

Characteristics of Terrorism Prevention Measures in Japan -An Integrated Framework of Causation and Opportunity Theories-

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Characteristics of Terrorism Prevention Measures in Japan:

**An Integrated Framework of Causation
and Opportunity Theories¹**

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Abstract

This paper aims to explore the characteristics of Japan's terrorism prevention policies from a holistic perspective. The analysis based on an integrated framework of causation and opportunity theories indicates the following points. (1) The current Japanese government's terrorism prevention policies cover most theoretically necessary measures. In other words, there are no significant deficiencies. (2) Concurrently, there are different levels of emphasis on these policies. Most of Japan's terrorism prevention measures are public safety-related measures, i.e., terrorism prevention measures in a narrow sense. Moreover, there are not many, if any, measures related to national defense. (3) Many public safety-related measures do not directly aim at terrorism prevention but at general crime prevention. (4) The powers given to security agencies for intelligence gathering and investigation are weak compared to those of other Western industrialized countries. (5) These points above may reflect postwar Japan's social and historical circumstances, including public concern about the potential for authorities' abuse of power and human rights violations. The results of this study may provide a holistic perspective on Japan's terrorism prevention measures.

Keywords: counterterrorism, terrorism prevention, Japan

1. Introduction

Are academic theories and frameworks on terrorism instrumental in analyzing counterterrorism policies in Japan? This paper aims to explore the characteristics of Japan's overall terrorism prevention policies from a holistic view.

1.1. Background

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001, counterterrorism measures have progressed globally. However, terrorism prevention measures are diverse, and each country has different policy priorities and characteristics. Although the power of violent Islamic extremists such as the Islamic State and al-Qaeda has declined in recent years, it is unlikely that terrorism threats will disappear entirely. Therefore, research on terrorism prevention measures will continue to be necessary.

There have been many academic studies on counterterrorism in Japan. However, most previous studies have focused on specific issues (e.g., legal issues related to investigative methods). In other words, academic research on terrorism prevention policies in Japan thus far seems highly fragmented. To the best of the author's knowledge, no study examined the characteristics of Japan's overall terrorism prevention policies from a holistic perspective. This paper explores this unclarified issue based on a theoretical framework mentioned in Section 1.3.

i The original manuscript of this article, written in Japanese, was a part of the author's book titled *Terorizumu to wa nanika (Essential of Terrorism)* (Keio University Press, 2020). This article is an English translation of the original manuscript with necessary revisions and is published with the permission of the publishing rights holder.

1.2. Definitions


As for the definition of terrorism, there is currently no consensus in either academic or practical terms. However, three elements are almost commonly included in the significant academic definitions and the statutory definitions of influential countries (Martin, 2019, pp. 7-8; Hoffman, 2017, p. 43; Bakker, 2013, pp. 38-42). The first is to have some “political motive” as an objective. The second aims to “spread fear” to the direct victims and a larger audience to achieve the aforementioned goal. The third is to use “illegal violence” or “threat of violence” for this purpose.

1.3. Approach

This study relies on an integrated framework of causation and opportunity theories, which helps provide a holistic view of overall terrorism prevention measures. As shown in Figure 1, this model analyzes various factors related to terrorism prevention measures from two aspects: (1) factors related to perpetrators of attacks and (2) factors related to opportunities for attacks (including both targets and spaces of attacks). The former is based on the criminological theory of crime causation, while the latter is based on the criminological theory of crime opportunity. The factors related to perpetrators also include both perpetrators’ motives and capabilities.

Measures to prevent terrorist attacks are extensive. They may cover the area of national defense, diplomacy, public safety (including police and criminal justice policies), communi-

Figure 1 An Integrated Framework of Causation and Opportunity Theories Regarding the Mechanisms of Terrorism



* Source: Kobayashi, 2020, p. 93. The original figure was in Japanese. The author did an English translation.

Figure 2 Overview of Terrorism Prevention Measures in Japan — Based on an Integrated Framework of Causation and Opportunity Theories

Policies Related to Perpetrators		
Measures Related to Perpetrators' Capabilities	Measures with Force	- Military attacks [Defense] - Paramilitary attacks [Defense, Public Safety]
	Measures without Force	- Negotiations with Terrorists [Diplomacy, Public Safety] - Creating institutions and mechanisms to limit terrorist activities [Diplomacy, Public Safety, Finance]
Measures Related to Perpetrators' Motives	Measures Related to Social-Level Issues	- External Measures: Assisting in the reconstruction of conflict-affected countries [Diplomacy] - Domestic Measures: Eliminating sources of social grievance and division, including discrimination and inequality [Social Welfare, Employment, Education]
	Measures Related to Individual-Level Issues	- Deterring opportunities for exposure to extremist ideology [Telecommunication, Education] - Strengthening social bonds as a deterrent power [Education, Social Welfare, Employment, Public Safety]

Policies Related to Opportunities	
Hardware Measures	- Urban planning and community development to reduce security risks [Land Construction, Public Safety] - Enhancing security infrastructure for potential target facilities [Public Safety]
Software Measures	- Promoting risk aversion among potential victims [Public Safety] - Releasing information on public safety risks [Public Safety]

* The bracketed words indicate the main policy areas involved.

* Source: Kobayashi, 2020, p. 235. The original figure was in Japanese. The author did an English translation.

cations, finance, social welfare, education, employment, and land construction. Figure 2 depicts these various measures based on the causation and opportunities framework. In Japan, however, “terrorism prevention measures” may often refer only to those related to public safety. In other words, the actions shown in Figure 2 are terrorism prevention measures in a broad sense. In contrast, the measures focused on public safety are terrorism prevention measures in a narrow sense.

1.4. Structure of the Study

The structure of this paper is as follows. The section following the Introduction provides an overview of the Japanese government’s official documents and systems regarding terrorism prevention measures as preliminary knowledge. The third, fourth, and fifth sections analyze Japan’s terrorism prevention measures based on an integrated framework of causation and opportunity theories. Based on the previous discussions, the final concluding section answers the main research question of this paper, “What are the characteristics of Japan’s terrorism prevention measures?”

2. Government Policies and Systems

This section provides an overview of the Japanese government’s policies regarding

terrorism prevention, based mainly on the government's official policy documents.

2.1. Government Comprehensive Policy Documents

The Japanese government does not have a policy document outlining comprehensive terrorism prevention measures in a broad sense. In Japan, "terrorism prevention" often means a part of security policy or crime control, i.e., terrorism prevention measures in a narrow sense.

2.1.1. "Action Plan for the Prevention of Terrorism" (December 2004)

One of the earliest Japanese government policy documents on terrorism prevention measures was the "Action Plan for the Prevention of Terrorism,"² which was decided on December 10, 2004, by the Japanese government's Headquarters for the Promotion of Measures Against Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) and Other Relative Issues and International Terrorism.³

The plan identifies the following six key measures; (1) Measures to stop terrorists at the border; (2) Measures to prevent activities of terrorists; (3) Strict control of material potentially used for terrorist attacks; (4) Measures to suppress terrorist financing; (5) Measures to enhance the security of essential facilities; and (6) Reinforcement of terrorism-related intelligence capacity.

This plan is the first comprehensive policy document on terrorism in postwar Japan. However, its content is limited to the scope of public safety or crime control policies, i.e., terrorism prevention measures in the narrow sense.

2.1.2. Strategy to Make Japan the World's Safest Country (December 2013)

As for a comprehensive policy document on crime control, on December 10, 2013, the government's Ministerial Meeting Concerning Measures Against Crime⁴ decided the "Strategy to make Japan the world's safest country."⁵ Notably, two policy documents preceded the aforementioned strategy. The first was the "Action Plan for Achieving a Crime-Resilient Society"⁶ on December 18, 2003, by the council. The second is the 2008 version of the same Action Plan determined by the same council on December 22, 2008. The 2013 strategy document is, in effect, an update of these predecessor policy documents.

2 The original Japanese title is *Tero no Mizen Bōshi ni Kansuru Kōdō Keikaku*. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/terrorism/action.pdf>

3 The organization is a special task force in the cabinet founded based on the cabinet decision on July 10, 2001. It consists of the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, the head of the organization, and relevant cabinet ministers and other officials.

Prime Minister's Office https://japan.kantei.go.jp/policy/index/sosikihanzai/index_e.html

4 The organization is a special task force in the cabinet that was founded based on the cabinet oral agreement on September 2, 2003. It consists of the Prime Minister, who is the head of the organization, and other all cabinet ministers.

Prime Minister's Office https://japan.kantei.go.jp/policy/index/crime/index_e.html

5 The original Japanese title is *Sekaiichi anzen'na Nihon sōzō senryaku*.

Prime Minister's Office <https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hanzai/kettei/131210/honbun.pdf>

6 The original Japanese title is *Hanzai ni tsuyoi shakai no jitsugen no tame no kōdō keikaku*.

The strategy decided on comprehensive crime control measures in seven major areas.⁷ Those deeply related to terrorism prevention are the second (Counterterrorism and counterintelligence toward the Olympics) and the sixth (Measures to prevent illegal stay in Japan from realizing a safe society where foreigners can coexist).

The second item includes measures directly related to terrorism prevention. (1) Building a society resistant to terrorism to prepare for Tokyo's 2020 Olympic and Paralympic Games; (2) Reinforcement of security and response capabilities for critical facilities such as nuclear power plants; (3) Immigration control and border security; (4) Reinforcement of measures to contain terrorist measures; (5) Reinforcement of intelligence gathering and counterintelligence functions; (6) Combating terrorism threats through international cooperation; (7) Strengthening measures against transnational threats such as weapons of mass destruction; and (8) Coping with North Korea's alleged abduction of Japanese nationals. The sixth item mainly includes measures related to transnational crimes. However, some of them also relate to preventing international terrorism. (1) Immigration control and border security; (2) Measures against illegal stays; and (3) Intelligence gathering and analysis functions.

It is worth noting that the contents of both items are essentially public safety policies, i.e., terrorism prevention measures in the narrow sense described earlier.

2.1.3. Program Outline for the Promotion of Anti-Terrorism Measures for the 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games and Tokyo Paralympic Games (December 2017)

On December 11, 2017, the Japanese government's Headquarters for the Promotion of Measures Against Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) and Other Relative Issues and International Terrorism decided the "Program Outline for the Promotion of Anti-Terrorism Measures for the 2020 Tokyo Olympic Games and Tokyo Paralympic Games."⁸

The program outline consists of seven measures. (1) Enhancement of intelligence gathering, integration, and analysis; (2) Strengthening of immigration control and border security measures; (3) Prevention of terrorism against soft targets; (4) Enhancement of security and counterterrorism capabilities at critical facilities; (5) Promotion of public-private partnerships to combat terrorism; (6) Ensuring the safety of Japanese citizens overseas; and (7) Promotion of international cooperation for counterterrorism.

The contents of the program outline are similar to those of the "Action Plan" and the "Strategy" mentioned above. These are public safety measures or "terrorism prevention measures in the narrow sense."

2.2. The Organization Overseeing the Government's Overall Terrorism Prevention Policies

The government's terrorism prevention measures in a broad sense may cover extensive

7 The seven items are as follows (1) Establishment of the world's most secure cyberspace; (2) Counterterrorism and counter-intelligence preparing for the Olympics; (3) Promotion of recidivism prevention measures to stop repetitive offenses; (4) Measures against organized crime that threatens society; (5) Ensuring safety and security to support a vibrant society; (6) Measures against illegal immigration to create a society where foreign residents can live together peacefully; and (7) Strengthening of the public security infrastructure to make Japan the world's safest country.

8 Prime Minister's Office <https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/sosikihanzai/20171211honbun.pdf>

areas. Accordingly, numerous and diverse administrative organizations within the Japanese government deal with these counter-terrorism-related tasks. However, no organization or post in the Japanese government oversees the entire terrorism prevention policies in a broad sense (Miyasaka, 2018, p. 476). If we look for it, we could only say that the Prime Minister and the Chief Cabinet Secretary, who oversee the entire government functions, are responsible for all terrorism prevention policies.⁹

In the U.S., counterterrorism has consistently been positioned as one of the highest priority policy issues since the September 11 attacks in 2001 (Kobayashi, 2020, pp. 10–12). However, even the U.S. government does not have an organization or post that oversees the overall terrorism prevention policies in a broad sense. This situation highlights the diverse nature of terrorism prevention policies and the difficulty in coordinating and integrating them.¹⁰

3. Policies Related to Perpetrators of Attacks (1):

Countermeasures Toward Perpetrators' Capabilities

Sections 3 through 5 analyze and overview various terrorism prevention measures in Japan based on “an integrated framework of causation and opportunity theories” mentioned earlier.

3.1. Measures with Force

The U.S. government has conducted widespread armed attacks against foreign terrorist organizations in the Middle East, Africa, South Asia, and elsewhere, including military operations in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2021.

In contrast, the Japanese government is subject to strict constitutional restrictions on its direct involvement in overseas military activities. For instance, Japan's Self-Defense Forces engaged in logistical support activities, including replenishment, for military vessels of various countries involved in counterterrorism operations in the Indian Ocean from November 2001 to January 2010. To ensure that these activities were constitutionally permissible, the Japanese Diet should enact the former Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (2001) and the Supply Support Special Measures Law (2008).¹¹

9 In April 1998, the Japanese government created the position of Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management, based on the experiences gained from the Sarin gas attack on the subway in March 1995 and the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. However, this post is mainly responsible for overseeing the initial response measures in the event of an emergency (including terrorist attacks) and not for terrorism prevention policies in a broad sense (Kobayashi, 2020, p. 299).

10 In September 2001, immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. government created the post of Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. The position was later changed to Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism. However, it is difficult to believe that this post effectively oversees the entire terrorism prevention policies in a broad sense, given the actual power relationships among the senior positions, including the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Kobayashi, 2020, pp. 299–300).

11 Ministry of Defense https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/kokusai_heiwa/terotoku/index.html

3.2. Measures without Force

3.2.1. Negotiations with Terrorists

Historically, the Japanese government experienced negotiating with terrorists, accepting their demands in exchange for the hostages' release. When the Japanese Red Army (JRA) took over the U.S. Consulate and the Swedish Embassy in Kuala Lumpur in August 1975 and hijacked a Japan Airlines plane in Dhaka in September 1977, the Japanese government released JRA personnel imprisoned or detained in Japan and paid a ransom to release the hostages.

Accepting the demands of terrorists in negotiations may contribute to the hostages' release and the settlement of the case in the short term. However, it may have a significant negative impact in the long term by triggering similar incidents.

Besides the abovementioned cases, Japanese nationals have often become hostages of terrorists abroad (Kobayashi, 2020, pp. 225-227). For example, a Japanese journalist who had been a long-term captive of a local terrorist organization in Syria was released in October 2018. However, there have been no confirmed cases of ransom by the Japanese government since the two cases mentioned above.

3.2.2. Creating Institutions and Mechanisms to Limit Terrorist Activities

Joining or Creating the Systems for Terrorism Prevention

To limit terrorist capabilities, the Japanese government has participated in various international efforts against arms, dangerous materials, and funds and developed domestic systems.

Examples of such international efforts include the formulation of various treaties such as the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (drafted by the UN General Assembly in April 2005), International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (drafted by the UN General Assembly in December 1997), and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 1997). The Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) works on anti-money laundering measures. Japan also participates in these efforts and has developed the necessary domestic laws and regulations. As of March 2022, Japan has concluded 13 treaties related to terrorism prevention.¹² For example, the recent tightening of identity verification at Japanese financial institutions is related to developing relevant domestic laws and regulations based on recommendations by the FATF.

As an example of such domestic efforts, in April 1995, the Japanese Diet enacted the Sarin Prevention Law. The background for this was the Sarin gas attack on the subway in March of the same year by the Aum Shinrikyo cult. In December 1999, the Diet also enacted the Law for Regulation of Associations. Consequently, Aum Shinrikyo came under the supervision of the Public Security and Intelligence Agency. In April 2005, the Japanese government tightened regulations on the hotel industry and strengthened identification requirements for non-Japanese guests. Furthermore, the Japanese government continues to reinforce restrictions on firearms and knives. While the primary purpose of these regulations is to prevent general crime, they also contribute to terrorism prevention.

12 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/terro/kyoryoku_04.html

Strengthening the Authority and Organization of Security Apparatuses (e.g., Intelligence and Law Enforcement Agencies)

Intelligence and law enforcement agencies are responsible for dealing with specific terrorism cases. Intelligence agencies are primarily responsible for gathering and analyzing information for prevention, while law enforcement agencies investigate individual cases and apprehend suspects.

Law Enforcement Agencies: For law enforcement agencies, advanced investigative techniques such as communications interceptions, disguised identity investigations (undercover operations), and consent systems for prosecution (plea bargaining) are helpful not only for general criminal investigations but also for counterterrorism. However, Japanese law enforcement agencies (including the police) have long had limited authority over these advanced investigative techniques compared to those in developed Western countries. This phenomenon is due to vital public concern about possible abuse of power by investigative agencies. This distrust of authority is one of the characteristics of postwar Japanese society (Kobayashi, 2019, pp. 147–148).

Intelligence Agencies: The Intelligence Community refers to the group of agencies involved in intelligence functions within the government. The Japanese Intelligence Community consists of four leading agencies: The Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office of the Cabinet Secretariat, the National Police Agency, the Public Security Intelligence Agency of the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Defense.

The main characteristics of the Japanese intelligence community compared to the intelligence communities of other Western industrialized countries are as follows. First, the scale of its organization and activities is small. Second, the authority to collect information is weak. Third, the authority granted to the community's governing body (Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office) to coordinate and integrate the community is weak. Fourth, the democratic control function is inadequate. In particular, from the perspective of counterterrorism, the lack of a foreign human intelligence agency equivalent to the Central Intelligence Agency in the United States and the lack of a dedicated domestic intelligence organization equivalent to MI5 in the United Kingdom are challenges (Kobayashi, 2021, pp. 121–123).

The Japanese government has been strengthening its intelligence function since the mid-2000s. The first reason behind this is the growing momentum to support counterterrorism measures globally after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Second, since the late 1990s, the Japanese government has become more concerned about national security in the face of instability in the region, including North Korea's nuclear and missile development programs and territorial disputes with neighboring countries.¹³ Examples of recent enhancements to the intelligence function by the Japanese government are as follows; (1) Enhancing the analytical process by creating the Cabinet Intelligence Analyst System (April 2008); (2) Strengthening the counterintelligence function through the enactment of the so-called National Secrets Protection Law (December 2013); and (3) Strengthening the terrorism intelligence gathering function

13 In February 2008, the Japanese government issued an official policy document titled "Kantei ni okeru jōhō kinō no kyōka no hōshin (Policy for Strengthening Intelligence Functions in the Prime Minister's Office)."

Prime Minister's Office <https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/zyouhou/080214kettei.pdf>

through the creation of the Counterterrorism Unit of Japan (CTUJ) (December 2015).¹⁴

No doubt strengthening the authority and structure of security agencies contributes to counterterrorism. However, public opinion is also concerned about these trends in balancing security and human rights and freedoms. For example, in December 2013, the Japanese Diet enacted a new law protecting state secrets. There were active opposition demonstrations and other activities in various parts of the country during the legislative process. As noted above, this background may be due to public distrust of authority, one of the characteristics of postwar Japanese society (Samuels, 2019, p. 80 & p. 241; Kaneko, 2008, p. 3; Kaneko, 2011, 330–332).

4. Policies Related to Perpetrators of Attacks (2): Countermeasures Toward Perpetrators' Motives

4.1. Measures Related to Social-Level Issues

Measures related to social-level issues are policies aimed at reducing or eliminating social grievances that may be behind terrorism. In practice, the Japanese government's terrorism prevention measures (in a narrow sense) usually do not include these measures related to social-level issues. Instead, these measures are generally part of foreign and domestic social policies (e.g., welfare, education, and employment).

4.1.1. External Measures

External measures in this category include reconstruction assistance to countries and regions that provide terrorist hotbeds. Generally, these are places devastated by war, internal conflict, or other conflicts.

For example, from December 2003 to February 2009, the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) engaged in humanitarian and reconstruction assistance activities in Iraq, Kuwait, and other countries, including medical treatment, water supply, restoration, and maintenance of public facilities, and transportation of related supplies. As a legal basis for these activities, the Japanese Diet enacted a special law entitled "Act on Special Measures concerning Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq" in 2003.¹⁵

In addition, some UN Peacekeeping Operations in which the Japanese SDF has participated have contributed to the prevention of terrorism. For example, Japan's SDF participated in the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights from February 1996 to January 2013.¹⁶

14 In October 2018, a Japanese journalist who had been a long-term captive of a local terrorist organization in Syria was released. On the 24th of the same month, then Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga stated at a regular press conference that the release of the journalist was the achievement of CTUJ's activities.

Prime Minister's Office https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/tyoukanpress/201810/24_a.html

15 The Ministry of Defense https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/kokusai_heimwa/terotoku/iraq/index.html

16 The Ministry of Defense https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11637018/www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/kokusai_heimwa/pko/1992_2000.html; The Ministry of Foreign Affairs <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/index.html>

Through Official Development Assistance (ODA) arranged by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Japanese government also assists developing countries in improving their counterterrorism capabilities.¹⁷

4.1.2. Domestic Measures

The Japanese government has various domestic policies to eliminate discrimination and societal divisions. These measures do not directly aim at preventing terrorism. The government policy documents on terrorism prevention measures (*See 2.1) barely mention such policies. However, past examples in Western countries show that social discrimination and division may have given rise to extremist ideologies and, ultimately, to terrorism. Therefore, these measures can also indirectly contribute to terrorism prevention.

For example, the Japanese government engages in various measures for building an intercultural society with a growing foreign population. With the revision of the Immigration Control Act in December 2018, Japan expects to accept foreign human resources on an unprecedented scale in the future (although the speed of policy implementation will depend on the status of the COVID-19). Accordingly, on December 25, 2018, the government's ministerial meeting on intercultural society building¹⁸ decided on the "Comprehensive Measures for Accepting and Coexisting with Foreign Residents" (revised on December 12, 2019).¹⁹ The measure includes the following items to support foreign nationals as residents in local communities in Japan. (1) Creating a community comfortable to live in; (2) Improving the living service environment; (3) Achieving smooth communication (e.g., improving Japanese language education); (4) Supporting non-Japanese children; (5) Supporting international students in finding employment; (6) Ensuring proper working conditions; and (7) Promoting participation in social insurance.

Moreover, The Japanese Diet passed the Hate Speech Elimination Law in 2016 to deter human rights violations related to hate speech.²⁰ Some local governments have enacted ordinances to regulate hate speech and impose penalties for violations (e.g., Kawasaki City, Kanagawa Prefecture).

4.2. Measures Related to Individual-Level Issues

4.2.1. Deterring Opportunities for Exposure to Extremist Ideology

On the one hand, in some countries, governments implement regulations against promoting extremist ideology in religious facilities and spreading extremist ideology in online network spaces such as the Internet and social networking services. Some private operators (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube) have explicitly stated that they will remove extremist ideology in their operational guidelines.²¹ On the other hand, the regulation of online network

17 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Japan's International Counter-Terrorism Cooperation" <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/terrorism/cooperation.html>

18 Prime Minister's Office <https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/gaikokujinzai/index.html>

19 Prime Minister's Office https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/gaikokujinzai/kaigi/pdf/taiosaku_kaitei_honbun.pdf

20 The Ministry of Justice, "Hate speech, not tolerated" http://www.moj.go.jp/JINKEN/jinken04_00108.html

21 Twitter, "Terrorism and violent extremism policy," March 2019. <https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/violent-groups>

space is a complex and sensitive issue from balancing security and human rights and freedoms.

In Japan, there are no specific legal restrictions on online content directly to prevent terrorism. For example, no legal system allows the government to remove online content containing radical ideas related to terrorism forcibly. This is due to vital public concern about the danger of human rights violations, including freedom of expression and secrecy of communication. It is one of the characteristics of postwar Japanese society.

However, noteworthy, if some online content constitutes illegal activities — such as business obstruction, threats, and defamation) — it may be subject to criminal penalties. For instance, the Act on Establishment of Enhanced Environment for Youth's Safe and Secure Internet Use, enacted in 2008, aims to promote the proper growth of youth by establishing a filtering system for “harmful information to youth.” Online content related to terrorism or extremist ideology — interpreted as “harmful information to youth” as defined by the law — may be subject to regulation. The Hate Speech Elimination Law, enacted in 2016, aims to deter human rights violations related to hate speech. If certain online content constitutes related to terrorism or extremist ideology “hate speech” as defined by the law, the Ministry of Justice will request service providers to remove such content.

Although these measures are not directly aimed at preventing terrorism, they help prevent social division and may indirectly contribute to terrorism prevention.

4.2.2. Strengthening Social Bonds as a Deterrent Power

The social bonding theory in criminology states that bonds in society (e.g., local communities, families, schools, and workplaces) prevent deviant behavior of each individual and that strengthening such social bonds in the community deter individual involvement in crime (Kobayashi, 2019, p. 19). In Japan, measures based on this concept do not specifically focus on terrorism prevention but aim to deter overall crime and juvenile delinquency prevention. However, judging from past situations in the U.S. and European countries, these measures may also contribute to terrorism prevention.

As a part of the government's measures, the aforementioned “Action Plan” decided by the government's Ministerial Meeting Concerning Measures Against Crime in December 2003 positions “Deterring Juvenile Crime through Society-wide Efforts” as one of the five priority items.^{22, 23} Implementing these various measures will involve not the police but also a wide range of actors, including schools, educational boards, child guidance centers, probation offices, local communities, and private volunteers.

5. Policies Related to Opportunities for Attacks (Including Targets and Spaces)

Measures focusing on attack opportunities attempt to reduce the crime risk by creating inconvenient situations for potential perpetrators to commit the offense (Kobayashi, 2019, pp.

²² Prime Minister's Office <https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hanzai/kettei/031218keikaku.pdf>

²³ The 2013 Strategy Document (successor to the 2003 Action Plan), the government's current comprehensive crime control strategy (*See 2.1.2), also places these policies among the critical measures of “Promotion of recidivism prevention measures to stop repetitive offenses.”

20-24). In Japan, these measures are not necessarily focused on terrorism prevention but are a part of comprehensive entire crime prevention measures (e.g., so-called “safe and secure urban development” policies).

The government’s example of such measures is the “Revitalization of Community Solidarity and Realization of Safe and Secure Community Development” program. The aforementioned “Action Plan” decided by the government’s Ministerial Meeting Concerning Measures Against Crime in December 2003 positions this program as one of the critical items.^{24, 25}

Among the measures focusing on opportunities, hard measures include promoting roads, parks, parking lots, stores, business establishments, residences, and other facilities that are less prone to crime.

Soft measures include promoting anticrime volunteer activities in local communities, encouraging publicity activities to raise the public’s recognition of crime prevention, and disseminating public crime and community safety information. The deployment of security guards and street security light cameras are also included in these measures. Recent measures to strengthen border security at airports (e.g., the introduction of high-performance facial recognition systems and X-ray scanners) are also included in these measures. The implementation of these measures will involve both public actors, such as the police, and private actors, including local communities, private companies, and non-profit organizations.

These measures are usually aimed at general crime prevention and not directly at terrorism prevention. In practice, however, they can also contribute to terrorism prevention.

6. Conclusion

Based on the analysis, this concluding section strives to answer this study’s research question, “What are the significant characteristics of Japan’s overall terrorism prevention policies from a holistic view?” The analysis based on an integrated framework of causation and opportunity theories indicates the following points.

First, the current Japanese government’s terrorism prevention policies cover most theoretically necessary measures. In other words, there are no significant deficiencies.

Second, among these policies, there are different levels of emphasis. Most of Japan’s terrorism prevention measures are public safety-related measures, i.e., terrorism prevention measures in a narrow sense. On the other hand, there are not many, if any, measures related to national defense.

Third, many public safety-related measures do not directly aim at terrorism prevention but at general crime prevention.

Fourth, the powers given to security agencies for intelligence gathering and investigation are weak compared to those of other Western industrialized countries.

Fifth, the second through fourth points above may reflect postwar Japan’s social and

24 Prime Minister’s Office <https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hanzai/kettei/031218keikaku.pdf>

25 The 2013 Strategy Document (successor to the 2003 Action Plan), the government’s current comprehensive crime control strategy (*See 2.1.2), also places these policies among the critical measures of “promoting measures to combat street crime in public spaces and intrusion crime in residences.”

historical circumstances. Japan's postwar constitution imposes severe restrictions on the activities of the Self-Defense Forces. Public sentiment is strongly concerned about the potential for authorities' abuse of power and human rights violations.

The study's conclusions may not appear to be anything novel. However, this study comprehensively re-examines separate and multiple issues that have been discussed only in a fragmented manner. The significance and novelty of this study may lie in providing a holistic perspective on Japan's terrorism prevention measures.

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