12	-	-
20.	Sheola	R & C	1.23	WS	0.25	Education	0.10
21.	Bagha	R & C	6.23	-	-	-	-
22.	Fulbari	R & C	4.18	Education	0.60	Sanitation	0.23
23.	Lakshmipasha	R & C	2.96	Education	0.09	-	-
24.	Amura	R & C	2.24	Education	0.15	Sanitation	0.09
25.	Bara Chotul	R & C	10.49	HRD	0.80	Education	0.70
26.	Jhingabari	R & C	9.52	Health	0.15	-	-
27.	Banigram	R & C	5.05	Education	0.10	Agriculture	0.10
28.	Rajaganj	R & C	4.32	-	-	-	-
29.	Barothakuri	R & C	6.84	Agriculture	0.82	Education	0.60
30.	Kholachara	R & C	3.69	Education	0.51	WS	0.30
31.	Manikpur	R & C	5.12	Education	0.43	-	-
32.	Sultanpur	R & C	5.83	Education	0.63	-	-

Note: R&C= Road and Construction, WS= Water Supply, HRD= Human Resource Development, NRD= Natural Resources Management. Source: LGSP Project databases.

The outputs of the PB process in terms of budgetary allocations of different sectors indicate that how the prioritization of needs are done by discussing with the citizens at ward meeting and subsequent PB activities in UP level including open-budget session. The participants are independent to choose priorities of their own communities, but they are in some extent bounded to prioritize only from the listed priorities made by UP officials by following specific guidelines and directions of PB process. The development sectors are prioritized by citizens through PB process based on the regional development policy as well as citizens' demands. The different

regions have different policy priorities based on the location, physiographic conditions, extend of poverty and economic activities of people.

Here, the priority sector 1 is about the schemes and projects that are related to construction of roads and other infrastructures. Irrespective of location, size, budget amount and other criteria, all 32 studied UPs invested their major part of budget to the projects of infrastructure development as the first priority sector. Interesting finding is that 4 UPs have only one priority and it is road and construction. That means there are demands and priorities from the citizens to invest more budgetary resources in the infrastructure projects to increase physical accessibility. At the same time, UP representatives also want to utilize money in physical construction. Because these infrastructure projects are distinctly visible development activities, which provide popularity to Chairperson and UP council as a whole. It was observed during field visits that UPs want to work more on the physical infrastructure developments not only to get popularity but also to response desires of citizens. That is why, priorities are mainly concentrated on the construction works in case of all UPs irrespective of their location. Physical accessibility in all areas of rural Bangladesh is yet to connect every villages with paved roads and culverts/bridges. There is still abundant scope for more investment in the projects for construction of roads and other physical facilities. Moreover, accessibility is also related to the other socio-economic parameters including poverty and consequently priority of budget varies (Ahmed & Eklund, 2019; Islam, 2017). One of the priorities of national budget of Bangladesh is also developing physical infrastructures, while 31.46% development budget has been allocated in road and communication sector in FY 2020-21 (GOB, 2020).¹²⁰ Hence, PB is more distinguishable in infrastructure development projects.

¹²⁰ Source: Calculated from the Budget Documents, Finance Division, Ministry of Finance, Bangladesh.

In the priority sector 2 of PB, education sector got most priority in allocating budget. 13 UPs prioritized education as their second priority sector. Moreover, education sector also got third priority of 5 UPs. Therefore, irrespective of priority sequence education sector got priority of 18 UPs, which is 56.3% of total UPs. It is significant that majority of the UPs have education as a social sector as their important after the infrastructure development. Education is also one of the top priority sectors considered in national budget for last many years (GOB, 2020), and allocation of budget under education sector in FY 2020-21 was 19.1%¹²¹ of total development budget. national adult literacy rate is 73.9%¹²², striving to reach 100.0%.

If we look into the Table 6.11, there are regional variations in sectoral allocation of PB. 18 UPs those prioritized education under their priority of PB and out of them, 13 UPs are from Sylhet district and 5 are from Barguna district. The reason for this variation is educational backwardness of the people of Sylhet than Barguna as the adult literacy rate of Sylhet is lower (53.7%) than Barguna (58.9%), which are also lower than the national rate (73.9%) of literacy.¹²³ That is why, education sector also got priority (second or third priority) of the maximum number of UPs. Hence, it can be argued here that education is important determinant of PB allocation. At the same time, PB is more remarkable in the UPs having increased level of illiteracy.

For further analysis, the UPs those have education as their priority sector in allocating PB budget, the allocated amounts of education sector are compared with the literacy rate in Table 6.12. From this table, we can observe that 13 UPs prioritized education sector in their PB allocation, and the amount of education budget was continuously increased over the years for 9 UPs, which is 69.3%. Other 5 UPs' education budget were fluctuated and or in decreasing trend. But the amount

¹²¹ Source: Budget Documents, Finance Division, Ministry of Finance, Bangladesh.

¹²² Source: Statistical Yearbook 2019. Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics.

¹²³ Source: Statistical Yearbook 2019. Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics.

of such fluctuation is not high. The overall rate of literacy of these two study areas is less than the national rate, which is the motivation of priority allocation in education sector of UP budget. This issue could be considered in view of core notion of this dissertation, the rational choice, maximizing the utilities, which is education here. Due to the low rate of literacy level, education sector has been chosen by the citizens during the prioritization of demands through PB process. To materialize such priority demands, education sector got high consideration in local policy support as well as PB budget allocation. Consequently, there is output of larger share of budget in education sector with an increasing trend of continuation in a certain portion of studied UPs. From the above results, it is in some extent proved that in case of local government UPs of Bangladesh, continuation of PB process results increased budgetary outputs in maximum cases.

Table 6.12 Trends in Allocations of PB in Education Sector.

No.	Name of UPs	Literacy Rate (%)	Allocation of PB Education Sector				Trends in Changes
			2016-17	2017-18	2018-19	2019-20	
1.	Kakchira	60.5	0.58	0.62	0.72	0.83	Increased
2.	Kalmegha	53.6	0.20	0.20	0.35	1.16	
3.	Kathaltali	67.5	0.16	0.20	0.39	0.46	
4.	Nachnapara	67.4	0.10	0.10	0.18	0.24	
5.	Mathiura	66.9	0.13	0.10	0.20	0.21	
6.	Mollapur	65.2	0.17	0.10	0.11	0.12	
7.	Fulbari	56.9	0.06	0.09	0.57	0.60	
8.	Manikpur	55.1	1.24	0.24	0.15	0.43	
9.	Sultanpur	55.7	-	0.06	0.56	0.63	
10.	Lakshmipasha	56.9	-	0.46	0.02	0.09	
11.	Amura	55.3	0.37	0.04	0.16	0.16	Fluctuated
12.	Banigram	47.1	0.16	0.25	0.10	0.10	
13.	Kholachara	33.5	0.57	0.58	0.20	0.51	

Source: LGSP Project databases. Local Government Division, Ministry of Local Government, Rural Development and Cooperatives. Source of Literacy Data: Population and Housing Census 2011, Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics.

As shown in Table 6.11, in water supply projects 11 UPs allocated budget as their second and third priorities and 7 (63.6%) of them are from Barguna district. The UPs are Arpangashia, Chaora, Haldia, Kukua and Mokamia. Moreover, two UPs from the same region, Gourichanna and Fuljhury also selected water supply as their third priority. Because pure water is not available in

those coastal regions due to extreme salinity in the shallow ground level, which is very urgent demand of citizens and priority policy follows such unavoidable urgency. So, for the UPs of Barguna district, PB is more remarkable for water supply projects as there are demands of supplying pure drinking water. PB budget also allocated for human resource development as second priority of 5 UPs, which is important to generate rural employment, while rate of unemployment in Bangladesh is 5.3% of total labor force (World Bank, 2020).¹²⁴ Hence, PB also remarkable for some UPs in employment generation.

6.3 Findings and Discussions

The analysis of this Chapter focuses on the outputs of PB of different UPs using budgetary data, data of socio-economic indices and interview data. The analysis follows the sense of Assumption 3 that how different characteristics of UP affect PB process and outputs. The chapter examines the PB outputs from political, economic, and social circumstances, that are derived from the actor's utility maximization process discussed in Chapter 5.

The characteristics of UP are instrumental in expanding or limiting the outputs of PB. First of all, as PB is a political agenda, local political atmosphere is sympathetic to determining PB outputs. It is examined and found that local political culture is some extent congenial and supportive to adopting and implementing successful participation of citizens in planning and budgeting. But participation in PB is hampered due to political partisan and results decreased outputs of PB. Additionally, regarding the leadership strength of elected representatives, it seems that unempowered and weak leadership lessen the level of political commitment, and elected representatives are unable implement proper initiatives of PB to obtain desired outputs. Leadership

¹²⁴ Source: <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?locations=BD>

quality relates to the level of education of elected representatives, and it is found that higher of educated Chairpersons gained more PB budget for their UPs. Hence, PB is more increasing at the UPs of educated and capacitated leadership with better empowerment.

Continuous adoption and implementation of PB results increased budgetary allocation of PB as it is found that most of the UPs' PB budget were increased over the years consecutively. Similar findings are shown by Erito and Rask (2019) that municipalities that have run PB process several times have increased their budgets over the years. Similarly, Zhuang (2013) finds that budgets were increased substantially during three consecutive fiscal years from 2009 to 2011 after adopting PB. And ideally PB should help to increase the amount of funds available for discretionary spending (Krejnova & Raudla, 2013). PB was increased as the number of local projects were also increased to directly benefit communities and correspond to the priorities identified through participatory process (Shall, 2007) over the four fiscal years.

Outputs of PB depends on the stability and support of UP leadership by their constituents. It is found that PB was mostly increased the UPs, those Chairpersons have been serving for longer periods. Simultaneously, those Chairperson had stronger support from the voters of their constituencies. Therefore, PB is more incremental and sustainable in the UPs of longer serving and stronger supportive Chairpersons.

Size of UPs matters in producing outputs of PB as it is found that PB amounts of smaller populated UPs are remarkably and significantly in increasing trend than larger populated UPs, which resembles that small-sized local government, efficiency in governance could be ensured more with greater involvement of citizens as well as budgetary outputs. On the other hand, UP's size by area has a statistically significant positive relationship with amount of PB. Because large

area UPs have more demands of improvement of the infrastructural facilities to cover their larger physical area. That means, PB of larger size UPs is more growing.

Increased allocation of PB follows the increased rate of poverty as there is statistically significant and strong positive relationship between rate of poverty and allocation of PB. If poverty is high allocation of PB is also high. Therefore, PB is more expanding in the poverty-stricken UPs. Hence, poverty is a determinant of PB allocation of UPs. At the same time, poverty has a regional dynamism as it is found that UPs belong to Barguna district has higher rate of poverty and accordingly higher PB amount is allocated to those UPs. On the other hand, the UPs of Sylhet district are comparatively less poverty-prone and their allocation of PB is also low accordingly.

In relation to the above discussion, characteristics in dimension of regional location, UPs located in southern part of Bangladesh have increased outputs of PB allocation than the UPs located in eastern part. This finding derived from the statistical analysis results that there are significant differences in allocation of PB between the UPs of these two distinct regional locations of Barguna and Sylhet district. Similar differences are also found in physiographic conditions of UPs while higher amounts were allocated in coastal and riverine lowland areas of Barguna and lower amounts were allocated in plain, wetland and small hilly areas of Sylhet. The reasons for such differences in PB allocation are differences in physical accessibility that create increased demands of physical infrastructural development. Furthermore, PB is also growing in the sub-urbanized UPs those are located near the District and Upazila headquarters.

In case of sectoral priorities of PB budget, all the UPs most amount of budget allocated for infrastructure development as per prioritization through PB process. Interesting finding is that some UPs do not have second and third priorities and or both and they have only infrastructure projects. That means those UPs want to invest more in the infrastructures which are more visible

developments and elected representatives want to implement those to get popularity quickly. The similar were observed during field visits that UP want to work more on the physical developments not only for their popularity but also citizens' desire. That is why, priorities mainly concentrated on the construction works. So, the PB budget is more stably grows with infrastructure projects. Although education sector got second priority in allocation of budget in most of the UPs, education sector's PB amount has been significantly increasing over the fiscal years. Importantly, education budget was mostly increased in most of the UPs Sylhet because literacy level is lower of Sylhet is lower than Barguna district. So, lower level of literacy of citizens is strongly related with the increase of education budget and accordingly education is a factor for stable growth of PB budget.

This chapter discusses the characteristics of UPs that are also factors in producing immediate output of PB, which are increased amount of budget and adoption of projects accordingly. The increased budgetary amount as well as developmental projects contributes to the improved socio-economic conditions of communities including reduction of poverty, development of infrastructure and addressing the other social welfare services. And this all are resulted by the active participation of citizens who are provided the scope for practicing such democratic rights that eventually support to deepen bottom-up democracy. The adoption of PB itself is not the compelling factor for expansion of the budget, but the targets of PB process are to response the development priorities of citizens. Therefore, the PB process is significant because it does not only address developmental priorities but also it is the stage for the reflection of citizens' demands of their daily life.

Chapter 7: Discussions and Concluding Remarks

7.1 Main Findings

7.1.1 The Research Objectives

The research objective is to analyze how each actor makes use of PB for own utility to contribute to effective implementation of development policy of Bangladesh. And the sub-questions and assumptions are set for this study are as follows:

1. How does behavior of each actor influence participation process of citizens in PB?

Assumption 1: Citizen's awareness, interest and capacity have influence on their participation process in PB.

Assumption 2: The proactiveness of the actors of local government affects the process of PB.

2. How do local governments utilize PB process to contribute to socio-economic development of UP?

Assumption 3: Different characteristics of UP affect PB process and outputs.

7.1.2 Findings

Assumptions 1 and 2 were addressed in Chapter 5 and Assumption 3 was addressed in Chapter 6. First, Assumption 1 discusses the awareness, interest and capacity of citizens to examine the degree of participation in PB. Main findings are as follows:

- (A) The result of the survey I shows that almost two-third of citizen respondents never participated in any PB process. So, the ratio of non-participation in PB is very high, but the ratio of

participation of lower educated level is higher than the higher educated. That means, PB is more sympathized to the general public.

(B) Participation varies in different processes of PB. Especially the ratio of participation in the open-budget session is remarkably higher than those of the other processes (Table 5.4). The open-budget session is more significantly functioning than the other events of PB because everyone can participate in it as there is no limitation of the number of participants. Moreover, it is a well-known event to citizens as the local governments disseminate information widely about the open-budget session and proactively encourage citizens to participate in it. In the open budget session, the participant is given an opportunity to deliver her/his opinion about the draft of the budget; this opportunity brings about the chance of reflection of the citizen's demand and contributes to build the consensus about the contents of the budget plan. In this light, the open budget session is thought to be a safeguard system for the bottom-up democracy. The fact is that the participation ratio of it is remarkably higher suggests that the effectiveness of this system can be evaluated to some extent.

(C) There is a positive relationship between knowledge of rights and participation as it is found that respondents who have knowledge, have more tendency to participate than the respondents who are not knowledgeable (Table 5.5); the result of this survey I verified the general theory. Therefore, having knowledge of legal rights can be a prerequisite for strengthening participation as well as developing and expanding PB.

Second, Assumption 2 discusses the willingness and proactiveness of the actors of local government toward the process of PB. Main finding are as follows:

(A) The willingness of the actors of local government affects the process of PB; this research focuses on the elected representatives among the actors. In some cases, the political

commitment in terms of specific promotional activities by elected representatives brings about the substantial policy support; the elected representatives who make use of PB process get the higher supporting ratio and the long terms (Table 6.5 and Figure 6.4). Considering their utility of political stability, the elected representatives desire legitimacy of their initiatives of PB and proactively wish to engage general citizens. Ward meeting and open-budget session ensure engagement of mass participation of people, those belongs to the majority of voting ratio; the elected representatives pursue their political stability of their leadership at UP in this way. Those facts suggest that PB process is functioning as the interface between the administrative demand and citizen's demand, and it brings about the higher and longer support ratio to the elected representatives; the general trend shown in Table 6.5 and the case study of Haldia UP suggests the causal relationship between PB process and the political stability. However, the research outcome (Table 5.8) also suggests that in many local governments the elected representatives have not affected the process of PB yet. This is the current issue of PB's situation.

- (B) There are thought to be lack of capacity and skill of local government officials in facilitating PB process. At the same time, they do not have much desire to expand PB as their responsibilities are constrained by the official rules and regulations. They are also not capable to activate stakeholder's committees for promoting participation of citizens and other stakeholders. Sharing information by the officials is one of the initial activities of PB process. But it is found that there is restrictive behavior of officials in sharing information of PB with citizens. This finding indicates that even though the officials are expected to make use of PB to fulfill their utility of effective formulation and implementation based on real needs of the region, they are not thought to be capable enough to perform their functions.

Thirdly, Assumption 3 discusses the contribution of UP's characteristics to the process and outputs of PB. From the analysis of Chapter 6, main findings are as follows:

- (A) There is a weak correlation between the size of area and the amount of PB (Figure 6.5). The reason is thought to be that a broader area of UP have more demand of the improvement of infrastructural facilities for a broader jurisdiction. However, as the correlation is weak, the other factors, such as location also should be considered. On the other hand, the trend of sizes of amounts of PB has a correlation with the size of population; the amounts of PB of the smaller population UPs have a tendency toward increasing (Table 6.7). In a smaller community, citizens are usually more connected to each other and feel more self-actualization with PB. And PB is thought to be functioning as the competent interface between citizens and the local government especially in a compact society.
- (B) The amount of PB is growing in the UP which has the urgent investment demands such as the extent of poverty (Table 6.9), the needs of infrastructure building because of the industrial structure needs in the agriculture with small individual works (Table 6.10), and the priority fields of the development policy (water supply, agriculture, and such; Table 6.11).
- (C) The amount of PB is growing in the UP which has the urgent educational and cultural demands such as the extent of literacy rate (Table 6.12). It is found that the local governments are making use of PB for needs of regional development.

7.2 Conclusions and Implications

7.2.1 Conclusions

The survey and interviews of this research are sample inquiry and have covered the limited number of respondents, and the following analyses are based on those case study analyses. However, some of the results are suggesting the significant potential situation of PB and considering those suggestions is thought to contribute the discussion of the future framework of PB in Bangladesh.

From the above findings, the response to two sub-research questions of this dissertation are as follows:

1. How does behavior of each actor influence participation process of citizens in PB?

For this question, at first citizen's behavior is focused. So, Assumption 1 was set; citizen's awareness, interest and capacity have influence on their participation process in PB. The survey shows that the participation of lower educated level is higher than the higher educated. Especially, the ratio of participation in the open-budget session is remarkably higher than those of the other processes. There is a positive relationship between knowledge of rights and participation.

Interlinking those results, they hint that citizens are assumed to have the potential proactive attitude to more active participation to PB process. Theoretically, the citizens are thought to have preference for the bottom-up democracy and a phase of it was verified through this sample survey.

Second, the elected representatives are focused. So, Assumption 2 was set; the proactiveness (willingness) of the actors of local government affects PB process and outputs. The statistics of survey and case study suggest that the elected representatives who had the proactive attitude of making use of PB process got their utilities; political stability.

Summing up those analyses, at least the following points are thought to be suggested; the rational choice theory thought to be partly verified through this research:

- (A) The elected representatives pursuing their utilities have willingness to make use of PB process and they in fact get them such as the longer terms and the higher supporting ratio in some cases.
- (B) The citizens including the lower educated level potentially show their willingness to participate in PB process in some cases; they pursue their utility: the reflection of their bottom-up demands.
2. *How do local governments utilize PB process to contribute to socio-economic development of UP?*

For this question, characteristics of UP are focused; Assumption 3: Different characteristics of UP affect PB process and outputs.

The amount of PB is growing in the UP, which has the urgent investment demands such as the extent of poverty, the needs of infrastructure building because of the industrial structure needs in the area of the agriculture with small individual works, and the priority fields of the development policy (water supply, agriculture and such). And the amount of PB is growing in the UP which has the urgent educational and cultural demands such as the lower literacy rate.

The result of the research suggests that PB process is the interface between substantial development demand and the citizen's bottom-up demand. That is, PB budget is supported by urgent substantial demands of that region. And at the same time, those budget contents are discussed through the direct participation citizens by processes. PB is, therefore, the stage of interface between the regional urgency and the citizen's bottom-up demands. And that concept is expected to contribute to the stability of framework for the Actors. Consequently, the Actors must use PB as a sustainable force for them when they consider the future development of their utilities.

Based on these analyses, the main research question and the response of this research is as follows:

Main research question: how each actor makes use of PB for own utility to contribute to effective implementation of development policy of Bangladesh?

Theoretically each actor is thought to make the following activities:

(A) The elected representatives

They secure the regional development fund which is in accordance with the regional administrative demands; depart from poverty, urgent necessity for building infrastructure for their region's industrial needs, and such. They authorize the fund through PB process. The citizens have the awareness that the leaders realize the citizen's need. Such consensus bring about the support to the elected representatives. That structure leads to the political stability. In this standpoint, PB is the source of political stability.

(B) Local officials

The local officials can verify that the contents of the regional fund which was secured match the actual citizen's demand in that region. In this standpoint, PB is the opportunity of verifying matching, although there are limitations of evidence in investigating behavior of officials extensively. But officials are catalysts in technical facilitation of PB process. They are expected to pursue reflecting bottom-up demands theoretically by their motivational efforts (Huang & Feeney, 2016) to understand and respond (Gaventa, 2004).

(C) Citizens

Citizens take part in PB process. They are given the opportunity to deliver their opinions during deliberation on the draft of the budget and let the local government reflect their demands. In this standpoint PB is the stage of realizing bottom-up demands.

These theories may be partly true, however, currently those functions of PB are not fully realized in fact. Table 5.8 shows that around over half respondents have the following opinions:

- Citizens have less trust on local government.
- Citizens have less access to local government's activities.
- Local government officials do not promote participation in PB.
- Elected representatives do not encourage citizens.

There are some causes for those apathy of current operation of PB process; lack of information, dependency, lack of leadership and such. How should the local governments resolve those issues? The required responses are prepared in the following section of policy implications.

7.2.2 Policy Implications

This study deals with an important issue of governance, a contemporary vibrant policy strategy, participation of citizen in local government budgeting, the PB. Citizen participation is central to functioning bottom-up democracy and participation in public policy is being viewed increasingly as a means to make governance ecosystem more inclusive, transparent, and accountable. PB contains all these potentials of maximizing the equity in decision-making processes and effect better policy outcomes. This study broadly found that PB of local government of Bangladesh has deficiencies in participation due to unawareness of citizens, unclear political commitments of local elected representatives, unattended policy measures by local officials. In this backdrop, policy implications regarding effective implementation of PB could be manifold as follows:

Firstly, for ensuring access to participation, local governments need to take several measures including wide dissemination of information so that participants can be informed and aware of their rights. At the same time, for encouraging participation, citizens should be listened as well as their opinions should be valued, and local government should engage citizens in more

empowered stance through engaging community leaders for facilitation and building partnership with citizens. Furtherly, PB should be introduced and strengthened at the community level, which is the very beginning of PB process and relatively closer to ordinary people in term of informal setup, arrangement, place of meeting and overall informal atmosphere. In that way, lower educated and marginalized citizens can participate in more empowered stance not only in community meeting but also in the ward meeting and open-budget session. Ward meeting's scope of participation could be enhanced by expanding its membership and increasing number of events. At present open-budget session is held once a year in whole UP. It can be localized at ward level by increasing number of open-budget sessions. Most importantly, local government should utilize higher educated citizens potentiality by offering them leadership in facilitation at community level PB process and it may result more effective policy-decisions as well as increased outputs.

Secondly, although local governments are legally autonomous, they have dependency on local administration for various supports and services and simultaneously, dependency on central government for budgetary transfers. As PB requires discretionary political, administrative, and financial fulfillment to implement participatory decisions, local government should increase their own resource strength by expanding tax-bases. Therefore, gaps between policy and practical implementation must be eliminated by practicing delegated authority of decision-making.

Thirdly, current local government functional strength is inadequate to run successful PB process. For example, shortage of human resources is evident. Without PB-dedicated officials, facilitation of PB process will not result expected outcomes. Therefore, strength of human resources is needed to be increased with building capacity of them to deal PB efficiently. Moreover, PB should be institutionalized and sustainable avoiding current project-based practices by following legal mandate of implementation.

Fourthly, as this research found that the quality of local leadership is not strong enough to gain policy outcomes, it is necessary to strengthen capacity of local elected representatives including electoral reforms in fixing the minimum educational qualification of candidature. A special capacity building initiative for the elected representatives should be commenced on their roles and responsibilities in facilitating PB process as well as how to maximize the outputs so that implementation of PB can be enhanced with effective participation of citizens, which can lead to generate expected outcomes along with sustaining their stability.

7.3 Academic Contributions

This research demonstrated that participation and outcomes of PB depend on the roles and behaviors of actors of the local governments. Beyond the practical implications in policy perspective, this study has contributions to academic discourse.

Firstly, this study explored the role and behavior of PB actors and empirically investigated how actors use PB process in maximizing their utilities, while research on multi-actors' role is limited specifically in the context of PB of Bangladesh. Hence, this study will fulfil the research gaps in perspective of actors' roles and behaviors in perspective of participatory governance.

Secondly, this research discussed the important political theories in context of PB, and provided valuable insights specifically regarding RCI and participatory governance. PB actor's behavior and role in maximization of output is a thought in contributing these two theories and their implications.

Thirdly, this dissertation explored the evolutionary root of participation and PB in the local government of Bangladesh and connects with the present implementation status, which has given a total picture on the PB of Bangladesh. This part was explicitly missing in current literature. The issues have been bridged with the theoretical discussion and literature in establishing contextual

ground, which has provided a framework of PB process connecting the individual actor and their contributions towards effective engagement. Such similar prior comprehensive framework was not introduced to address PB issues holistically.

Fourthly, this study discusses PB outcomes, the results of the behavior of individual actors and demonstrates that local political leadership, such as elected representative's behavior is key for sustainable development of PB. While PB is distinct as the top-down approach introduces, facilitates, implements and promotes by local government leaders blending with bottom-up decision-making processes participating by citizens through deliberative practices.

7.4 Limitations and Further Research

This study faces several limitations during its entire life. Firstly, there are scopes to analyze specific local government's time series data of PB using advanced quantitative techniques to see the trends comparing with the number of participants. But such data neither stored with compilation by the local governments nor structured and made available for research. Further research can solely invest its efforts in one specific local government unit to compile data with the help of officials and analyze accordingly. Additionally, these kinds of data are also useful to compare between two types of local governments and further studies can consider.

Secondly, this study could not analyze performance of PB using input-output method due to data constraints. Further study can do performance analysis with identifying the reasons.

Thirdly, this research focuses on the relationship between the behaviors of actors and the outputs of PB. It cannot reach the discussion of the relationship between the outputs and the outcomes of PB in both of qualitative and quantitative level; those further discussion will be required aftertime.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Survey Questionnaire with Citizens

Analysis of Participatory Budgeting Functions in the Local Government Budget Making Process of Bangladesh

Questionnaire for Survey



Graduate School of Global Governance
Meiji University, Tokyo, Japan

[This questionnaire has been designed in order to collect data for academic research only. Respondent's identity will not be disclosed and the confidentiality of provided information will be strictly maintained. Your sincere cooperation will add countless value to the research.]

Name of UP/Pourashava: _____

Upazila _____ District: _____

1. Gender:
(a) Male (b) Female (c) Others (specify) _____
2. Age:
(a) < 25 (b) 25-40 (c) 41-60 (d) > 60
3. Education:
(a) No Literacy (b) Primary (c) Secondary (d) Higher Secondary
(e) Graduate (f) Post-graduate
4. Occupation:
(a) Farmer (b) Fisherman (c) Labor (d) Teacher (e) NGO
(f) Salaryman (g) Small Business (h) Business (i) Village Doctor
(j) Mechanic (k) Student (l) Housewife m) Others (specify) _____
5. Do you know that participatory budgeting (PB) is mandatory by law in local level (UP/Pourashava) decision-making?
(a) Yes (b) No
6. Have you ever participated in any PB meeting/event of UP/Pourashava?
(a) Yes (b) No

If 'Yes', could you please say the name of the meeting/event?

Name of Meeting/Events	Yes	No
a) Community Meeting		
b) Ward Meeting		
c) Union/Pourashava Level Meeting		
d) Union/Pourashava Council Meeting		
e) Open Budget Session/Hearing		

If 'No', what are the reasons of your non-participation?

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
a) Not informed					
b) Have no interest to participate					
c) My participation has no value					
d) Have no time/busy with own job/work					
e) UP/Pourashava does not ask/invite to participate					
f) Do not allow to speak/ give opinion/ do not listen to citizens					
g) Only formality and limited discussion					
h) They do not need citizens except voting					

7. Do you think that citizens are aware and interested to participate in the PB process?

- (a) Yes (b) No (c) Aware but not interested

If answer is (b) and/ or (c) why citizens are not interested to participate?

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
a) Citizens have less/no capacity to participate					
b) Citizens are ignorant to local government activities					
c) Citizens have less trust on local government					
d) Citizens have less/no access to local government's activities					
e) UP/Pourashava officials does not promote participation in PB					
f) Chairman/Mayor/Members/Councilors do not encourage citizens					
g) Political clash among the citizens					
h) Community leaders are not active to motivate citizens					
i) There are no specific PB activities					
j) PB is formulated but not implemented					
k) Citizens have no direct benefits/incentives					

8. Perception on community bonding (social capital) among the citizens regarding participation in PB.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
a) Citizens are not collectively organized					
b) There are grouping in respect of political and social status					
c) Societal clashes between and among the localities					
d) Poor people are denied by the elites in community-based organizations					

e) Community-based organizations are politically biased					
f) Absent of NGO to aware citizens for claiming their right to participation					
g) UP/Pourashava has no initiative for increasing social capital					

9. Perception about civic capacity and mobilization regarding participation in PB.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
a) Big number of citizens have no literacy					
b) Many citizens have no capacity in general					
c) Citizens have no power to mobilize for claiming their rights					
d) No initiative for capacity building by the UP/Pourashava authority					
e) People want to materialize their individual benefit only					
f) Political affiliation creates division and weakens mobilization					
g) Overall social mobilization is absent					

10. UP/Pourashava's financial capacity for implementing PB effectively.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
a) There are few/no local revenue income					
b) UP/Pourashava is reluctant in collecting tax					
c) Depended to central government budget allocation					
d) Only project-based budget allocation: ADP, LGSP					
e) Not enough to fulfill citizen's demands					
f) Corruption in budget spending					

11. What are the major activities PB contribute/function more?

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
a) Construction/repairing of roads					
b) Construction of culverts/Sanko					
c) Development of water supply (Tube well) and sanitation (Latrine)					
d) Establishment of irrigation canal/drain					
e) Improving garbage collection and management					
f) Installation of lamppost/lighting					
g) Development of playgrounds/park					
h) Development of religious establishments (mosque/mandir/graveyard/eidgah etc.)					
i) Tree plantation					
j) Organizing health camp					
k) Organizing sports/cultural events					
l) Supporting distressed (poor, disable, elderly)					
m) Supporting poor and meritorious students					
n) Safety & security/night guard system					

12. How PB could be more accessible to citizens?

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
a) Citizens should be informed and aware					
b) Relevant capacity building is necessary					
c) There should have partnership with citizen					
d) Citizen's opinions should be given priority					
e) Opened-door policy should be adopted by UP/Pourashava					
f) Participatory mechanisms should be adopted in every decision-making of UP/Pourashava					
g) Community leaders should encourage citizens					
h) Community level participatory activities should be increased					

13. Willingness and commitment of UP/Pourashava

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
a) Officers are not proactive to engage citizens					
b) Restricted-minded/less information dissemination					
c) No specific responsible officer for PB promotion					
d) Chairman/Mayor has no specific commitment for engaging citizens into PB					
e) Members/Councilors have no role in encouraging citizens to participate in PB					

14. Participatory budgeting initiatives/programs

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
a) Few specific PB initiatives					
b) Ward level committees are not active					
c) Ward level project prioritization is not done properly					
d) No sharing at UP/Pourashava level except open budget session					

15. Legal aspects, institutional strength, decentralized authority and capacity

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
a) Legal provisions are substantive for implementing PB					
b) Institutionally UP/Pourashava is not very powerful/strong					
c) Legally autonomous but functionally dependent to government authorities					
d) Lack in capacity of both officials and elected representatives					

16. Stakeholders' role

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
a) Stakeholders such as local government, CBO/NGO & citizens roles are not well-defined					
b) No partnership with CBO/NGO					
c) Manipulation by UP/Pourashava					
d) Politically-biased & elite participants dominate					

17. What is your overall opinion regarding the effectiveness of PB?

- (a) Effective
(b) Moderately effective
(c) Not effective

(Thank you for your kind cooperation)

Name of Surveyor: _____

Date: _____

Appendix 2: Consent Form for Survey Participants



Graduate School of Global Governance
Meiji University, Tokyo, Japan

Consent Form

-
- I have understood the purpose of this survey and I am agreed to participate voluntarily.
 - I have understood that my personal information will be kept confidential and will not be disclosed in any circumstances.
 - I have understood that this research procedure may not benefit me directly.
 - The provided opinions are solely mine and I have given opportunity to ask questions.
 - I was not bound or pressurized to opine against my own views.
-

Signature: _____

Date: _____

Name of Surveyor: _____

Date: _____

Appendix 3: Questions for Key Informants Interviews

1. What is the overall situation of PB implementation at the local government UP and Pourashava of Bangladesh?
2. What is about the political commitment of local government leaders and willingness about engagement of citizens into the PB process?
 - 2.1. What kind of initiatives they should take for engaging citizens effectively?
 - 2.2. How far their administrative and financial authority allow them to make decision of PB and implement from the practical point of view?
 - 2.3. What is your opinion about their attitude and behavior in engaging citizens overall?
 - 2.4. How far they have autonomous authority in making decisions and implement?
3. What is your opinion about the capacity of UP and Pourashava officials? How far they are proactive in implementing PB process, activating citizens and communities including different committees (ward committee, standing committee etc.)?
 - 3.1. How far they are cooperative to UP/Pourashava council (Chairman/Mayor, Members/Councilors)?
 - 3.2. How far they are open to citizens in sharing information?
4. What do you think about citizen's response in participating PB process?
 - 4.1. What about their understanding and awareness on PB?
 - 4.2. How far they are interested to participate in a PB process?
 - 4.3. Even if they are interested how far they are capacitated to contribute in PB process?
 - 4.4. Is the community relation (social bonding) good to encourage citizen to participate, to organize and to demand collectively?
 - 4.5. Even if all the above conditions are positive, do they have easy scopes to participate?
5. How the different organizational structures of UP and Pourashava limit the effectiveness of PB?
 - 5.1. What are the differences in social, cultural and economic structures?
 - 5.2. What are the differences in administrative structures?
 - 5.3. What are the differences in local leaderships?
 - 5.4. What is your opinion on the participatory political culture?

Appendix 4: Interview Questionnaire with Elected Representatives and Officials

Interview Questionnaire for Chairmen/Mayors/Members/Councilors



Graduate School of Global Governance
Meiji University, Tokyo, Japan

[This questionnaire has been designed in order to collect data for academic research only. Respondent's identity will not be disclosed and the confidentiality of provided information will be strictly maintained. Your sincere cooperation will add countless value to the research.]

Designation: _____

Name of UP/Pourashava: _____

Upazila _____ District: _____

1. What is your opinion about citizen's awareness and interest to PB?

2. How do you comment about the knowledge and capacity of citizens to contribute in PB?

3. What kind of difficulties/experiences have you faced in dealing with the citizens during implementation of PB?

4. Can you mention the specific activities that have been taken for implementing PB in your local government?

5. What should be the priority area of activities under PB in your local government?

6. What initiatives have been taken by UP/Pourashava for increasing participation of citizens in the PB process?

7. What is your opinion about the financial capacity of your UP/Pourashava for implementing PB effectively?

8. How do you express about capacity UP/Pourashava officials in facilitating and promoting PB?

9. What are the constraints/problems/limitations in terms of capacity, infrastructure facilities, human, administrative and financial resources faced by UP/Pourashava in engaging citizens and in implementing PB program?

10. How PB Could be more accessible to citizens?

11. Do you have more opinions/comments on the overall issues of PB in your UP/Pourashava?

(Thank you for your kind cooperation)

Name of Interviewer: _____

Date: _____